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ABSTRACT

Merchant Seamen, Sailortowns, and the Shaping of U.S. Citizenship, 1843-1945
by
Johnathan Thayer

Advisor: Joshua B. Freeman

This dissertation argues that merchant seamen, because of their inherent
transience, diversity, and the unique nature of their work, occupied a marginal position in
U.S. society, and that that marginalization produced a series of confrontations with
shoreside people, communities, institutions, and the state, most specifically over the
nature and definition of citizenship. This argument is developed through examination of a
series of encounters and negotiations that merchant seamen provoked from the piers,
back alleys, and boardinghouses of the nation’s “sailortowns” from the 1830s through
World War II, including: 1) nineteenth century maritime ministry projects in the Port of
New York that originated during the 1830s, in which merchant seamen and evangelical
reformers confronted each other within Manhattan’s lower wards and engaged in
contestations over sailors’ liberty, mobility, and masculinity; 2) the 1897 U.S. Supreme
Court case Robertson v. Baldwin, in which four merchant seamen argued that their
imprisonment as punishment for breaking contract through desertion constituted a
violation of the Thirteenth Amendment; 3) an analysis of the 1915 Seamen’s Act that
focuses on the outbreak of industrial maritime labor unionism in New York that sparked a
national reckoning with seamen’s rights following the Titanic disaster; 4) a tour of the
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“million dollar home for sailors” at 25 South Street in lower Manhattan, and an analysis
of the ideological and economic motivations behind the war that the Seamen’s Church
Institute waged on the city’s sailortown and its indigenous economies from 1913-1945;
and, 5) an examination of the “alien seamen problem” that became a national political
issue during the 1920s, emerging alongside restrictive and exclusionary immigration
legislation from 1917-1936, and the alien seamen immigration raids that took place in
New York in 1931.
The dissertation concludes by addressing the question of how merchant seamen
responded to the Great Depression through the lens of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936,
which empowered the federal government to impose unprecedented regulation and
control over the U.S. merchant marine and its labor pool. The narrative ends with the
coming of World War II, in which merchant seamen, acting as civilians recruited for
work transporting war cargo through combat zones, suffered a higher casualty rate than
any branch of the armed services and yet were excluded from postwar benefits despite the
extent of their sacrifices.
Merchant seamen, because of their persistent transience, “bluewater masculinity,”
and extreme multiculturalism, have always been perceived as inherently alien, and
therefore have constantly posed challenges to the boundaries of U.S. citizenship. In
response, attempts by both civil society and the state to counter these challenges have
consistently attempted to marginalize and exclude merchant seamen from the full
protections and rights of citizenship. These competing forces anchor an argument for a
history of merchant seamen that locates them at a vanguard position in the history of U.S.
citizenship, lending new perspective to the role that merchant seamen played in U.S.
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history; not just during the “Age of Sail,” to which historians have given ample attention,
but through late nineteenth and twentieth century histories of philanthropy, law, labor,
immigration, and war.
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INTRODUCTION

Since the founding of the nation, merchant seamen have pushed at the boundaries
of the United States, both literally (at its coastlines) and epistemologically (through
established mechanisms of citizenship). As the labor source that fueled a maritime
“commerce wedded to the concept of liberty” in the early republic, merchant seamen
challenged notions of individual freedom, mobility, and masculinity, and asked questions
of both civil society and the nation’s fledgling federal government as to who could claim
protections from the state, to what extent workers could define the nature and terms of
their own labor, and what sociocultural worlds would be considered acceptable under the
moral parameters of a new nation anxious to assert and project certain assertions of its
own identity on the world’s stage.1
Imperial crises of the early republic lent urgency to these questions. Beginning in
the 1790s until the end of the Napoleonic Wars, merchant seamen encountered a British
navy desperate for recruits to man vessels in its long war with France; French privateers
attempting to protect their fragile new republic by policing maritime commerce with
belligerent nations; and Barbary pirates taking advantage of targets sailing under the flag
of a novice entrant onto the high seas of empire. These encounters forced the United States
government to quickly and authoritatively define its own role in protecting its “citizen
sailors” against the threat of impressment, capture, or worse at the hands of foreign nations.
In response, the federal government developed an elaborate system of identity
documentation, setting in motion the development of a modern administrative bureaucracy

1.

Paul A. Gilje, Free Trade and Sailors’ Rights in the War of 1812 (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2013), 98.
1

1

responsible for defining and regulating a system of citizenship paperwork.2 Additionally,
the federal government adopted a rallying cry of “Free Trade and Sailors’ Rights” that
pitted revolutionary ideals of liberty and egalitarian rights against the threat that British
impressment of American sailors posed to the identity and legitimacy of the young
Republic.
With the resolution of the War of 1812 the United States government, and by
extension U.S. merchant seamen, had weathered these significant foreign threats. Anxieties
and contestations regarding “sailors’ rights” turned inwards, to the sailortowns that thrived
in every American port town and city along the nation’s coastline. Threats to American
identity, as defined by an elite and emergent propertied class, came not from foreign
nations, but rather from internal sources of sociocultural discord.
This dissertation proposes to address the inward turn in American urban-maritime
history through a study of sailortowns that locates these coastal urban spaces at the center
of a series of prolonged confrontations over the nature of citizenship for merchant
seamen in the U.S. from 1843 to 1946. Beginning in 1843 along the piers surrounding the
Battery in Manhattan, merchant seamen carved out an enclave of their own, far from the
fashionable rowhouses and respectable lives of Victorian-era New York. Marginalized
socially, culturally, economically, and geographically due to the nature of their transient
work and lifestyles, merchant seamen confronted the City’s bourgeoisie with a shocking
front of bluewater masculinity and multiculturalism within the narrow and winding
cobble-stoned streets of sailortown. In reaction, maritime missionaries launched a
protracted campaign of inverse colonialism, planting ministry outposts and a series of

2

Nathaniel Perl-Rosenthal, Citizen Sailors: Becoming American in the Age of Revolution (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2015), Chapters Seven and Eight.
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“floating chapels” amidst the boardinghouses and grog shops of sailortown’s notorious
streets and alleyways. What motivated and what was at stake in such coastal encounters?
And, how did such encounters attempt to shape concepts and cultures of seamen’s
masculinity, and by extension, their relationship to the state?
In addition to these cultural and social encounters, merchant seamen along the
nation’s coastal borders challenged conceptions of citizenship through legal
confrontations with the state over the nature of their rights to Constitutional protections,
labor regulations, immigration law, economic relief, and the obligations of total war. As
the forces of industrialization reached the American shipping industry, transforming ships
from sail to steam technology in the late nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries,
merchant seamen experienced radical changes to what E.P. Thompson described as the
“total experience” of working class lives, both at sea and ashore. 3 By adopting a “coastal
history” approach, which proposes coastlines as sites of encounters and negotiations
between shoreside and maritime peoples, this dissertation presents narratives of
confrontations originating in sailortowns that were initiated by the impacts of
industrialization on maritime labor markets and working-class lives in the port cities of
New York and San Francisco, and smaller port towns like Astoria, Oregon.4
These modern strategies of what Marcus Rediker calls “creative survival”5
intensified during the shipping slumps of the 1920s and the coming of the Great
Depression, pushing seamen to make demands on the state for relief in exchange for

3

E.P. Thompson, Making of the English Working Class.
Isaac Land, “Tidal Waves: The New Coastal History,” Journal of Social History, Spring 2007, 731-743,
and Robert Lee, “The Seafarers’ Urban World: A Critical Review,” International Journal of Maritime
History, 25(1), June 2013, 23-64
5
Marcus Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates and the AngloAmerican Maritime World, 1700-1750 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987)
4
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heightened federal intervention and regulation of the merchant marine. This compromise
proved especially useful for the state, which cultivated an increasingly militarized
merchant marine as the U.S. prepared for, and eventually entered World War II. Young
men from port cities and far-flung landlocked pastures alike were recruited to federally
operated urban maritime training centers and auxiliary receiving stations where they
waited in “maritime pools” to be called upon by their government to risk their lives at
sea.
This dissertation puts forth an extended argument for a history of merchant
seamen that locates them at a vanguard position in the history of U.S. citizenship. This
argument lends new perspective to the role that merchant seamen played in U.S. history;
not just during the “Age of Sail,” to which historians have given ample attention, but
through late nineteenth and modern twentieth-century histories of philanthropy, law,
labor, immigration, and war. This argument is formulated through a series of encounters
and negotiations that merchant seamen provoked and instigated from within the nation’s
sailortowns, including: Chapter One: an examination of nineteenth century maritime
ministry projects in the Port of New York that originated during the 1830s, in which
merchant seamen and evangelical reformers confronted each other within Manhattan’s
lower wards and engaged in contestations over sailors’ liberty, mobility, and masculinity;
Chapter Two: a full investigation into the 1897 U.S. Supreme Court case Robertson v.
Baldwin, in which four merchant seamen argued that their imprisonment as punishment
for breaking contract through desertion constituted a violation of the Thirteenth
Amendment; Chapter Three: an analysis of the 1915 Seamen’s Act that focuses on the
outbreak of industrial maritime labor unionism in New York that spread from the port

4

cities of Britain and sparked a national reckoning with seamen’s rights following the
Titanic disaster; Chapter Four: tours of the “million dollar home for sailors” at 25 South
Street in lower Manhattan, and the war that the Seamen’s Church Institute waged on
sailortown and its indigenous networks of seamen’s agency from 1913-1945; and,
Chapter Five: an examination of the “alien seamen problem” that became a national
political issue during the 1920s, emerging alongside restrictive and exclusionary
immigration legislation from 1917-1936, with a focus on non-citizen merchant seamen,
entitled by the 1915 Seamen’s Act to shore leave in U.S. ports regardless of their
citizenship status, who took full advantage of their legal rights to mobility in U.S. ports.
These five chapters collectively investigate the changing nature of merchant seamen’s
citizenship, including their rights to mobility and self-determination, as laborers, and as
foreign nationals in transit within the constantly shifting social, cultural, and economic
worlds of the maritime worker.
This dissertation concludes by looking ahead to areas of potential future research,
addressing the question of how merchant seamen responded to the Great Depression
through the lens of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, passed with the purpose of
developing and maintaining a U.S. merchant marine that would be virtually selfsustaining and free from dependency on foreign fleets and labor. The narrative ends with
the coming of World War II, in which merchant seamen express through their own words
and perspectives as civilians who nonetheless suffered a higher casualty rate than any
branch of the armed services during the war, and yet were excluded from postwar
benefits despite the extent of their sacrifices. Such a conclusions reinforces yet again the
essential argument of this project: that merchant seamen have always been inherently

5

alien and have constantly posed challenges to concepts of U.S. citizenship, and that the
proposed solution by both civil society and the state to these characteristics has
consistently been attempted marginalization, subjugation, and exclusion.
Each of the thematic turning points in this narrative will begin in the streets, back
alleys, and boardinghouses of the nation’s sailortowns, with the stories of individual
merchant seamen providing the lens through which this dissertation re-presents larger
narratives of national legal and political developments. Through this approach this
dissertation argues first, that the forces of industrialization that transformed ship
technology simultaneously transformed the working-class lives of merchant seamen,
intensifying class conflict and producing collective networks of dissent and resistance
within the urban borderland spaces of sailortowns, in which sailors fought to maintain
control over their mobility, agency, and rights, thereby provoking a series of prolonged
encounters and negotiations between merchant seamen and shoreside peoples, and by
extension, the state; second, that given their social, cultural, economic, geographic, and
legal marginalization, merchant seamen occupied a vanguard position at the parameters of
U.S. urban, legal, labor, immigration, and wartime history; third, that the constellation of
these histories, embedded in the encounters and negotiations that merchant seamen
provoked along the nation’s coastlines and sailortowns, collectively represents a unique
and essential perspective on the history of U.S. citizenship.

6

CHAPTER ONE

“Sailors’ Boardinghouses and the Inverse Colonialism of Maritime Ministry in the
Port of New York, 1843-1906”

7

Introduction
The origins of maritime ministry in the United States coincided with rapid
national developments in transportation, communication, and mobility. This constellation
of transformative changes hardened class differences and provoked widespread anxieties
over perceived threats to the stability of social, cultural, and economic ideals of the
Victorian-era American upper class. While the nation would remain predominantly rural
through the end of the nineteenth century, the 1820s and 30s saw unprecedented
population migration and the dramatic growth of cities. Manhattan, perhaps more than
any other city in the United States, epitomized these trends. The completion of the Erie
Canal in 1825, and the consequent opening of inland markets made accessible via the
Hudson River and Great Lakes, combined with a deep and welcoming harbor to make
New York a juggernaut of maritime commerce and an epicenter of international trade.
The simultaneous development of larger, faster ships capable of transporting
higher volumes of cargo within industrializing international markets transformed the very
nature of maritime labor, as well. Whereas seafaring markets had previously been
regulated by informal and hyper-local networks centered on the patriarchal authority of
local captains and interpersonal relationships among shoreside communities, maritime
labor within this rapidly expanding system of international capitalism adopted an
increasingly competitive business model that alienated merchant seamen from the
communities that had formerly nurtured young men into sailors. As profits rose and
maritime shipping firms consolidated, voyages became longer, conditions on ships
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became harsher, and turnover through desertion and abandonment became more
frequent.6
Consequently, seafaring communities in port towns became increasingly
contained within ghettoized “sailortowns” at the marginal shorelines of port cities that
were dependent on maritime commerce to fuel their development and expansion.
Merchant seamen, as the human targets of these forces of marginalization, found
themselves increasingly alienated from shoreside communities, and responded by
forming their own dense micro-economies of commercial, cultural, and social exchange
that served the needs and desires of a uniquely transient class of maritime laborers.
Within these micro-economies developed thriving networks of longshoremen, boat
people, cart men, waterfront vendors, merchants, importers/exporters, custom house
agents, saloon and grog shop owners, boardinghouse and brothel keepers, prostitutes,
nautical equipment purveyors, sail makers, cordwainers, coopers, tailors, shellfish
hawkers, thieves, shipyard laborers, harbor dredgers, and of course, merchant seamen.
The racial and ethnic makeup of these individuals, including men who spilled out of ships
from the far corners of the known world, free African Americans, and a hodgepodge of
Jacksonian-era youths drawn from the rural frontiers of the nation to its most-rapidly
developing city, made New York’s sailortown the epitome of nineteenth century
American metropolitanism.
Inevitably, given the clash of cultures inherent in the nature of New York’s
sailortown, evangelical reformers encountered this world with the perception that a new

6

Daniel Vickers, Young Men and the Sea: Yankee Seafarers in the Age of Sail (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 2005). For a perspective on similar developments in Canadian sailortowns, see Judith
Fingard, Jack in Port: Sailortowns of Eastern Canada (University of Toronto Press, 1982).
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form of urban wilderness had rapidly developed beyond the pale of moral and spiritual
propriety. From the perspective of these reformers, sailortown represented an urban
borderland between the civilized geographic space and sociocultural echelons of
Manhattan’s respectable society, on the one hand, and the dark, boisterous, and morally
corrupt cobblestone streets and narrow alleyways of Lower Manhattan’s waterfront
districts on the other. The city’s lower wards came especially to represent an urban
frontier that ostensibly necessitated the same spirit of proselytization that motivated and
mobilized the missionaries of the Benevolent Empire to the fringes of American society,
as well as the far reaches of the non-Christian world.7 Evangelical reformers adopted the
role of colonial missionaries, familiar on distant frontiers inhabited by aboriginals
uninitiated into Christian doctrine. In New York’s sailortown, however, the aboriginals
came to the missionaries from the far reaches of the world via ships, thereby confronting
the arbiters of urban Christian morality with a shocking front of bluewater
multiculturalism and masculinity. Rather than projecting their values abroad as with
typical colonial projects, waterfront missionaries in New York engaged in a form of
inverse colonialism by digging in at home to protect their values from invasion.
This chapter examines the early history of missionary work within New York’s
sailortown, specifically the work of the American Seamen’s Friend Society (ASFS),
headquartered in New York, and the Seamen’s Church Institute (SCI), formerly the
Protestant Episcopal Church Missionary Society for Seamen in the Port of New York.
The ASFS was a leader in maritime ministry throughout the nineteenth century,
establishing ministry outposts in nearly every major port city in the nation. The rhetoric

7

Brad Beavan identified the colonial methodologies of urban reform work in Victorian London in Leisure,
Citizenship and Working-Class Men in Britain, 1850-1945 (Manchester University Press, 2005).
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that ASFS administrators projected in public simultaneously characterized merchant
seamen as developmentally and morally inferior, and at risk for exploitation at the hands
of unscrupulous agents of sailortown. This description created a self-justifying logic that
legitimized the Society’s ministry ideology and pastoral work in the process. SCI’s early
project focused primarily on infiltrating and coopting an exotic parish of extreme
multiculturalism into the folds of temperance and Christian morality. Additionally, SCI
set its sights on sailortown’s boardinghouse economy, which was fueled by a market for
temporary room and board created by sailors’ inherently transient and marginalized
lifestyles. This boardinghouse economy posed an existential threat to the city’s upper and
propertied classes, especially those with property holdings on or near the waterfront,
and/or with interests in the stability and productivity of maritime commerce. Reform,
motivated by the energies of maritime ministry and enacted through the mechanism of
legislation, attempted to staunch the perceived waterfront invasion, coopt merchant
seamen’s exoticness through invasion, and ultimately control and subsume this
boardinghouse economy and the threats to the maritime labor market and respectable
society that its “crimping” culture and extreme multiculturalism cultivated.
At stake in these confrontations was the extent to which merchant seamen were
able to project and maintain “liberty” in the social, cultural, financial, and even spiritual
aspects of their lives. Sailors’ mobility was a characteristic essential to such incarnations
of liberty and was often a central issue in contestations between merchant seamen and
maritime missionaries. These encounters shaped the parameters of merchant seamen’s
relationships to the legal and political systems of the state, and by extension, inchoate
concepts of citizenship.

11

Sailortowns
In their heyday, sailortowns were the object of much fascination and handwringing
for contemporary city-dwellers who reckoned with such marginal, boisterous, and
masculine spaces. Similarly, a small group of historians have found much to analyze in the
study of sailortowns. Stan Hugill, a merchant seaman, shanty-man, and folk historian
initiated the modern historiography of sailortowns from within. His Sailortown, published
in 1967, documents the folk origins of sailortowns in dozens of ports around the world,
showcasing their quirks while also gesturing towards characteristics that seem to be
universal to the experience of the sailor ashore regardless of where he landed.8 Marcus
Rediker found a wellspring of nascent proletariatism and collective working-class
consciousness within the eighteenth century sailortowns of the North Atlantic, in which
the rigidness of the districts’ geo-cultural borders intensified to even more extreme levels
once at sea and under a ship’s hierarchy of authority.9 Jesse Lemisch and Paul Gilje have
argued that sailortowns in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries offered
merchant seamen a “freedom of action” ashore marked by anti-authoritarianism, challenges
to hierarchy, and a shared fraternal spirit that represented a working-class embodiment of
political ideals of liberty that propelled regime change during the Age of Revolutions.10
Daniel Vickers on Salem, Massachusetts, and Judith Fingard on eastern Canadian port
cities both found that industrialization transformed the local economies of sailortowns from

8

Stan Hugill, Sailortown (London: Routledge and K. Paul, 1967).
Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea.
10
Jesse Lemisch, “Jack Tar in the Streets: Merchant Seamen in the Politics of Revolutionary America,”
William and Mary Quarterly 25, (1968), 371-407, and Paul A. Gilje, Liberty on the Waterfront: American
Maritime Culture in the Age of Revolution (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).
9
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informal networks based on familial or otherwise extralegal agreements between captains,
boardinghouse keepers, seamen, and so-called “crimps,” to an increasingly regimented and
exploitative system that operated principally to stabilize the maritime labor pool and ensure
a steady stream of sober and reliable seamen to crew the vessels upon which international
economies depended.11 Further, Fingard argues that municipal governments and the
evangelical waterfront reformers who served as informal auxiliaries to the state, in their
attempts to eradicate threatening elements of sailortown, in reality stripped seamen of much
of the negotiating power that they maintained by nature of the informal networks of
sailortown, resulting in a further disenfranchisement of the very clientele they claimed to
be protecting.
These instances of coastal encounters have been analyzed most recently by Isaac
Land, who, building on Michael Pearson’s writings on “littoral society,”12 has set to define
a “new coastal history” based on his interpretation of the waterfront as embodying an
“intersection of maritime and urban space” that facilitates places of meeting and interaction
among disparate groups, rather than representing a self-contained “world unto itself.”13
David Worthington, in his introduction to the first edited volume dedicated to the sub-field
of coastal history,14 presents a framework of the “confrontational coast” or “corresponding
coast” as lenses through which to investigate the cultural and environmental histories of
adjacent littorals, while Graeme Milne prefers “entanglements” as opposed to “encounters”
or confrontations to describe reciprocal coastal interactions between maritime and
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landlocked peoples.15 This model of coastal hybridization aligns with Valerie Burton’s
argument that merchant seamen embraced their roles as breadwinners in response to the
transformations that steam technology introduced to sailors’ working and shoreside lives.16
More recently, Robert Lee’s efforts to restore Jack Tar from the “debauched image” in
which he has been portrayed counters the stereotype of the drunken, criminal sailor ashore,
resurfacing sailors’ persistent ties to family, kin, and communal networks, re-establishing
links between maritime and shore-based employment, and examining the extent and
significance of welfare and reform efforts in mediating the sailor’s urban world.17
This chapter looks also to historians of urban spaces and philanthropy as a means
to reconnect merchant seamen to their larger urban world. This approach works to correct
oversights not only in the field of maritime history, but also of urban history, which, as
Land has argued “for all its sophisticated debates about the meaning of theatres, towers,
and temples… has offered surprisingly few insights into the forest of masts in the harbor.”18
Sailortowns, like other pockets of urban underworlds, often provided spaces of marginal
labor and mobility for those who were otherwise disenfranchised within the industrializing
city, much like the pickpockets and prostitutes that historian Timothy Gilfoyle explores.
Like Vickers and Fingard’s seamen, who navigated the informal or extralegal networks of
sailortown to secure subsistence and develop community, Gilfoyle’s sex workers and
professional criminals embraced illicit or illegal lifestyles as a response to their own
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marginalization and a means to mobility within an industrializing, economically polarizing
society.19 In addition to mobility, sailortowns provided venues in which working-class men
could perform versions of independence by embracing “true democracy” through a
rejection of bourgeois attachments to property and money, embarking on unrestrained
drinking sprees, and projecting an image of masculinity and fraternalism that historian
Elliot Gorn locates in the culture of nineteenth century bareknuckle prize fighting.20 Urban
elite and middle classes countered these tactics of “creative survival”21 among the poor and
working-class with strategies of surveillance and suppression, placing systems and
technologies of control over the “social geography of light and darkness” of the city, such
as the concurrent development in American cities of municipal lighting grids and modern
police forces that Peter Baldwin documents.22
Sailortowns, at the epicenter of a rising spirit of youthful self-assertion, mobility,
and independence among urban youths, sparked widespread anxieties about the direction
of national morality. For example, Patricia Cline Cohen’s account of the murder of
prostitute Helen Jewett in 1836 at the hands of one among a teeming mass of transient
young bachelors who streamed into New York City as apprentices, sleeping in
boardinghouses and taking full advantage of the throng of commercial and leisure activities
available to them during the peak of Jacksonian urban expansion. The spectacle of Jewett’s
murder, which reached unprecedented heights in press coverage and cultural fascination,
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reflected the fact that a very tender nerve had been struck among the nation’s urban middleclass, who were haunted by the specter of being swallowed up by an invasion of
unsupervised youths who had descended upon the nation’s cities.23
This framework of invasion is particularly useful in considering New York’s
sailortown, which was the coastal landing point for a veritable army of the uncouth, fresh
off voyages from the far reaches of the earth and uninitiated into the genteel urban
society upon which the city’s bourgeoisie claimed their social legitimacy. Within this
contested urban space, Victorian-era reformers, motivated by a “mingling of good
intentions and blinkered prejudices,”24 to borrow Seth Koven’s incisive description of
British reformers, set their sights on the teeming piers and waterfront streets of New
York’s sailortown, ushering in an era of entrenched warfare against the district’s
nefarious elements. There they waged a prolonged campaign against a perceived social
and moral pandemic that threatened to spread inland unless properly co-opted, staunched,
or otherwise eradicated.

Part I: Invasion
Sailors’ boardinghouses were at the epicenter of merchant seamen’s perceived
invasion of New York’s sailortown. Boardinghouses were a ubiquitous aspect of urban
life in the nineteenth century. By 1843, the market for room and board for people on the
move who did not own their own property, or who were in town temporarily was
booming, spurred on by the rapid growth of cities and the development of a wage-
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dependent working-class that was by definition mobile, transient, and fundamentally
unattached to the conventional anchors of the typical home and family life.
Manhattan epitomized these trends. Walt Whitman, writing in 1856, claimed that
“three-quarters of all the adult inhabitants of New York [c]ity… live in boardinghouses.”25 Thomas Butler Gunn, writing in 1857, dedicated an entire volume to the
varieties of boardinghouses that he encountered as a young man while living and working
in New York. The Physiology of New York Boarding-Houses is an inventory of different
types of boardinghouses, including “The Artists’ Boardinghouse,” “The Medical
Students’ Boardinghouse,” “The Boardinghouse Frequented by Bostonians,” “The Irish
Immigrant Boardinghouse,” “The Chinese Boardinghouse,” and “The Boardinghouse
Where There are Marriageable Daughters.”26
Boardinghouses resonated in the nation’s collective imagination because they lent
clear and graphic evidence to perceptions of a rapidly changing society. The decades of
the mid-nineteenth century saw dramatic changes to commerce, agriculture, and the seeds
of an industrializing economy, including the rise of wage labor and the decline of the
local, artisanal trade economy. The latter was especially transformative, as the old system
of apprenticeships declined. The decline of an older, paternalistic model, in which
masters were expected to not only teach their apprentices a trade but also provide room
and board, gave way directly to the rise of boardinghouses. As Wendy Gamber argues,
boardinghouses were the product of a rejection of Victorian sensibilities surrounding the
home, which was valued as an incubator for moral conduct and a supposed refuge from
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market forces. Boardinghouses, by contrast, were creatures of the market itself,
assemblages of artificial communities created without the influence of the social
conventions of family and marriage, instead brought together by the economic relations
of the waged economy. To outsiders and critics of the boardinghouse economy, these
conditions produced an alarming turnover of strangers with nothing other than the market
tying them together. Boardinghouses, therefore, came to be seen as sites ripe for thieves,
illicit sexual conduct, and other behavior considered outside the parameters of acceptable
Victorian norms.27
Merchant seamen were a central point of focus for all of these Victorian anxieties
about developing industrial urban life. Inherently transient, diverse in nationality,
ethnicity, and race, mostly young and unattached, seamen represented the caricature of
young men at risk within the boardinghouse economy. The practice of “advance notes”
paid to seamen who signed on voyages, though much debated over the later decades of
the nineteenth century, generally persisted before then, meaning that many seamen in port
were either signing on voyages in exchange for relatively substantial sums of money
available to them immediately, or were being paid off from a voyage that had recently
ended. Either instance encouraged a culture of “sprees” ashore. Furthermore, seamen
entitlement to shore leave while in port frequently availed themselves of extended periods
of “liberty” ashore in the saloons and brothels of urban sailortowns.
At the heart of the social, cultural, economic, and geographic boundaries of
sailortowns was the sailors’ boardinghouse. Gunn dedicates a chapter to sailors’
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boardinghouses in his Physiology, describing a scene as typically perceived by outsiders
that is worth quoting at length due to its vivid, hyperbolic detail:
“At one end of the room two fiddlers are uniting in the production of harmonic
discord sufficient to drive Ole Bull frantic. A third has succumbed, either to
professional enthusiasm or to the amount of liquor injudiciously bestowed upon
him by his admiring audience, and now lies in a corner, his countenance
decorated after the style of a New Zealand chief by an artistic performance in
burnt cork. His two friends have, also, sympathizingly relieved him of a pocket of
copper coin; it being the custom at the conclusion of each dance to bestow
voluntary contributions on the orchestra.”

“To this accompaniment half a dozen persons of either sex are dancing. The
figure, an abnormal one, is kept up with energy worthy of the Fifth Avenue, when
in full performance of the German. Stamping, capering, jigging to and fro, hands
across and down the middle–such is the order of the night–till the sanded floor
vibrates again, and the glasses on the table tinkly with sympathetic excitement.
The male dancers are all sailors, their partners being coarse, fat, vulgar-looking
young women, whose bloated features indicate confirmed habits of drunkenness.
They have very hoarse voices, wear necklaces and large brass ear-rings, call each
other sisters, and affect bright red or yellow dresses. Three of them reside
constantly in the house, and are important adjuncts to the landlord in the one great
object–pillaging his guests.”28
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Fig. 1: Image from Gunn’s Physiology depicting a typical scene from a sailors’
boardinghouse. (Image: Gunn, The Physiology of New York Boarding-Houses)

This combination of drunkenness, cultural exoticism, theft, and questionable female
companionship proved especially threatening to nineteenth century protectors of moral
respectability.
As Graeme Milne and others have detailed, boardinghouses were often indeed
centers for enterprising crimps and their agents. Keepers frequently dispatched “runners”
to the waterfront as soon as a ship coming into port was visible on the horizon. Runners
would meet sailors, sometimes even rowing out to ships before they reached the piers, in
20

order to entice them to stay at their boardinghouse, often with offers of free or reduced
prices on goods and services. Nefarious keepers were notorious for running up bills,
falsifying accounts, and imposing bewildering debts on their patrons. Seamen caught in
such schemes were forced to sign on for their next voyage and hand over a substantial
amount or all of the advance pay to which they were entitled.29
Milne’s excellent discovery and analysis of sailor James Hall’s boardinghouse bill
accumulated in Tynemouth, England in 1857, offers a rare glimpse into the details of this
practice, as resurfaced in a court case that the seaman brought against a boardinghouse
keeper named Glover. Over the course of a sixteen-day stay, Glover charged Hall for 59
quarts, 48 gills, and 4 glasses of beer; 60 pints, 60 gills, and 18 glasses of rum; 27 ½
glasses of gin; 1 pint and 1 gill of brandy; 15 quarts of ale; 32 glasses of “spirits”; and
80.5 ounces of tobacco; in addition to cash, clothes, and “borrowed money.” In total,
including room and board, seaman Hall had accumulated a debt of 26 pounds sterling.
Considering Hall had been paid 36 pounds for a voyage he had just completed from the
Black Sea, this represented a prohibitively expensive obligation.30
Hall filed suit against Glover, alleging that he had forged his accounts and
overcharged the sailor for items he had never purchased. The inventory would seem to
support Hall’s claim; on December 13th alone, Hall was alleged to have bought 20 pints
and 25 gills of rum, 35 quarts, 26 gills, and 4 glasses of beer; 6 glasses of gin; 22 ounces
of tobacco; 26 bottles of lemonade; and 12 glasses of gingerade. Glover testified in court
as to the accuracy of his accounts, claiming that Hall had been engaged in an extended
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spree of “treating,” that is, purchasing rounds for groups of fellow drinkers, with the
gesture expected to be reciprocated repeatedly as the night progressed. The “treating”
defense was a typical strategy to justify such astounding tabs. In this particular case, the
court ruled in favor of Hall, deducting 20 pounds sterling from the bill.31 It is unlikely,
however, that most seamen in similar situations would be so fortunate, either because
other boardinghouse keepers might be less cavalier about forging accounts, or a less
clever sailor than Hall might not have the resources or experience with the economy of
sailortown to successfully navigate the court system in order to hold his exploiters
accountable.
Due to their position as de facto holding centers for maritime labor pools,
boardinghouse keepers often enjoyed mutually beneficial relationships with ship captains
and recruiters who were constantly seeking men to crew their vessels. In turn,
boardinghouse keepers collected commission fees for their role in supplying crews. In
cases in which a sailor had accumulated debt that was beyond his means to pay out-ofpocket, arrangements were made to transfer any advance pay a sailor was entitled to for
signing on a voyage directly to the keeper in order to settle up. Graeme Milne again has
uncovered an example of this practice involving steward John Isaacs, who found himself
very quickly in $57 of debt during a brief stay in port in Astoria, Oregon between jobs.
Fees against Isaacs’s next advance note included $8 for transport to and from his ship in
port; a $20 recruiter fee for finding Isaacs his next job; a $10 “runner’s fee” for
accompanying him to his next ship; a $15 shipping fee; plus $4 board. All of these
expenses left Isaacs with just $3 of his advance note, the rest of his wages having been
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dispersed among the many middlemen who owned a stake in the economy of Isaacs’s
temporary stay in port.32

Fig. 2: Image from Gunn’s Physiology depicting “land sharks” preying on a sailor.
(Image: Gunn, The Physiology of New York Boarding-Houses)
Sailors’ boardinghouses became the target of such extraordinary regulation,
surveillance, and control for two primary reasons. First, as described earlier in this
chapter, boardinghouses were perceived as central sites in the network of crime, deceit,
and extortion that marked the notorious crimping enterprise. In addition to nefariously
preying on naïve or inexperienced seamen, crimps also had the potential to wreak havoc
on the local maritime economy by distorting the local labor market by withholding the
supply of men and “tying up the whole port” as a negotiating tactic, as they did in New
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York in 1884 when legislation threatened to abolish the distribution of allotments except
to direct members of sailors’ families.33 Boardinghouses were also perceived as a threat
to employers because of their role in corrupting the labor pool with liquor, bad behavior,
and sexually transmitted diseases.
Second, sailors’ boardinghouses housed a population of the city that was
marginalized not only by the nature of their work, but also by their foreignness, extreme
multiculturalism, and their isolation from the conventions of respectable society. A
review of the 1900 U.S. Federal Census records for the licensed boardinghouses listed in
the 1902 report reveals the profound multicultural diversity for which sailors’
boardinghouses provided refuge and cultivation.
Collectively, these snapshots of sailors’ boardinghouses in 1900 represent a litany
of causes for anxiety that seamen and their economy of temporary housing in port
provoked in the city’s upper classes. The 1902 Board of Commissioners report’s
inventory of licensed sailors’ boardinghouses reveals that there were 48 total houses
registered in Manhattan, with many more no doubt operating illegally according to the
law that created the Board. 16 licensed houses, all on Cherry Street, operated on what
would today be less than three city blocks. Marked by extreme geographic density at the
margins of the city’s lower wards, boarders also represented marginal ethnic and racial
groups living in pockets of all-male “artificial communities,”34 removed almost entirely
from the conventions of marriage, family, and other cherished virtues of the Victorian
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home. Further, most of these boarders were newcomers to the U.S., some having arrived
very recently, and therefore unfamiliar with American social and cultural norms.
This data, taken at the turn of the twentieth century, confirms many of the
characteristics that defined sailortowns around the world. Following the quantitative
research of Louise Moon with census data in the British port city of Portsmouth, urban
districts could be identified as sailortowns by their high concentration of youthful,
unmarried, and multi-ethnic males. These populations were accompanied by a
concentration of goods and services catering the maritime marketplace, or what Milne
refers to as “spaces of enticement” and “spaces of dangers” within sailortowns.35 Finally,
according to Moon, sailortowns attracted the focus of reform from the philanthropists and
agents of maritime ministry.36
Sailors’ boardinghouses ranged in type from small endeavors intended to help
support families to large-scale business enterprises. For example, at 109 Cherry Street, a
48-year-old man born in Greece named George Peters and his 35-year-old French wife
Annie took on six boarders to support their 13-year-old daughter and three sons, aged 14years, three-years, and eight-months. The entire family lived in the residence alongside
their boarders and hired cook. Each of the six boarders came from a different country of
origin, including one born in New York, one Russia, one Sweden, one Scotland, one
Denmark, and one Turkey. The boarders ranged in age from 22 to 35, and were all single
men who had spent an average of two years in the U.S. The census lists the occupation
for all six men as “Seamen.”37
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Next door at 111 Cherry Street was a boardinghouse that represented the other
end of the spectrum of the business. Two men, a 60-year-old native New Yorker and a
45-year-old Irishman co-headed the household, suggesting that they were business
partners. A large-scale operation, the partners housed 46 boarders from predominantly
Northern European countries, including 27 men from Sweden. The average age of the
boarders was 31.5-years, yet only one of the 46 boarders was married. Most were recent
entrants to the U.S., and all of them listed “Seamen” as their occupation.
96 Oliver Street was an even larger-scale operation, housing 61 boarders, all of
whom were born in Spain. While it seems that houses with boarders of mixed
nationalities were not uncommon, it was also not uncommon for boarders of the same
background to congregate together under the same roof, whether of the boarders’ own
volition or according to the preferences of certain keepers. All 61 of the Spanish seamen
were single and of an average age of 27.2-years. 28 did not speak English, and on
average the boarders had been in the U.S. for less than five years.
197 South Street was an example of a mixed-methods sailors’ boardinghouse.
Russian proprietor Adolf Smedberg lived on-site with his wife and three daughters, aged
seven, five, and two-years. The family employed a 22-year-old female servant and
housed a bartender and “lunchman.” Smedberg ran a mid-size house, with 14 total
boarders, 13 of whom were Russians (the other being Greek). The average age of the
boarders was higher than usual at 35.6, but all of the men remained single and listed their
occupation as “Seaman.”
Within the marketplace of sailortown, boardinghouses provided space and
mobility for proprietors and boarders from even the most marginalized racial and ethnic
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groups. 89 Roosevelt Street was a black sailors’ boardinghouse owned and operated by
Henry Young, born in Barbados, and his African-American wife Margaret, born in New
York. The couple had been married 21-years as of 1902, and housed 11 boarders, all of
whom were recorded as “B” (black) for their race, and all listed “Sailor” as their
occupation, except for one “Cook,” who also likely worked on ships. The nationality of
the boarders offers insight into the diversity of black seamen at the turn of the twentieth
century: three boarders were from Barbados, one from St. Thomas, one from St. Vincent,
one from the Bahamas, one from France, one from Brazil, and one from Jamaica. All of
the boarders except one were single, with an average age of 29.1 years. Most of the
boarders had been in the U.S. for less than two years.
The census gives us a tantalizing glimpse at 107 Cherry Street, where proprietor J.
Nakamura, 32 years old and from Japan, operated a boardinghouse with a 26-year-old
male cook and 6 boarders, all of whom were Japanese, single, and between the ages of
25-35 years. The boarders were not seamen; five of them listed their occupation as
“Waiter” and one was a student. However, this all-Japanese boardinghouse is especially
interesting because two years after the 1900 Federal U.S. Census, Nakamura registered
his business as a licensed sailors’ boardinghouse with the city’s Board of Commissioners.
Considering that many of his neighbors on Cherry Street were already operating sailors’
boardinghouses in 1900, this was likely a simple business decision for Nakamura, as he
followed the development of a district where seamen of every ethnicity and race could
find a place to stay in port.
Finally, as the census data reveals, sailors often maintained micro-enclaves
defined by race or ethnicity within the larger enclave of sailortown. The presence of
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houses like 96 Oliver Street, in which 61 Spanish seamen mostly in their 20s, unmarried,
and half of whom could not speak English, posed a significant challenge for the agents of
SCI’s maritime ministry project. Certainly, black Caribbean sailors’ boardinghouses like
89 Roosevelt Street, and the Japanese house at 107 Cherry Street challenged prevailing
ideals of white citizenship. In turn, this confrontation sowed the seeds of ideological and
political conflicts that would linger well into the twentieth century. Alienated from
respectable shoreside communities by the nature of their labor, their extreme
multiculturalism, their geographic isolation and consolidation on the margins of the city’s
shoreline, boardinghouses that provided temporary refuge for seamen in the Port of New
York were a logical target for agents of reform and regulation in the city.

Part II: Conversion
Nineteenth century agents of maritime reform were among the first responders to
the perceived threats that New York’s rapidly developing sailortown posed. Consistently,
these reformers took up the “sailors’ home” as a concept that was under threat and in
need of preservation. Through their confrontations with merchant seamen and the
systems and institutions that alternately supported and took advantage of their time
ashore, maritime ministry organizations set precedents for how both civil society and the
state would react to these threats that persisted well into the twentieth century.
Beginning in the 1830s, an onslaught of funding backed philanthropic initiatives
providing services for merchant seamen in the Port of New York. The American
Seamen’s Friend Society (ASFS), founded and organized in New York between 1826 and
1828, had by the late nineteenth-century established a network of sailors’ homes and
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seamen’s missions in most of the major port towns and cities in North America, as well
as certain ports in Europe, Asia, and Africa. In addition to operating a Sailor’s Home at
190 Cherry Street along the East River from 1842 to 1903 that was capable of housing
300 seamen, ASFS also proposed to establish marine temperance societies in every port
city, starting with the Marine Temperance Society of the Port of New-York, founded by
members of the Roosevelt Street Mariners’ Church in 1833.38 Also in 1833, Sailors’ Snug
Harbor opened in Staten Island, funded by a major bequest from Captain Robert Richard
Randall, a wealthy former privateer and merchant who died in 1801. Sailors’ Snug
Harbor provided free lodging and the services of a resident chaplain for seamen who had
sailed under the American flag for at least five years, with operations peaking in the late
nineteenth-century when more than a thousand seamen called Snug Harbor home.39
Meanwhile, in 1843 the Protestant Episcopal Church Missionary Society for Seamen,
later the Seamen’s Church Institute of New York (SCI), converted a ferry boat into a
chapel and moored it permanently along the East River at the foot of Pike Street, where
Rev. Benjamin C. C. Parker held church services that targeted merchant seamen and
other denizens of sailortown. SCI consecrated two more “floating chapels” between 1844
and 1906, in addition to several reading rooms and coffee houses that competed for the
seamen’s patronage amidst the boardinghouses and saloons of lower Manhattan’s
sailortown.40
SCI’s maritime ministry project in the port of New York developed in several
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phases, the first of which was a period in which missionaries embedded themselves
directly within the heart of the city’s sailortown, attempting to infiltrate the district’s
sociocultural networks and indigenous spaces by establishing a series of outposts meant
to serve as alternatives to sailortown’s commercial establishments. This put missionaries
into direct economic competition with saloon owners, boardinghouse and brothel keepers,
and other middlemen who profited from sailors’ time spent ashore. Funded by a
formidable mix of churches and Gilded Age industrial philanthropists, SCI purchased
buildings along the East (1869-1906) and North Rivers (1888-1914) and at Coenties Slip
(1889-1906), establishing “reading rooms” for seamen where religious tracts, nonalcoholic refreshments, and space for spiritual reflection were made available. The
Institute purchased a boardinghouse at 52 Market Street in 1894 and appointed its own
administrator to directly compete with surrounding boardinghouses within which thrived
a litany of illicit activity and from which shipping agents and “runners” could call upon a
quick and ready labor source at a moment’s notice. Religious tent services held directly
on piers, and the appointment of a roving “Missionary-at-Large,” represented further
attempts by the Society to penetrate the indigenous territory of sailortown and impose a
specific moral and spiritual shape on its inhabitants.
Despite the New York roots of ASFS and SCI, both maritime ministry
organizations had significant national reach and impact. By the late nineteenth century,
ASFS had succeeded in consolidating many of the nation’s sailors’ homes and seamen’s
missions. Auxiliary missions from around the country submitted monthly reports to
ASFS administrators, which were published in the Society’s monthly newsletter, the

30

Sailor’s Magazine, boasting a total distribution of 55,000 copies.41 The cultural
construction of merchant seamen as unique, exceptional workers that ASFS projected to
this national audience served a specific function for nineteenth-century maritime
missionaries: because the merchant seaman’s perceived natural moral deficiency and lack
of a sense of responsibility made him especially liable to cruel treatment both at sea and
ashore, he was in need of special protection from those members of a benevolent society
who involved themselves in Christian philanthropic work. This understanding of the
merchant seaman’s character justified the mission of maritime ministry organizations and
gave reformers specific targets toward which to direct their philanthropic energies. The
copious literature produced by ASFS, most of which was distributed to Society
supporters and potential donors, provides thorough documentation of this rationale. In a
speech titled “Christ’s Dominion on the Sea” delivered by Rev. A. J. F. Behrends in
1883, the “modern sailor” is presented as “a very different man” who leads “a life
peculiarly his own, moulded by the sea.” For Behrends, the uniqueness of the seaman’s
life seeps into the physicality of his being: “He wears a dress that marks him, he speaks
the dialect of the ocean, his thoughts are shaped by his peculiar life, and his very features
bear the stamp of his occupation.” Physically marked by his labor, the seaman is
presented as a highly identifiable member of marginalized society, his appearance and
odd manners erecting cultural barriers “between him and his brothers in the land.”42
Elsewhere, in other ASFS Annual Reports, the seaman is described as possessing “coarse
manners” and “rude intelligence,” while he is simultaneously exalted for his “courage
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and generosity,” the product of a shared “simplicity” that is “characteristic of the
sailor.”43 The seaman is “trained to obedience,” frequently carrying orders out “to a
fault,” making him an easy target for those who would take advantage of him.44
Within the logic of maritime reformers, the seaman’s exceptional character led to
his exploitation, which made him an ideal target for ministry. As the authors of ASFS’s
Annual Report from 1897 ask, “unguarded and alone, or surrounded by evil
companionships; mother and wife and children, if he has any, and the blessed restraints of
a decent social life far, far away; has the sailor less need than others of the curb of a holy
religion?”45 Rev. Behrends, in describing the aspects of the seaman’s physical and moral
composition that marginalized him from respectable society, drew a direct line between
the social marginalization of merchant seamen and the possibility for new ministries:
“Thus modern commerce has created a new social class, and opened a new field for
Christian philanthropy… We must have new agencies and ministries for the citizens of
the sea, because the greatly altered conditions and immensely enlarged scope of modern
commerce have created a class unknown in the days of Paul.”46 Voicing a sentiment that
mirrors the historical research of Vickers and Fingard on marginal sailortown
neighborhoods in Salem, Massachusetts and eastern Canada, Behrends identifies the
seaman’s social marginalization as a product of the forces of industrialization, creating “a
new social class” of laborers in need of spiritual guardianship. Thus the rhetoric of ASFS
missionaries created a self-justifying logic that was used to promote the mission of the
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Society, while simultaneously rallying significant support behind the cause of merchant
seamen by bringing the realities of local conditions at sea and along the waterfront under
heightened public scrutiny.
ASFS focused on two potential outlets for reforming the condition of merchant
seamen at sea and in port. The first was a direct appeal to the forces of public opinion.
With an annual distribution total of 55,000 issues of the Sailor’s Magazine, in addition to
their annual reports, pamphlets, and other printed material, ASFS’s audience was sizeable
and capable of significant action if the Society could successfully convince it of the
urgency of the issues at hand. Fully aware of this power, ASFS distributed a barrage of
literature aimed at convincing the public of their duty to aid merchant seamen through the
ASFS in their struggle for fair treatment. One article from 1895 titled “Our Debt to the
Sailor” appeals to its readers’ middle class tastes and consumer habits in identifying the
seaman as a “public benefactor”:
If you will think for a minute upon your table daily you will find something there
for which you are indebted to the mariner. A part of our food, and clothing also,
comes to us from over the sea. In bringing these things to us so cheaply, so
speedily, and so abundantly, the sailor… is a public servant, and as such he
deserves far more than the slight recompense which is grudgingly offered him.47

The sense of individualized debt to merchant seamen that ASFS attempted to impose on
its readers also served as further justification for the seaman’s status as a ward, not just of
the Admiralty courts or of the U.S. federal government, but as a “ward of the church,”
and ultimately a ward of the individual readers themselves, whose middle class consumer
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lifestyles the labor of merchant seamen made possible. The ASFS President’s report as
published in the Annual Report from 1880 elaborates:
Now, if the sailor be a ward, it pre-supposes a guardian. Who then are the sailor’s
guardians? It will not do for us to cast the matter off, and say that the nation is the
guardian of the sailor, or that the law-makers are the guardians of the sailor, or
that the church as a body is the guardian of the sailor. In this matter, individual
responsibility comes down to you, and to me, and to every one of us, as members
of the church of Christ, to feel that we should have his interest at heart; –the
interests of the sailor, who does so much for us; without whom we should be
debarred many of the luxuries we enjoy, without whom our commerce could not
be carried on across the seas.48

Appealing to the shared identity of its audience as consumers, ASFS constructed a
powerful argument for public support of its operations that simultaneously supported the
Society financially while providing resources for services for seamen.
ASFS, with its powerful distributive network and sizeable audience, placed heavy
emphasis on the production of printed material as a tool for enlisting the collective
support of their readership for the cause of reforming the conditions under which
merchant seamen worked and lived. ASFS offered general appeals to the sympathy of the
public based on a shared bourgeois identity, reliance on the labor of merchant seamen,
and a broad Christian morality that transcended specific political or legal debates.
Following this strategy, ASFS presented a second potential outlet for reforming the
condition of merchant seamen based on a belief that religious conversion itself could
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effectively raise merchant seamen out of their plight. Rev. J. Rowell offers a perspective
typical of auxiliary missionaries who populated the nation’s sailortowns:
But, now, what can be done to remedy these dreadful abuses? A great deal
remains to be done by law… But I am not a member of Congress, and shall never
be, so I am forced to try the next best method, which is yet the best mode of all;
viz., to get the men themselves out of reach of this abuse by getting them
converted to God. Assign what reason you may for the fact, but it is a fact that
genuine Christian seamen seldom suffer gross abuse at sea. They often suffer
cruel reviling and slander, but I do not remember a single instance of the kind of
abuse that I have been speaking of having been inflicted on a genuine Christian
man.49

Eschewing legislative politics in favor of religious conversion, Rev. Rowell reinforces
the self-designation of the ASFS at the center of effective reform for merchant seamen.
Despite Rev. Rowell’s apolitical approach to reform, mirrored by the strategy of
ASFS more generally, the Society did participate in the Joint Conference for the
Protection of Seamen, a consortium of maritime ministry organizations formed to provide
legal advocacy for select causes in the name of the improvement of the lives of merchant
seamen. Despite lofty ideals implied by the adopted name of their consortium, the main
concern of the Joint Conference was almost exclusively with the unscrupulous
middlemen of the nation’s sailortowns who ran the establishments, depending on the
business of merchant seamen between voyages or on shore leave. “Crimps” were the
perpetual enemies of waterfront reformers who saw them as purely sinister criminals who
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coercively duped seamen in port, enticing them with food, drink, and female companions
on house credit while keeping an inflated tab of their debts until it was time to pay up in
the form of forfeited advance notes on their next voyage out of port. According to the
perspective of the Joint Conference, seamen who were caught in this system could sail
for years without seeing any of their wages, trapped in a peonage system of contract labor
from which crimps and shipowners profited immensely at the seaman’s expense. Indeed,
crimps and captains often worked in concert with each other: if in port for an extended
period of time, the predatory captain would impose harsher treatment upon his crew so as
to push them to desert and thereby avoid paying the expenses of keeping an idle crew
under contract while laid up. The crimps were more than happy to receive the disaffected
seamen in their establishments, and the captain would be free to rehire a new crew when
he was ready to sail, often at lower wages. If the captain could not motivate his men to
desert, then he might enlist the help of the crimps to do the work for him, luring the crew
away from the ship with the temptations of the waterfront. In his memoirs, SCI
Superintendent and Joint Conference leader Rev. Archibald R. R. Mansfield claims that
this system worked for the benefit of all parties involved, except for the seamen: “[f]or
this turnover, the crimp often received a bonus from the ship, and always paid himself
liberally out of the seamen’s pocket; the master saved the forfeited wages, and is known
sometimes to have shared in the crimp’s profit.”50
Mansfield’s version of the informal side of the waterfront economy is far different
from what has been uncovered by certain maritime historians. Rediker has demonstrated
that merchant seamen long used tactics such as desertion to re-assert control over their

50

Nock, Mansfield, Chapter Thirteen.

36

labor, jumping ship to escape abusive conditions or low wages and signing on elsewhere
in port where better conditions prevailed.51 Fingard takes that argument a step further,
insisting that crimps, rather than acting solely as exploitative forces within sailortowns,
served as facilitators to seamen who desired to desert their vessels, sometimes offering
outlets to legal recourse against abusive captains, or arranging for work on a different
ship in port.52 According to Fingard, crimps became the main targets of maritime
reformers because of the threat they posed to respectable society within port towns,
positioned to destabilize the influence of the temperance movement and a strictly
regulated sexual culture typical of Victorian society. Crimps and deserting seamen also
disrupted the flow of commerce within ports, slowing down shipping schedules and
impacting the profit margins of companies and the availability of an increasingly
consumer-based society. This commercial element was certainly in the minds of the
leaders of the Joint Conference, alongside priority given to seamen’s rights. As described
in the meeting minutes of the Joint Conference, crimps “sought to deprive seamen of
their lawful rights, and to injure the commerce of the port of New York or to delay or
prevent the shipping of crews upon vessels desiring the leave this port… [crimps] gave
menace to the good order and peace of this community.”53
With the stability of maritime commerce and waterfront society at risk, the Joint
Conference set to work on a list of objectives aimed at weakening the crimps’ power in
port. To curb the crimps’ influence on a seaman’s freedom to sign and obligation to fulfill
shipping articles, the Joint Conference sought to build on the achievement of the 1872
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Shipping Commissioner’s Act, which required that a seaman sign shipping articles in the
presence of a commissioner who could attest to his sobriety. By proposing to employ the
services of a “General Agent” in port who would monitor the legitimacy of all contracts,
the Joint Conference could actively intervene by keeping seamen out of the crimps’
system of perpetual debt. Similarly, the Joint Conference sought to put heavy restrictions
on the practice of granting allotment notes or advance payments to seamen who signed
shipping articles, arguing that most of that money would wind up in the hands of the
crimps, rather than the seaman himself or his family back home. Finally, the Joint
Conference called for the establishment of boardinghouse inspectors who would regulate
the keepers of hotels and other establishments that often moonlighted as brothels or grog
shops, notorious places in which seamen parted ways with their hard-earned wages.54
This combination of moral, spiritual, and economic motivations for reform
profoundly shaped SCI’s early timeline of maritime ministry in the Port of New York
from 1843-1906. In 1843, SCI’s first course of action was to purchase a decommissioned
ferry boat, convert it into a stunning floating chapel of typical Gothic design, and moor
the bizarre vessel at the foot of Pike Street in the heart of the city’s sailortown. The
Institute appointed Rev. Benjamin C. C. Parker as the first Chaplain at the Floating
Church of Our Saviour, and his journals offer primary documentary accounts of first
encounters between the intrepid missionary and his transient, cosmopolitan, and profane
parish. Given the multiculturalism and extreme geographic and cultural marginalization
that defined seamen’s working lives, their return to land can be read in anthropological or
ethnographic terms as an inverse model of a colonial project enacted between
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“foreigners” and “indigenous” or “aboriginal” inhabitants.55 Within the model of inverse
colonialism, landlocked residents of sailortown played the role of “colonizers” who
sought to shape and manipulate the “aboriginal” seamen of sailortown according to
prevailing commercial, moral, and gendered motivations.

Fig. 3: The Floating Church of Our Saviour, moored at the foot of Pike Street in
Manhattan in February 1844. (Image: Seamen’s Church Institute of New York and
New Jersey)
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The unique archival traces that document this early history make SCI an
especially fruitful subject to study in order to better understand merchant seamen’s
experiences in New York’s sailortown. Whereas the history of maritime ministry has
been grossly overlooked by historians, reading SCI’s administrative records within these
contexts of records creation and active use reveals a fuller context of confrontations
between merchant seamen and shoreside individuals, communities, and institutions.56 The
anthropologist Ann Stoler has described a methodology for reading colonial archives that
interprets the administrative records group as a process, rather than an objective thing
unto itself, and suggests that such processes offer researchers opportunities to read at the
margins of the official record in search of the voices and agency of colonial subjects.57 In
the case of SCI, reading along the Institute’s archival grain reveals its logic and “common
sense” of the inverse colonial project it imposed upon merchant seamen in the Port of
New York. Whereas historians have attempted to resurface fragments of social or cultural
history of sailors by examining unique aspects of sailors’ speech, clothing, and leisure,
this chapter aims to better understand the motivations behind reform, specifically efforts
to target sailors’ boardinghouses, as a means of establishing a framework within which
these early contestations over the mobility and agency of merchant seamen were waged.
Rev. Benjamin Parker, SCI’s first waterfront missionary, preached for months in a
drafty room above a grog shop on the corner of Pike and South Streets in the heart of
Manhattan’s notorious sailortown before his administrators were able to secure funding
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for an audacious project: the purchase and conversion of a decommissioned ferry boat
into a floating chapel that would host services exclusively for the city’s sailors.
Permanently moored along the East River in February 1844, the Floating Church of Our
Saviour represented the most daring counter-move by the city’s evangelical reformers in
the battle for the soul of the waterfront. By embedding themselves directly in the heart of
the sailor’s social, cultural, and economic world ashore, Parker and his colleagues had
officially declared war on their enemies by setting up camp within the inner-front of
sailortown’s informal networks, launching what would prove an epic campaign fueled by
the righteousness and moral certainty that characterizes all crusades.

Fig. 4: The Rev. Benjamin C. C. Parker, chaplain of the Floating Church of Our
Saviour from 1843-1859. (Image: Seamen’s Church Institute of New York and New
Jersey)
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More than twenty years prior, Parker was working as a common apprentice in
Manhattan when he had a conversion experience at a confectioner’s shop. Already a
literary young man and a devoted reader of “serious” literature, Parker was in the habit of
attending services at Trinity Church every Sunday after spending the week working at his
master’s shop. One Sunday, after hearing the rector’s sermon at Trinity “without the
slightest impression being made upon him,” a nineteen-year-old Parker “rambled through
the streets” of Lower Manhattan, eventually joining a group of young men who had
assembled inside a bakery:
“He [Parker] had taken but a few steps on the floor, before the words crossed his
mind like lightning: ‘What dost thou here? Is this a place for a man just from the
house of God?’ Instantly, he turned and left the store. Reflection crowded on
reflection; conscience, like a scorpion, stung him to the quick. He kept on
walking; the street he was in, like one in Damascus, was straight; and, running
through the city, passed over a long neck of land into the country. On he walked;
and, as he walked, he resolved he would never turn back, until he could bring his
mind to reform and turn to God. The die, at length, was cast; the resolution was
made, and he returned to the city.”58
This retelling of Parker’s conversion experience would have had deep resonance
for his contemporary audience with other tales that positioned the city as a geographic
space of sinful density, and “the country” as a space of purity, clarity, and spiritual
rejuvenation. In Parker’s case, like Paul on the road to Damascus, he strikes an epiphany
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while walking the straight path away from the dense urban scene of the bakery, teeming
with young men much like himself eager to indulge in the temptation of its offerings. On
the road to “the country,” likely only a mile or so north from the urban center, Parker
escapes the commercial trappings of the city and is able to reflect with clarity and
purpose on his own vices, and the spiritual path forward toward redemption.
For Parker, this path would involve a life dedicated to the Episcopal church, and
eventually to a group of urban dwellers who had succumbed to the temptations of the
city’s commercial offerings: seamen. By pivoting on this conversion experience, and
embedding himself within sailortown, Parker would spend the rest of his life seeking to
lead others down that same road towards clear-headed, sober reflection, whether it be
through a signed temperance pledge, willing acceptance of a pocket-sized Christian tract,
or full-fledged spiritual conversion.
Following his own conversion, Parker took up studies for the ministry at Trinity
Church under Dr. T. S. J. Gardner and entered Harvard thereafter, following in the
footsteps of his alumni father and brother. Graduating in 1822, Parker was ordained four
years later at St. Michael’s Church in Bristol, Rhode Island. He would go on to serve
parishes in Gardiner, Maine; Lenox, Massachusetts; and Woodstock, Vermont, before
returning to New York to take over services at St. George’s Church in Flushing.
A second conversion of sorts led Parker to dedicate the rest of his life to the
maritime ministry. While sailing back from Boston, where he had attended the 1841
General Convention of the Episcopal Church, Parker’s ship was waylaid off the coast of
Martha’s Vineyard, along with some fifty other vessels, and diverted to a nearby cove. It
being Sunday, Parker determined to hold religious services on shore. Having asked

43

permission of the adjoining captains to advertise the meeting, Parker was pleasantly
shocked to find some 150 seamen present, so many that he was forced to schedule a
second meeting for that evening.
“It seemed as if the good Providence of God had detained us for the very purpose
of holding this meeting,” he reflected. “The poor sailors wept like children; and at
the close of the service the poor fellows lingered, unwilling to separate from us.
We continued there, notwithstanding the darkness and fog were so thick that I was
more than once apprehensive we might not soon find our vessels. On board, I
found some of our own crew affected. We had reading of the Scriptures every
night in the cabin, with the explanations by me and prayers, which sometimes
lasted an hour and a half.”59

This story, apocryphal or not, is what remains in the written record detailing
Parker’s transition to the maritime ministry. Soon thereafter he was appointed chaplain of
the Floating Church of Our Saviour. For sixteen years, Parker tended to his exotic parish
with services held aboard the floating chapel and recorded his daily experiences in a
series of journals. There, he encountered perhaps the most diverse and multicultural
group of parishioners one could imagine in the mid-nineteenth century. Parker would
become an expert in epistemological reckonings with the unknown, developing tactics
designed to guide men with whom he had virtually nothing in common into the fold of
temperance and the Christian faith. These encounters are well documented in his journals
and often display the arc of first encounter, cooptation, and conversion that can be useful
as a model of the inverse colonial tactics described earlier in this chapter.
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The coastal exoticism that Parker documented was symptomatic of a larger
cultural fascination with distant “others” that took hold within the city at large. This
fascination is evident in Parker’s own journal entries, in which he describes two very
interesting encounters that lend insight to the intellectual framework from which he
conducted his missionary work with sailors along the docks of Pike Street.
First, in an entry from February 6, 1848, Parker reports being invited to meet
Isaac P. Chase, U.S. Consul to the Cape of Good Hope, who had in his custody “Henry,”
a teenaged man who had been taken from Africa by a merchant travelling through South
Africa. The arrival of Henry in the United States gained national attention in newspaper
reporting and appears in several works of historical scholarship.60 According to these
secondary works, Chase exhibited Henry up and down the Eastern seaboard before
eventually leaving him in New York in the custody of the Colored Orphan Asylum.
Parker’s journal entry is brief, but is rich in the type of pseudo-scientific discourse
typical of descriptions involving Western encounters with the exotic unknown. Being
“the only one who was ever brought to America,” Parker remarks that Henry “belongs to
a race who live wild in the woods and subsist on ants and insects, for their food and are
very low in the scale of humanity.” He goes on to measure his height, age, and describe
the color of his skin, the angle of his cheek bones, and the unique texture of his hair.61
Second, in a lengthy journal entry from October 3, 1847, Parker reports on the
visit to a Sunday service at the Floating Church from twenty-seven Chinese sailors who
had been held captive in port for several months. Again, we see Parker encountering the
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exotic unknown. Unlike Henry, however, these foreigners were a part of Parker’s parish:
the merchant seamen of the world. Parker writes that the “China men accordingly came
to Church this afternoon in their native Costume, and excited great interest in the
Congregation.” He then reports taking up a collection of clothing for the seamen and
gifting each of them with an engraving of the Floating Church and copies of the The Life
of John Newton “to take with them to Canton to circulate where it might be their chance
to go in their own country.” The seamen departed church services with “nearly one dozen
red Flannel Shirts.”62
The story of the Chinese seamen is made even more interesting given that they
were being held captive as laborers signed on with the Keying, a vessel with both a
British owner and captain who had duped the seamen into shipping out for Asian ports,
only to redirect the voyage to New York where the ship was moored and opened to public
exhibition in the Battery at the cost of five cents a head. An advocate for the seamen, Lin
King Chew, intervened and helped to file suit against the captain to pay back wages and
to provide the seamen with passage back home to China. The captain and shipowners
eventually gave in to public scrutiny and arranged for the seamen to travel home on the
bark Candace.63 According to a contemporary report in The American Magazine, Rev.
Parker presided over an elaborate service before the Candace left port, with a number of
the City’s prominent religious leaders in attendance:
“It was an impressive reflection, said Rev. Mr. Parker (in a short statement he
made to the congregation, after the benediction,) of the present circumstances of
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the interesting strangers who were then present, and who were to leave our shore
on the morrow, in the ship that lay alongside of the Floating Church, where they
were, for cities under our feet on the other side of the globe, that though they saw
before them persons who excited a deep curiosity, from their peculiar
complexion, mode of dress and physiognomy, that they belonged to a race which,
in numbers, at the present time, equaled one-third of the whole population of the
earth.”64
The article goes on with an elaborate description of the sailors’ sentimental departure:
“The whole rail on the starboard side was lined with the swarthy figures of these
bare-headed Mongolians, shaking their hands in the air, and looking towards the
steamboat. The cups of the crew were flourishing aloft behind them, as they gave
their three cheers, which were answered by the ladies waving their handkerchiefs,
and the response of the gentlemen. When these had ceased, the Chinese sailors
struck up their farewell song, which continued, in their harsh, cracked voices, till
both vessels were so far separated that the sound died on the air.”65

According to census data, the presence of Chinese in New York was not even
recorded until 1860, when the tally was registered at 0, a number that rose to just 12 in
the 1870 census. Even accounting for the inaccuracies of census data, these figures give
evidentiary context to the excitement that the Chinese seamen caused during their stay in
the Port of New York. From Parker’s perspective, these exotic visitors presented a
spectacular opportunity to demonstrate the potential of the SCI missionary project. The
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Chinese seamen, doubly marginalized by their race and profession, were welcomed into
the heart of Parker’s parish, enveloped in the evangelical spirit of the mission, and sent
forth into the wider world with the tools to communicate the word of God across the
ocean and back home to China. This process of embracing the exotic and what might
otherwise be considered threatening elements of foreign interlopers in port, and
attempting to transform that exoticness into a more recognizable, safe, and useful mold
through proselytization is something that Parker and his colleagues at the SCI would
repeat again and again as they developed and carried out their maritime ministry in New
York’s sailortown.
Numerous other, less extreme versions of this methodology appear in Parker’s
journals, including an entry from December 2, 1843 involving a labor dispute that was
threatening to erupt in sailortown. In this entry, Parker describes an incident in which an
“incendiary” handbill was slid underneath the door of the Sailors’ Home early on a
Sunday morning inciting the seamen therein to join an effort to raise wages within the
port. Interpreting the handbill as a potential perversion of the Sabbath, the keeper of the
Sailors’ Home implored upon his sailor residents to forget to handbill temporarily and
instead respect the holiness of that day, saying, according to Parker, that “they had better
put that paper out of the way for that day. It was the Sabbath. No good could come of
agitating such a subject on Sunday. They would benefit themselves more, & raise
themselves more in the estimation of respectable merchants, by going to public worship
on the Sabbath than by talking on or moving in such a subject then.”66
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This is a remarkable attempt to coopt the nascent energies of collective waterfront
labor organization, embodied in a single handbill slipped beneath the door of a sleepy
Sailors’ Home, and an attempt to repackage it as a testament to the positive effects of
Protestant morality, temperance, and Sabbatarianism. The invocation of “respectable
merchants” is particularly telling as evidence of early strains of tamping down efforts at
self-organization among the waterfront laboring population in the interests of cultivating
a controllable, sober, and productive pool of available maritime workers.
Supposedly, the effect of this speech was that 150 sailors from the Home attended
services at Parker’s makeshift church instead of engaging in labor advocacy activities. As
Parker describes it, “Nothing more was seen or heard of the hand bill that day. Not a man
in the whole house out of 210 men was seen at all intoxicated or the worse for liquor, but
[everything] was quiet and orderly as if the whole establishment had been the residence
of a family of professors of religion.” Parker goes on to summarize his version of the
progress made upon the moral condition of seamen in the Port of New York since SCI
had set up operations along the waterfront:
“Who could have thought to look upon such a sight 10 years ago, no seamen,
many just in from long voyages at sea, where they had been confined to the strict
discipline & hard work of the forecastle for many long months, now at liberty on
shore, wholly unrestrained in one house, except by moral influences, & not a man
loud boisterous talkative or in liquor among them. What had produced this
change. [m]ore than half of them1 7 or 8 years ago, without such a house & such
influences as had been made to bear upon them of late, would probably have been
found in brothels or reeling in noise, blasphemy & disgusting bestiality in the
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streets or sleeping away the effects of a debauch on the [sidewalks] in the parts of
the city where they dwell. Here were 210 men all sober, well disposed, with all
their faculties bright & all their senses, uninjured; all their moral feelings open to
good impressions, & this was of that late degraded class whom the community
have so long neglected as out of the reach of moral & religious influences.”67

This pious scene stands in stark contrast to the labor meeting that took place adjacent to
Parker’s church services, at which some 600 seamen gathered at Burling Slip to establish
a meeting place at Croton Hull. Amidst a meandering journal entry, Parker describes the
true business of this meeting: a vote was taken among attendees to demand a raise in
wages from nine dollars a month to fifteen dollars. But even this straightforward agenda
is couched in several paragraphs of incessant preaching over the moral improvement and
sobriety of the seamen present at the meeting:
“Here were 500 sailors on shore all perfectly sober, entering into conventions
against the boarding houses, which have hitherto been their ruin. Voting not to
board any more at any other than a temperance boarding house & to protect their
shipmates from the extortionate spirit and the corrupting and tyrannical influence
of a class of men by whom they have hitherto been wholly controlled & from
whose power they have not had strength before to escape. By one mighty effort
they here broke the toils in which they had for the last 100 years been kept in
Bondage… It has shown that they can triumph over their own evil habits and the
power of their enemies, and that they may hereafter unitedly take a stand in the
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world & individually in society, as a sober, prudent, and intelligent class of men
that they never before have occupied.”68

This idyllic vision for a spiritually contained version of organized maritime labor would
be severely tested over the following decades, but in December of 1843, Rev. Parker had
visions set firmly in sight for a new centralized location upon which such a consolidation
of waterfront Christian morality could be launched:
“Just at this crisis, there is to be presented to them an object for their benefit more
beautiful and agreeable than [anything] they have yet in any port in the world
seen. It is a beautiful Gothic Church, floating on their own element, moored at the
wharf, in which they may worship God in the beautiful &: appropriate services of
the prayer book, which is to be put into the hands of every man who enters the
building, and where they may join audibly in a worship which is deeply
devotional without extravagance, and intellectual &: spiritual and edifying
without formality.”69
By the end of Parker’s tenure at the Floating Church of Our Saviour in 1868, SCI
had succeeded in embedding themselves within the heart of New York’s sailortown and
had developed a powerful methodology for coopting exotic and otherwise potentially
threatening elements of the waterfront into a ministry project that sought to transform
seamen into converts. They were positions also to bring a wayward, marginal district of
the city back into the fold of respectable mainland, bourgeois society. However, SCI’s
missionary methodology was increasingly tested by the strength of position that sailors’
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boardinghouses maintained at the epicenter of sailortown’s economic, social, and cultural
worlds. In order to truly transform sailortown, SCI and its missionaries could no longer
wait for the sailor to come to them. Rather, they had to take the fight to the sailor on his
own turf.

Part III: Control
Reformers were quick to seize upon these spectacular incidents and identified the
sailors’ boardinghouse economy as the epicenter of urban sailortowns and the primary
target of their maritime ministry project. In New York, the city’s boardinghouses served
as microcosmic structures upon which to project Victorian-era anxieties over wayward
unsupervised youths, the pitfalls of urban dealers in vice, and spectacular national news
stories about crime and murder. Merchant seamen epitomized these anxieties by
embodying a caricature of subversiveness: inherently transient, diverse in nationality and
race, mostly young, unattached men who were paid off at the end of their voyages and
prone to “sprees” within the labyrinth of sailortown's back alley brothels and grog shops.
As early as 1866, the New York State Legislature established by law a Board of
Commissioners for Licensing Sailors’ Hotels and Boarding Houses in the Cities of New
York and Brooklyn. The Act, titled “For the better protection of Seamen in the Port and
Harbor of New York,” consisted of one appointed representative from a consortium of
corporate bodies with direct economic or philanthropic interest in the eradication of the
sailors’ boardinghouse economy, including the Chamber of Commerce of the State of
New York, the American Seamen’s Friend Society, the New York Board of
Underwriters, the Marine Society of New York, the Society for Promoting the Gospel
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Among Seamen in the Port of New York, and the Shipowners’ Association of the State of
New York.70 SCI joined this conglomerate of maritime insurers, shipping agents, and
evangelical reformers by the time the original law was amended in 1909. Edmund L.
Baylies, an attorney with offices on Wall Street, served as Counsel for the Board while
simultaneously playing a high-level administrative role on SCI’s Board of Managers.
The specific regulations of the Act represent a point-by-point plan to eradicate
nefarious crimping practices in port, providing further evidence that sailors’
boardinghouses were indeed at the epicenter of the sailortown economy. The Board was
empowered to accept applications for official licenses to operate sailors’ boardinghouses
in New York and Brooklyn, granting them powers to evaluate conditions and the
personnel of applicants, and the ability to reject or revoke licenses from boardinghouses
where rules were not followed. Licenses, in turn, granted boardinghouses and their agents
a monopoly on legal business in port. Agents without licenses were, first and foremost,
not allowed to legally operate a sailors’ boardinghouse at all. Even if a boardinghouse
keeper was able to circumvent this fundamental exclusion, almost every tactic for the
recruitment of seamen and the generation of revenue traditionally at their disposal was
deliberately and specifically restricted. For example, it was declared illegal for unlicensed
boardinghouses to employ runners, to board vessels in port, to “engage in the business of
shipping seamen,” and to solicit boarding or lodging of crew employed on any vessel.
This draconian system was enforced through an application process, which carried a $20
fee payable to the Board, and through the distribution of “badges” to be worn by the
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runners and agents of licensed boardinghouses when engaged in the business of recruiting
seamen.
Additionally, boardinghouses that had been granted licenses were subject to
mechanisms of surveillance intended to discourage establishments from falling into
“disorderly character,” “force, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.” Licensed proprietors
were required to keep a journal and book of accounts that documented all inventory of
charges to guests, as well as provide the Board with a comprehensive list of runners in
their employ, including their full names and addresses. Further, “any attempt to persuade
or entice any of the crew to desert from any vessel in New York” by agents of a licensed
boardinghouse would result in the revocation of a license granted. Finally, to ensure that
these criteria were being consistently satisfied, licensed boardinghouses and their account
books were subject to inspection from the Board at any given time.71
The Board of Commissioners for Licensing Sailors’ Hotels or Boarding Houses in
the Port of New York was required to issue an annual report to the Chamber of
Commerce. The 1902 report72 provides insight into the motivations and strategies for
framing the work being done by the Board to their supporters and allies in the fight
against the sailors’ boardinghouse economy. O. Egerton Schmidt, Commissioner and
President of the Board, wrote the following introduction to the annual inventory of
licensed boardinghouses, in which he depicted himself and the Board as respectable
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leaders of the “mercantile community” whose interest in sailors’ well-being in port
derived entirely from Christian moral obligation:
Shortly after accepting the office of State Board of commissioners for Licensing
Sailors’ Hotels or Boarding Houses in the Port of New York, which your
Honorable body thought proper to intrust [sic] me with, I called your attention to
the gross abuses which sailors arriving at the shipping from this port, were
subjected to, and it seemed to me passing strange that while our mercantile
community boasted of its fair dealings, advocated reciprocity, preached the
Golden Rule and extolled Jack’s brave endurance and his intelligent care of us
landsmen when at sea, we looked upon him generally with distrust when on shore
and left him largely to the deviltries and evil doings of the harpies who constantly
beset him and who fleeced him of his hard earned wages.
The societal and economic standing of the Board’s representatives within the
worlds of finance, commerce, and reform betrays Egerton’s attempt to divorce the its
intentions from any underlying economic interests. Clearly this was a project that was
attempting to rein in and control an aspect of the sailortown economy that was perceived
as disruptive and harmful to the stable flow of maritime commerce. Egerton wrote in
celebration of its successes in virtually eradicating the sailors’ boardinghouse economy
that posed such an urgent threat to the city’s respectable agents of commerce that the
Board’s constituent bodies represented: “The runners who formerly supplied liquors on
board vessels in the harbor are now kept in check and ‘blood money’ exactions from the
“crimps” have been reduced to a very few cases.”
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Other major economic and cultural forces in the city were at work in this effort to
clean up sailortown. SCI, as a member of the Board of Commissioners and leader of their
own maritime ministry project, consistently benefited from and served as adjunct to the
city’s commercial, financial, industrial, and religious wealth. SCI’s donors included highranking members of the city’s clergy, including the Episcopal Bishop of New York and
the sitting rector of Trinity Church, which had been among the Institute’s original
funders. Trinity Church had managed to transform a seventeenth century Royal Charter
that had originally granted the church sole proprietorship over much of lower Manhattan,
into “Church Yard,” a real estate portfolio that stretched from the North (Hudson) River
to Broadway, and from Vesey Street to Christopher Street. As fungible assets, this
portfolio also happened to overlap with some of New York’s most notorious sailortown
districts, including clusters of sailors’ boardinghouses, both unlicensed and licensed.
Throughout the nineteenth century, Trinity Church sold off a significant amount of this
property to buyers that included members of the Skidmore, Van Wyk, and Lockwood
families, in addition to William S. Vanderbilt and William B. Astor. Collectively, this
roster of real estate owners in New York’s sailortown represented a network of investors
in the future of the district’s real estate value that included Trinity Church itself.73
Kathleen McCarthy has documented a timeline of American philanthropic
growth, beginning in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries during which a
nascent network of philanthropic societies developed out of colonial precedents,
motivated by the revolutionary language of individual rights and religious
disestablishment, which placed the church firmly in the realm of private actions. The
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legacy of disestablishment subsequently produced a ministerial profession dependent on
philanthropic fundraising that would structure the nature of American philanthropy
through the birth and expansion of the Benevolent Empire. Following these
developments, philanthropy came to represent a vibrant “third sector” of American
political, social, and economic life dependent on the actions of private citizens. Private
philanthropic organizations and actions thus formed a mutually beneficial and codependent relationship with the American state, both serving to subsidize the other in
their respective responsibilities towards citizens and clientele, and in their demands for
funding and stable networks of a hierarchy of leadership and control that was bordered by
class, gender, and race.74
Philanthropists within this “third sector” of American life engaged in “moral
capitalism” and “nonprofit entrepreneurship,” in which inherent tensions between profitmaking and republicanism were resolved through charitable giving.75 More than any of
SCI’s funders, Morgan embodied these characteristics, especially considering his
relationship to maritime commerce in New York. Morgan was a consistent donor to SCI,
beginning in the 1870s and lasting until his death in 1913. He assumed the position of
Lay Manager and patron at the Institute as early as 1876, a full 26 years before the
incorporation of the International Mercantile Marine Company, a combination of smaller
shipping lines that represented Morgan’s attempt to monopolize the entire maritime
shipping industry.76 Under the Permanent Fund for 1887, Morgan is listed as having
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donated $1,000. Morgan’s father, Junius, is listed as a Life Member in the year of his
death, 1890. J.P. Morgan ceases to be listed as a Lay Manager in 1892, but remains a
Patron. For that same year, Cornelius Vanderbilt, John Jacob Astor, and Alfred Thayer
Mahan are listed as Lay Managers. For 1893, Morgan is listed as donating $150 towards
Special Contributions for Festivals, Sunday School and Entertainments at North River
Station, He is listed as donating $50 for Special Contributions for the Poor, Sewing
School, Thanksgiving, Christmas and Easter Entertainments for Seamen at North River
Station in 1896. In 1897, it is reported that “We have also been the recipients of some
most acceptable legacies,” including $735.27 from Morgan “a devoted friend and
benefactor of our work, who has so often manifested his interest by his liberal support,”
in this instance by selecting the Institute as the benefactor of a fund left in the will of “the
late Hosier Morgan of England, giving the income from $4,470.54 for the relief of the
poor of New York City.”77
Morgan’s largest donations came between the years 1906 and 1912, when SCI
was raising funds for a new headquarters. In 1906, Morgan is the highest listed subscriber
at $25,000 to the “New Seamen’s Institute” building, second only to the Institute itself at
$50,000. Morgan’s figure is matched by John D. Rockefeller, followed by contributions
from Frederick W. Vanderbilt and Andrew Carnegie at $15,000 and $10,000
respectively. For the same year, Morgan donated $100 “for the Poor, Seamen’s
Entertainments, Ice Water Fountain, San Francisco Offering, Bibles, Comfort Bags,
Coffee, etc.”78 In 1913, the annual report commented on Morgan’s death:
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“The Society records with sorrow the death of Mr. J. Pierpont Morgan, at
one time a member of its Board, and ever its loyal friend and supporter. On the
day before Mr. Morgan sailed for Europe on his last trip, he doubled his
contribution to our building fund, and this was probably his last large
benefaction.”79
Morgan’s donation towards the new building ultimately amounted to $100,000, the
largest contribution on record, followed by Rockefeller, Henry C. Frick, Augustus D.
Julliard, Carnegie, and Frederick, William, and Alfred Vanderbilt.
In her biography of Morgan, Jean Strouse depicts a man who found a “noble
calling” in the business of consolidation and trusts, who saw no separation between what
was good for Wall Street and what was good for the United States, and who envisioned
himself as occupying an economic and moral position at the center of such immense
responsibility with competence and shrewd wisdom.80 Morgan’s belief in finance as
public service stemmed from a long list of accomplishments, beginning with his role in
refunding Civil War debts, his role as banker to federal government and “doctor” to
railroads, his steadfast determination to put U.S. back on gold standard in 1870s, and his
safeguarding nation’s railroads and international credit during the 1880s. A comparison
can be drawn between what one might call Morgan’s “republican capitalism” and the
“moral capitalism” that McCarthy ascribes to nineteenth century entrepreneurial
philanthropists who resolved inherent tensions between revenue-seeking and
republicanism by explicitly linking economic ventures to the mission of Protestant moral

1913 Annual Report, 16.1b: Annual Reports, Records of the Seamen’s Church Institute of New York and
New Jersey.
80
Jean Strouse, Morgan: American Financier (New York: Random House, 2014).
79

59

evangelicalism. As Strouse states repeatedly, the distance that Morgan placed between
himself and the socio-economic turmoil of the nation’s first great “Age of Inequality”
was based primarily in his unwavering conviction that there was nothing unsound in his
business practices, and that his life of profit-seeking was ultimately a selfless act to the
greater benefit of the United States writ large.81
Who profited from projects of maritime ministry and reform in sailortown is an
interrogative thread running throughout any investigation of the history of merchant
seamen in port. This is especially true when considering the vigor with which the city’s
elite turned their collective forces to sailors’ boardinghouses, which had clearly come
under intense scrutiny through the formation of the body of the Board of Commissioners.
In addition to the Board, Egerton attributed gains made in reforming sailortown to the
larger work of maritime ministry–specifically, the outposts of SCI–which were meant to
build upon the work of the Institute’s floating chapels and expand their footprint within
New York’s sailortown:
The comfortable reading rooms near the river fronts have increased in attendance
and usefulness, and the new one, at No. 1 State Street, next to the British
Consulate General, and near the United States Shipping Commissioner, with
whom it is in close and friendly touch, needs a visit in order to more intelligently
understand the good that is being accomplished there daily.

Egerton was prescient in positing these outposts as the beginning of a much larger project
in development. As SCI began to expand its operations, the Institute’s Superintendent,
Rev. Mansfield, gave full attention to the fight against sailortown’s boardinghouses:
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“Between the mission house and the church, Pike Street was lined with the fivestory brick tenements and three-[story] frame boarding-houses that made up the
district. These were the citadels of the enemy. When a group of sailors would go
down the street from the mission to the church, they were more often than not
molested, knocked over the head, or hooked into the saloons; or at least they had
rubbish thrown at them.”82

Mansfield and SCI at the turn of the twentieth century were planning for major steps
toward infiltrating sailortown’s boardinghouses. These “citadels” in particular drew the
ire of the young missionary and Superintendent. All along Monroe, Hamilton, and
Market Streets these structures stood mocking Mansfield as he plotted his strategy for
eradicating their proprietors and the nefarious agents, runners, and prostitutes whom he
perceived as thriving behind closed doors. In interviews conducted near the end of his
life, Mansfield reflected on these boarding houses with a contempt that clearly had
simmered for his entire life. He spoke of the Old Ship boardinghouse, which he claimed
was the “most notorious” in the city, and a nearby house with entrances on Monroe and
Hamilton run by Mother Olson, where “the women used to sit at the windows of the
house on summer days, casting ribald and coarse remarks at those who went past. One
day when I was walking by, one of them reached out and knocked my hat off into the
street.”83
SCI’s most direct counter to the boardinghouse keepers was to attempt to beat
them at their own game by setting up a sailors’ boardinghouse funded by the Institute at
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52 Market Street, under the proprietorship of SCI-appointee Henry Smith and his wife.
The idea was to compete directly with the sailor’s more nefarious options while
maintaining supervision and control over operations. This strategy quickly proved to be
no match for the persistent culture of sailortown. Mansfield describes Smith’s wife as a
“poker shark” who “used to get the seamen full of liquor, then play poker with them until
two or three in the morning, and fleece them of every cent they had.” When SCI agents,
including Mansfield himself, would come to check on how the Smiths were conducting
business, an elaborate game of deception broke out so as to reassure their benefactors that
all was well:
“[T]he old lady put on her best clothes, the old man got himself cleaned up, and if
there were any drunken sailors on the premises, they were locked in a room on the
top floor, like a lot of pigs. I once saw this room when there were a number of
sailors in from ‘the home voyage.’ There were fourteen seamen in there, dead
drunk, rolling on the floor in their own swill; an incredibly foul sight. The room
was kept for this one purpose.”84
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Fig. 5: Sailors’ boardinghouse at 52 Market Street, owned and operated by SCI in
1894. (Image: Seamen’s Church Institute of New York and New Jersey)
SCI abandoned 52 Market Street as a failure to control sailortown’s
boardinghouse economy. Meanwhile, the Board of Commissioners and its members
called for a strategy that would coopt the tactics of the crimps and runners and put them
to use against them:
All of this work which I have only touched upon, is now going on, the machinery
is there and running nicely, although we do need a steam launch and the means to
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maintain it, to carry out properly the work in the harbor on the same lines as those
of England and in other ports of this country.85

SCI acquired J. Hooker Hamersley, a mid-size steam-powered passenger-boat, in 1912,
enabling the Institute to employ its own runners and directly enter competition with the
existing sailors’ boardinghouse economy. The Hamersley transported SCI agents into
harbor to meet ships directly as they came into port, enticing seamen to come use
Institute facilities instead of the typical sailors’ boardinghouses to which they were
accustomed.
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Fig. 6: Steam launch J. Hooker Hamersley, acquired by SCI to intercept seamen on
ships coming into port before they were contacted by boardinghouse runners and
crimps. (Image: Seamen’s Church Institute of New York and New Jersey)

Having learned from the failures of 52 Market Street, it was clear that success in
the sailors’ boardinghouse market would require a radical reconfiguration of operations,
one that Mansfield was eager to put into motion. He would do so with support from the
city’s formidable “mercantile community,” the Church, and other members of respectable
society. Egerton ends his missive with a direct appeal for financial support from the
Chamber of Commerce and the public at large:
All that is needed is a little more interest and financial aid on the part of the
community to redeem our City, from its former bad reputation in the care and
treatment of seamen while forced to remain a little while in our port.86

This appeal for assistance made explicit that as SCI expanded its footprint of operations
in New York’s sailortown, the Institute would have the support of the consortium of
corporate bodies that made up the Board of Commissioners. Indeed, those with interests
in maritime commerce in the Port of New York rallied behind SCI by 1905, when it
formed a New Building Committee to raise funds for a 13-story headquarters dedicated to
the welfare of sailors. In reality, the construction of the “million-dollar home for sailors,”
as it became known, was motivated as much by competition with the crimps for control
over of sailortown’s boardinghouse economy as it was about providing safe harbor for
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seamen ashore. Ultimately, SCI’s new headquarters at 25 South Street intensified its
objectives in plotting for the eradication of sailortown altogether.

Conclusion
The contested urban space of New York’s sailortown served as a venue for a
series of confrontations between merchant seamen and shoreside individuals,
communities, and institutions. The origins and acceleration of maritime ministry work in
the Port of New York beginning in the 1830s and continuing throughout the nineteenth
century, was, in part, a reaction to a perceived invasion of merchant seamen who arrived
from the wilderness of the high seas to form the teeming settlement of sailortown at the
margins of the city’s lower wards. At the heart of these confrontations was the existential
threat that merchant seamen’s projected bluewater masculinity and multiculturalism
posed to Victorian sensibilities of moral and spiritual propriety. In response to seamen’s
inherent transience and mobility, enshrined in their right to shore leave and embodied in
the indigenous institution of the sailors’ boardinghouses, maritime reformers launched
projects that involved tactics of maritime ministry work and legislative advocacy. These
projects followed a trajectory enacted in three stages: first, a stage of initial infiltration,
characterized by SCI’s model of inverse colonialism as embodied in the plantation of the
Floating Church of Our Saviour in the heart of sailortown in 1843; second, cooptation
and conversion, in which agents of maritime ministry such as Rev. Benjamin Parker
worked to recruit alien merchant seamen to their services and convert them by delivering
sermons, distributing religious tracts, and soliciting temperance pledges; and third,
regulation and control through the formation of the Board of Commissioners for the
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Regulation of Licensed Sailors’ Boardinghouses, as well as and the passage of legislation
establishing standards for sailors’ boardinghouses that could be used to shut down those
perceived as nefarious or working against the interests of the Board and its members.
Despite the substantial energies and funding that backed these projects to
control them in port, merchant seamen did not submit passively to would-be reformers
and regulators. Instead, merchant seamen consistently found alternative means of
maintaining “liberty” in port. Specifically, the practice of desertion, long a common
means for seamen to break contract and retain agency in abandoning unfavorable
employment conditions, continued to be commonly practiced in sailortowns on both
coasts of the United States, despite its official illegality and the looming punishment of
imprisonment if caught and prosecuted. By the end of the nineteenth century, after
decades of informal practice and inconsistent enforcement of such penalties, merchant
seamen’s assertions of liberty through desertion came into direct conflict with the state
through formal legal attention to the practice. The case of the Arago seamen from 18951897, in which four merchant seamen argued that their imprisonment as punishment for
breaking contract through desertion constituted a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment,
is a case study in confrontations between merchant seamen and the state over the
parameters of their rights to Constitutional protections and, by extension, U.S.
citizenship. Further, it is evidence that the trajectory of staunching invasion, converting,
and controlling merchant seamen adopted by nineteenth century maritime reformers had
direct applications for the U.S. government in dealing with similar confrontations with
merchant seamen. From 1843, when the Floating Church of Our Saviour was consecrated
at the foot of Pike Street, to 1906, when the last floating chapel was officially
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decommissioned, maritime ministry projects in the Port of New York had developed a
potent strategy for negotiating encounters with merchant seamen who challenged
boundaries of moral and spiritual propriety and the stability of maritime commerce. This
strategy would prove useful time and again for both civil society and the state in
confronting merchant seamen over the parameters of U.S. citizenship, as the following
chapters will document.
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CHAPTER TWO

“Merchant Seamen and the Parameters of Involuntary Servitude: The Arago
Deserters and the United States Supreme Court, 1895-1897”

69

Introduction
On July 7th 1895, the merchant barque Arago arrived in port at San Francisco
with four of its crewmembers in irons. Having been sighted by the afternoon crowds
gathered along the shore, the vessel’s erratic path into harbor attracted unusual attention.
Gazing out on the channel, onlookers observed with increasing concern as the Arago
abruptly lowered her sails and veered dangerously along the rocks. A tug was quickly
dispatched and the ship brought safely to shore, having narrowly avoided running
aground. At shortly after five o’clock a police flag was raised in the Arago’s rigging, the
harbor police descended upon the wharf, and four prisoners were extracted from the
ship.1
The case of the Arago would prove to be a landmark in the legal history of
contract labor in the United States. The arrested seamen–John Bradley, Philip Helzen,
Morris Hansen, and Robert Robertson–had signed shipping articles with the Arago for a
voyage scheduled to take them along the Pacific Coast of the U.S. to Valparaiso, Chile,
and back. However, once they reached port in Astoria, Oregon, the seamen jumped ship
and deserted. Holding the men in violation of their shipping articles, Captain Perry
hastily issued warrants and saw that the men were arrested and held in a local jail for
sixteen days before being forcibly returned to the ship and ordered back to work. Once at
sea the men refused, and were placed back in shackles until the ship reached San
Francisco.
Having arrived at San Francisco in chains, the story of the Arago’s imprisoned
seamen spread quickly. The seamen could hardly have expected to find themselves in a
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city more sympathetic to their plight than San Francisco in 1895. Seamen and labor
activists had founded the Coast Seamen’s Union there in 1885, an organization out of
which Andrew Furuseth had emerged as the undisputed leader of the movement for
seamen’s rights, a cause enthusiastically supported by then Mayor of San Francisco
James D. Phelan as well as local congressman James G. Maguire. Operating in 1895 as
the Sailors’ Union of the Pacific, Furuseth and the Sailors’ Union of the Pacific (SUP)
put their considerable influence and energies into helping the Arago seamen, all four of
whom were rank and file members of the union, to make their case before the District
Court of Northern California. Despite the SUP’s assistance, the District Court
unceremoniously rejected the Arago seamen’s suit out of writ of habeas corpus. The case
was then carried on to the heights of the United States Supreme Court, where it was
argued as Robertson v. Baldwin and decided on January 1897.
Ultimately, the majority opinion of the Supreme Court also ruled against the
Arago seamen, siding with U.S. Marshal Barry Baldwin, who had taken the seamen into
custody in Astoria. Specifically, the Court rejected the claim that the seamen’s arrest
constituted a violation of the clause of the Thirteenth Amendment abolishing involuntary
servitude, arguing instead that the merchant seamen constituted a type of worker that
“from time immemorial been treated as exceptional,” and that therefore “shall not be
regarded as within [the Thirteenth Amendment’s] purview.”2 Where did this exceptional
status originate? Why were merchant seamen considered to be outside the purview of the
protections of the Thirteenth Amendment thirty-two years after its passage? What did the
Arago decision mean for larger claims of merchant seamen to the rights and privileges of
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U.S. citizenship, and by extension, the claims of other workers who labored on the
margins of American society in 1897?
The case of the Arago seamen was based entirely on the same status of merchant
seamen as exceptional or otherwise alien social, cultural, and economic interlopers that
made them targets of maritime ministry as documented in Chapter One. Further, the
rhetorical classification of merchant seamen as inherently deficient or irresponsible
members of society that philanthropic groups employed to justify their own projects
throughout the nineteenth century proved useful for agents of U.S. law ranging from local
marshals to the U.S. Supreme Court in justifying the extreme legal marginalization and
exclusion imposed upon this special class of workers. Once again, merchant seamen’s
assertions of liberty were at the source of these confrontations, this time through the
mechanism of desertion, which was simultaneously harnessed by merchant seamen to
maintain control over their conditions of labor and posed a threat to prevailing ideologies
of U.S. political economy and the stability of maritime commerce. In response, the
judicial system adopted the same trajectory of infiltration, cooptation and appropriation,
and regulation and control utilized by nineteenth-century maritime reformers. The initial
arrest and prolonged imprisonment of the Arago seamen represented a direct attack on
the mechanism of desertion that seamen had implemented to protect their own agency
and mobility with the maritime labor market. The Court subsequently attempted to
rhetorically subsume merchant seamen as wards of the state in order to justify the
extraordinary judicial rulings of Constitutional exclusion and legal paternalism that they
delivered against the Arago seamen. Finally, the decision rendered by the Supreme Court
in 1897 against the Arago seamen set legal precedent for the absolute power of masters
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and mates over the physical bodies of their crews, thereby empowering a rash of
employers in industries dependent on other classes of marginalized workers to test the
limits of their newly won powers.

Legal History, Labor History, and Merchant Seamen
As this chapter will demonstrate, Robertson v. Baldwin was a key Supreme Court
rulings on labor law at the turn of the twentieth century. The Arago case served as a
testing ground for the Supreme Court to determine the very nature of contract labor under
the protections of the Thirteenth Amendment, the significance of which was reflected by
the case’s nickname among certain interested parties as the “Second Dred Scott
Decision.”3 In delivering its decision against the Arago seamen, the Court bestowed a
belated definition on the parameters of the Thirteenth Amendment, thereby shaping the
increasingly restrictive nature of American contract labor that developed during the socalled “Lochner Era.” During this timeframe, Court delivered a string of rulings against
workers and in favor of business based on a use of the substantive due process, a concept
guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments that entitles people (a category to
which corporations officially belonged) freedom from governmental deprivation of “life,
liberty, or property” without due process of the law, and that interpreted regulatory laws
as interfering with individual economic liberty and freedom of contract. While the
Lochner Era is considered to have begun with Lochner v. New York in 1905, in which the
Supreme Court invalidated a New York state law that set a maximum number of hours

Andrew Furuseth, “Fugitive Sailor Law / Fugitive Slave Law” (pamphlet), Records of the Seamen’s
Church Institute of New York and New Jersey, Queens College Libraries, Department of Special
Collections and Archives.
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bakers were allowed to work on the basis of freedom of contract, it could logically be
extended backward to January 1897 to include Robertson v. Baldwin as a precedent
setting case that allowed for later decisions ruling against laborers working under
contracts.4
This chapter has three primary objectives. First, it seeks to resurface Robertson v.
Baldwin as a landmark case in the history of American labor. Where the case has been
covered by historians,5 it is given cursory attention as one example among many used to
support a larger thesis external to the specifics of the Arago case itself. Oddly, the case
appears most frequently in legal history as a useful precedent for modern interpretations
of the Second Amendment related to the right to carry a concealed weapon.6 This
tangential treatment of the case misses the essential fact that in Robertson v. Baldwin the
Supreme Court for the first time offered a concrete definition of involuntary servitude
following the Thirteenth Amendment. The following pages take this fact as the case’s
primary significance.
Second, in surveying the existing historiography relevant to the Arago case, this

The “Lochner Era” gets its name from the case Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), but the era is
commonly dated earlier than the Lochner case to Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) decided on
March 1897, more than two months after Robertson v. Baldwin. See: Aviam Soifer, “The Paradox of
Paternalism and Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism: United States Supreme Court, 1888-1921,” Law and
History Review 5, no. 1 (Spring 1987), 249-279.
5
The legal historian Robert J. Steinfeld covers Robertson v. Baldwin most extensively in Coercion,
Contract, and Free Labor in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 270278. Steinfeld situates Robertson v. Baldwin on a timeline of state court interpretations of the Thirteenth
Amendment, arguing that the primary significance of the case is in the precedent it set for future cases
involving coerced contracts that were argued at the state level. The case is briefly covered elsewhere by
Leon Fink, Sweatshops at Sea: Merchant Seamen in the World's First Globalized Industry (Chapel Hill:
The University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 61-62, and by Andrew Furuseth’s biographer Andrew
Weintraub, Andrew Furuseth: Emancipator of the Seamen (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958),
34-36.
6
Such interpretations seize on a passage from the Court’s majority ruling written by Justice Brown: “The
law is perfectly well settled that the first ten Amendments to the constitution . . . [are] subject to certain
well-recognized exceptions arising from the necessities of the case. . . . Thus, the right of the people to keep
and bear arms (article 2) is not infringed by law prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons…”
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chapter seeks to bridge the scholarship of maritime historians with that of legal and labor
scholars who study transitions in ideology regarding American contract labor from
emancipation into the early twentieth century. In so doing, it will become evident that
there is substantial territory shared across seemingly disparate fields, the end-product of
which will be a more comprehensive view of what may appear at first an isolated
incident.
Third, this chapter breaks with maritime historians who have ignored or dismissed
outright the archives of maritime ministry organizations, such as the American Seamen’s
Friend Society and the Seamen’s Church Institute of New York, based on a misguided
view that the patronizing nature of their rhetoric and efforts at reform render them useless
in terms of reconstructing the experiences of the merchant seamen they sought to aid.7 On
the contrary, this chapter argues that analysis of this patronizing rhetoric alongside the
specifics of reform efforts provides an essential insight into the central irony at the heart
of merchant seamen’s paradoxical position within the “free labor” economy of the
postbellum United States. In fact, this paternalistic perception of seamen as deficient
citizens in need of special protection was reflected in the contradictory regulatory policies
of the state, in which seamen were simultaneously offered guardianship while subjected
to extraordinary measures of restriction and control.
William Forbath argues that the pioneering historians of American labor have

Typical of maritime historians’ treatment of maritime ministry organizations is Matthew Taylor Rafferty,
who in The Republic Afloat: Law, Honor, and Citizenship in Maritime America (University of Chicago
Press, 2013) who portrays organizations like the ASFS as capitalizing on public sympathies following the
War of 1812 to fund a ministry that infantilized seamen and was met with hostile resistance from seamen
themselves, who objected to the paternalism of charities. Judith Fingard, in Jack In Port: Sailortowns of
Eastern Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1982) takes Raffety’s portrayal a step further in
arguing that the combined efforts of the state, maritime business, and maritime reformers in Canadian
sailortowns served primarily to regulate merchant seamen’s mobility within waterfront labor markets,
guided primarily by impulses to keep seamen disciplined in order to “serve the needs of capital” (30).
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long been committed to conducting “history from the bottom up” at the expense of a
focus on “the centers of public power and the making and workings of state policy.”
Seeking to remedy this historiographic omission, Forbath offers a study of American
labor’s relationship to U.S. law, which he describes as “Janus-faced”: confining in its
persistent extraction of concessions from laborers at the turn of the twentieth century,
while enabling a forum in which laborers and their allies could assert agency and achieve
moderate reform.8 Following Forbath’s call on labor historians to not ignore the role of
law in considering the history of American laborers, the first section of this chapter
examines in detail the experience of the Arago seamen before the District Court of
Northern California. Drawing on local newspaper accounts, this section traces the
momentum of the case as it made its way to the Supreme Court. Ironically, it is within
court records that merchant seamen often appear in their most primary archival
manifestation. In the absence of personal papers or other primary archival traces, the
courts provided both a forum in which merchant seamen were allowed to voice their
cases, and a system of documentation that ensured that those voices were preserved
within the historical record. The Arago case thus provides insights from the perspectives
of Forbath’s “centers of public power” as well as merchant seamen themselves, often
framed by external reformers and other third-parties who intervened on the seamen’s
behalf.
Materially, the Arago case centered on a deceptively simple legal question: do the
masters of ships have the right to enforce shipping articles by use of penal sanctions? Put
another way: can a seaman be arrested for breaking his contract? Despite such a plainly
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stated premise, by the time the Supreme Court finally issued an opinion on January 25,
1897, it was clear that the case had implications far beyond the immediate fate of the four
seamen who had deserted the Arago in Oregon in 1895. By following the trajectory of
American labor ideology during the years preceding and immediately following the
Arago decision, this chapter argues that Robertson v. Baldwin represented a culminating
point for a narrowed free labor ideology that had been reduced to a simple but
increasingly absolute adherence to freedom of contract by 1897. It became also a starting
point for a period of American labor law history in which an increasingly laissez-faire
economic ideology reduced concepts of freedom to an adamant insistence on individual
property rights, either to be upheld absolutely in the case of corporations and employers,
or enforced individually through the protection of the right to contract out one’s labor
free from interference external to the demands and machinations of the free market. 9
Where exactly the individual laborer fit within this system had been partially resolved by

Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877 (New York: Harper Perennial
Classics, 2002) has demonstrated that this contract-based manifestation of free labor ideology has its roots
in the devolution of Reconstruction. With the South defeated, Northern Republicans perceived in the New
South an opportunity to spread free labor ideology based on the Northern industrial wage system into virgin
territory that had been held back by the slavery system. Out of the transition from slavery to free labor,
Southern planters who had formerly depended on slave labor faced the problem of how to entice labor out
of an emancipated workforce. In order to regain control over freedmen’s labor, planters countered newly
acquired black mobility with restrictive laws and contracts. As Foner describes this transition, the former
master-slave relationship was replaced with contractual agreements, the freedom of which was
compromised by various coercive tactics, including denied access to land ownership, the use of fines or
imprisonment to punish non-compliance, and the threat of violent enforcement from local white
supremacist organizations such as the Klu Klux Klan. With the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment
ostensibly ensuring black civil rights, Northern Republicans increasingly insisted that blacks were
unequivocally equal citizens under U.S. law, and any special ties to the protections of the federal
government should therefore be severed so that blacks could compete fairly in the free market. As Heather
Cox Richardson The Death of Reconstruction: Race, Labor, and Politics in the Post-Civil War North,
1865-1901, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001) argues, Northern Republicans increasingly came
to perceive blacks’ inability to successfully integrate into an abstracted “free” labor market following
emancipation as evidence of their intentional rejection of free labor ideals, a transgression for which blacks
were “willingly read… out of American society” by their former Northern Republican allies. Thus, the
Supreme Court declared the Civil Rights Acts unconstitutional in 1875 and federal troops withdrew from
the South in 1877, leaving Southern state governments to revoke black suffrage and perpetuate a system of
labor based on coercive contracts and privileged access to resources and representation.
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the Thirteenth Amendment, which outlawed slavery and involuntary servitude, but left
the definition of the latter concept unstated. After thirty-two years of labor structured by
coercive contracts enacted on Southern plantations and pockets of Northern industry, the
Arago decision ultimately served as the vehicle through which the Supreme Court finally
put forth a working definition of involuntary servitude that could be used to evaluate the
legality of certain contracts that tested the limits of the Thirteenth Amendment’s
protections. In many ways, the Arago case was the culmination of a transition from
Reconstruction era conceptions of free labor accounting for instances of appropriate
government intervention in labor negotiations, to an increasingly draconian system that
insisted on absolute freedom of contract up to the point of self-enslavement. At the end of
the nineteenth century, this transition produced a dominant economic ideology that had
become adamantly anti-paternalistic, viewing “wards” with increasingly hostile
suspicion, whether they be freedmen, American Indians, or merchant seamen, as
“unnatural” hindrances to the “natural” machinations of free trade.10 Given the trajectory
of that such ideology, the Arago decision would impact directly on the nature of contract
labor in the rural South, industrial North, and as far away as Hawaii, where debates over
annexation hinged on the central question of whether the Arago decision made legal
Hawaii’s existing system of indentured labor. This chapter will attempt to situate the
Arago decision within the legal and labor historiography documenting the nation’s
transition into a postbellum economy based on abstracted conceptions of free labor, and
the transition of that ideology into an American Gilded Age marked by strict adherence to
freedom of contract.
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Merchant seamen were a logical sector of the nineteenth century labor force
through which to bring these issues to high profile attention and debate. Having long
been considered wards, whether of the British admiralty courts or the United States
federal government, merchant seamen were consistently subjected to extraordinary forms
of restriction and control under U.S. law, ostensibly with the justification that seamen
represented morally underdeveloped, irresponsible citizens who required the
guardianship of the government.11 In addition to supposedly affording seamen special
protections under U.S. law, this justification also provided a convenient means of
protection for the commercial interests of shipowners and the growing network of
investors, businessmen, and consumers who depended on a reliably consistent merchant
shipping industry in order to keep the emerging national system of capital flowing.12
The merchant marine had long held a central importance in relation to the health
of American capital, and by extension, the United States’ position on the global political
stage. As a result of its significance, the merchant marine represented an early testing
ground for the young federal judiciary to determine the boundaries and definition of labor
rights and citizenship in the Early Republic. As Matthew Raffety argues, merchant
seamen during the Early Republic were a particularly litigious group of laborers,
frequently bringing grievances against their employers to local courts in port towns.13 In

See: Martin J. Norris, “The Seaman as Ward of the Admiralty,” Michigan Law Review 52, no. 4 (1954).
The legal precedent most frequently cited for this classification of seamen is the Supreme Court case
Harden v. Gordon (1823), in which Justice Story declared: "Seamen are by the peculiarity of their lives
liable to sudden sickness from change of climate, exposure to perils, and exhausting labour. They are
generally poor and friendless and acquire habits of gross indulgence, carelessness and improvidence. . . .
Every court should watch with jealousy an encroachment upon the rights of seamen, because they are
unprotected and need counsel; because they are thoughtless and require indulgence; because they are
credulous and complying; and are easily overreached."
12
See: Fingard, Jack in Port.
13
Raffety, The Republic Afloat.
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addition, Marcus Rediker has documented the extra-legal tactics such as work stoppages,
slow-downs, desertion, mutiny, and piracy that seamen used to re-assert control over their
labor.14 While seamen were at the vanguard of the negotiation of the power dynamics of
an emerging modern wage labor system, they also put pressure on the nation’s inchoate
conceptions of citizenship, forcing the federal judiciary to take a definitive stance in
response to British impressment of American merchant seamen into the British Navy
during the years leading up to the War of 1812.15
W. Caleb McDaniel has recently pointed to an “era of anti-slavery pluralism” that
existed in Britain, as well as the United States well beyond their respective points of
emancipation, impacting public opinion and policymaking regarding issues such as
marriage, vagrancy, colonialism, and immigrant labor that extended into the early
twentieth century.16 Prior to McDaniel, the legal historian Robert J. Steinfeld complicated
the usefulness of emancipation in demarcating the timeline of free labor in the U.S.
Despite a general erosion of penal sanctions for American workers by the 1830s that
Steinfeld attributes in part to a growing identification of indentured servitude with chattel
slavery, people at the margins of American society (such as “people of color” in Hawaii
and elsewhere), and merchant seamen, would not be protected from penal sanctions until
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the first decade of the twentieth century. Thus, Steinfeld argues that modern free labor
was not a product of the emergent free market; rather it was the result of “a difficult
political and moral resolution of fundamental conflicts within liberalism,” specifically a
prevalent dual allegiance to freedom of person and freedom of contract. Rather than
attribute modern free labor to the triumph of Northern free market industrialism,
Steinfeld concludes that “only political events and changing moral standards led to the
line being drawn as it was in American constitutional law during the early years of the
twentieth century.”17 Accepting Steinfeld’s theory regarding the origins of free labor, the
final section of this chapter focuses on public responses to the Arago decision in an
attempt to map the “political events and changing moral standards” that eventually led to
a Congressional abolition of penal sanctions to enforce merchant seamen’s contracts;
first, partially in 1898 with the White Act and finally in 1915 with the landmark
LaFollete Seamen’s Act.
Within the decision of the federal judiciary, as well as the reactions of the
reformers, labor activists, and newspaper reporters who responded to the Arago decision,
there existed a shared central irony that hinged on the merchant seaman’s longstanding
classification as a “ward” of both benevolent society and the federal government: within
the rhetoric of reform, activists seeking to repeal the Arago decision perpetuated this
ward status as they simultaneously attempted to change the legal system that that same
status had created. Similarly, the federal judiciary attempted to justify extraordinary
restriction and control of merchant mariners as a form of freedom of contract, while
simultaneously arguing that seamen were naturally inferior citizens, and therefore
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required the government’s oversight.
In exploring the origins and manifestations of this central irony, this chapter seeks
to explain why merchant seamen found themselves excluded from the protections of the
U.S. Constitution as late as 1897, where that exclusion originated within the historical
context of U.S. labor during the second half of the nineteenth century, and what effect
that exclusion had on merchant seamen’s status as U.S. citizens during the final years of
the nineteenth century, and the first decades of the twentieth.

Desertion and Mobility in “Pirate City”
When the Arago seamen deserted their vessel in Astoria, Oregon they were
participating in a long tradition of illegal mobility practiced by seamen to maintain
relative control over the terms and conditions of their employment. As Marcus Rediker
argues, seamen were among the world’s first wage laborers. Across the Atlantic Ocean,
which served as a primary zone of exchange within a mercantilist, and later, industrial
capitalist global economy, merchant seamen embodied an essential component of free
trade. Contractual agreements in the form of shipping articles served to guarantee
exchanges of labor, a formal system that replaced earlier, more informal, localized, and
paternalistic forms of labor exchange. The formality of contracts became necessary due
to the extreme conditions of seafaring labor in combination with the singular importance
of maritime commerce within the global economy. This transition into the “contested
negotiation of wage work” necessitated a strategy of “creative survival” among seamen,
who were frequently subjected to oppressive conditions and violence on ships.18 The
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authority of mates and captains was met with extra-legal tactics of resistance from the
seamen under their command that included mutiny, piracy, and desertion.19
Desertion, in particular, became a manifestation of the contested power dynamics
that the contractual labor system introduced to merchant shipping. While seamen deserted
their vessels for many reasons, it was always an action that subverted the power of
captains and mates who held authority over them, and it often functioned as a means for a
seaman to reclaim control over his own mobility within an increasingly restrictive labor
system. In studying the port city of Salem, Massachusetts, Daniel Vickers documented a
corollary between rising desertion rates alongside the development of an increasingly
industrialized maritime shipping industry. Vickers found that a total of just three percent
of seamen deserted on voyages in which Salem was the port of origin between 17261800, while that number increased to 22% between 1801-1825, and 33% between 18261850. As Vickers concludes, “It is hard to imagine that this rising incidence of desertion
did not reflect something real that was changing in the quality of working life on board
Salem vessels during the first half of the nineteenth century.”20 As the advent of steam
engines in the early nineteenth century enabled larger cargoes and longer voyages, Salem
transformed from localized port of origin to port of call within a globalized market, with
maritime labor transformed into a “marginal activity, even within the seaports it
supported.”21
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Judith Fingard reaches similar conclusions in her study of Canadian sailortowns,
which she describes as networks of “variegated elements in the port economy” dependent
on seamen’s discharge and desertion: boardinghouse keepers, restaurant and saloon
owners, and shopkeepers all relied on the seaman’s business, which in turn depended on
his ability to extract himself from the restrictions of contractual employment and spend
his money over extended periods of time on shore.22 Legislative efforts led by maritime
ministry reformers and local government agents directly challenged the viability of the
self-contained micro-economies by targeting crimps and putting in place measures to
enforce shipping articles. Attempts to “clean up” the waterfront in Canadian sailortowns
included the creation of river police forces who would conduct raids of boarding houses,
and the establishment of shipping offices where contracts were drafted and signed under
supervision of an appointed agent. All of these efforts centered around controlling the
seaman’s mobility by enforcing contracts through direct government intervention. As
Fingard concludes, “The gallons of ink which the authorities expended on suggestions for
curbing it indicate that they saw desertion as a serious threat to the achievement of
disciplined society.”23
When the Arago seamen opted to desert in Astoria, they were first and foremost

considerably, producing more desertions, and seamen became increasingly marginalized within the Salem
port community, geographically pushed to the edges of the waterfront and culturally distanced from
respectable aspects of the Salem population.
22
Fingard, Jack in Port, 20. Fingard argues that the middlemen operating within sailortowns known as
“crimps” acted as shoreside facilitators for seamen to call upon for the two primary methods available to
them of resisting abuse while at sea: litigation and desertion. This argument runs counter to common
perceptions of crimps, perpetuated by contemporary reformers and the popular press, as deviant
manipulators of “poor Jack,” who was incapable of helping himself from being exploited by the more
unscrupulous elements of sailortown. Fingard directly counters this depiction of crimps, insisting that
seamen who were “crimped” or who themselves chose to be crimped “joined together in a united front
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electing to end their contractual relationship with the ship, and by extension, its Captain,
whom the sailors would testify had been abusive towards the crew. Astoria’s sailortown,
despite its notorious reputation around the world as a den of vice and danger, also
represented a safe-haven for the Arago deserters. Had Captain Perry not reacted with
such vigor to the seamen’s actions, the Arago deserters would have been free to navigate
the intricacies of Astoria’s maritime labor market from within a network of recruitment
centered in sailors’ boardinghouses and negotiated through word-of-mouth and other
informal channels of information exchange. If the Arago deserters were to have followed
a typical pattern, they would have most likely spent some time (and money) ashore, and
after several days or even weeks, decided to sign on with another ship and get back to
work, preferably under conditions more favorable than their last ship.
It was this contrast between the realities of a sailortown’s reputation for bad
behavior and corruption on the one hand, and its inherent usefulness for merchant seamen
attempting to maintain control over the terms of their own labor on the other, that
reformers, politicians, and the courts found so baffling. Astoria, indeed, was a town with
no shortage of nefarious characters and tales of criminality. Described by one memoirist
as “the pirate city by the sea,”24 Astoria had gained worldwide attention by the 1890s for
its elaborate systems of shanghaiing. Many anecdotes survive of visitors from out-oftown being approached by friendly ship “owners” and being offered a tour of one of the
many ships docked in port, only to discover the “owner” gone, and anchors being raised
as the ship left port for a months-long voyage with the helpless tourists now enlisted as
members of the crew. As long as the captain had procured signed ship’s articles for each

The Oregonian, March 13, 1979, as cited in Denise Alborn, “Shanghai Days in Astoria,” Cumtux
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of his “crew,” whether forged or otherwise coerced through the tactics of crimping, he
was legally entitled to command their labor for the duration of the scheduled voyage.
Often, this process involved crimps getting their victims drunk and tricking them into
signing articles or accumulating debt that could only be paid off by going to sea and
forfeiting wages. Waterfront saloons with trap doors and tunnel systems used to transport
drunk or drugged seamen to ships-in-waiting feature prevalently in the lore of crimping,
especially in Astoria and nearby Portland. Sailors’ boardinghouses were also often central
sites for the crimping enterprise. James Turk ran boardinghouses in both cities, and was
rumored to have shanghaied his own son once for “blood money,” usually a portion of
the victim’s advance, or a fee collected from the ship’s recruiter. Bridget Grant, notorious
boardinghouse keeper and crimp, was the matriarch of a family that made its entire
business in Astoria’s sailortown through a conglomerate of boardinghouses, saloons, and
enterprises that were all dependent upon the seaman’s patronage, whether voluntary or
coerced.
Reformers and politicians seized upon spectacular accounts and characters
engaged in the crimping economy to advance an agenda intended to “clean up”
sailortowns and thereby stabilize the labor pool for maritime commerce. Whereas these
reformers claimed to be helping seamen help themselves while ashore, by targeting the
economies of sailortown they were also cutting off the very networks that frequently
provided safe-havens for merchant seamen on the move, constricting their ability to end
bad contracts and negotiate new ones, and restricting their individual liberties as wage
laborers in a maritime economy that was becoming increasingly exploitative of its labor
pool. Desertion was an essential component in this system, and it is no coincidence that it
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was at the heart of the case of the Arago.

The Right to Desert
In most instances, ship captains would have shown little hesitation in replacing
wayward crewmembers with idle seamen “on the beach,” transiently inhabiting the
world’s sailortowns, often for lower wages than those replaced. What made the Arago
case exceptional was the vigor and persistence with which Captain Perry pursued the four
seamen who deserted his ship; not only originally in Astoria, but subsequently en route to
San Francisco, and again upon reaching port there, Captain Perry had his men
incarcerated and chose to pursue legal action to the fullest extent of the law. Yet the
Arago seamen proved more than up to the Captain’s challenge to their freedom.
Essential to the seamen’s case was the support of the SUP, led by then-Secretary
Andrew Furuseth. In a letter written to Furuseth from jail, Robert Robertson, who served
as mouthpiece for the Arago seamen, complained that the ship’s crew had been subjected
to poor conditions while at sea, and that their right to jump ship in search of alternatives
had been violated by Captain Perry and the local officials at Astoria:
The captain felt sure that he had us… and on the trip he fed us on salt horse and
bulldozed us. We went to him and told him that since we did not suit him, he had
better pay us what was coming to us. This he refused to do, so we left him and our
money at the first opportunity, and we are in prison as a result. What are we going
to do about it?25
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power structure between themselves and those who set the terms of their employment.
Mobility was an essential tool that seamen employed to counter poor conditions and
abusive treatment such as the “salt horse” diet and “bulldozing” that Robertson accused
Captain Perry of imposing on his crew. While an effective defensive tactic for seamen,
desertion was also illegal, and deserters had long been subject to arrest if they were
caught and prosecuted, a fact dating back to the passage of the 1790 U.S. Merchant
Marine Act. The act contained a clause that sanctioned the use of arrest to enforce
shipping articles. The Merchant Marine Act was one of the first pieces of legislation
passed by the First Congress of the United States, a testament to the priority Early
Republican leaders placed on establishing a stable and secure merchant fleet. With the
young nation desperate to assert itself within Atlantic trade markets and eager to assume
a place on the global geopolitical stage, a robust and regulated merchant marine was
essential in the immediate aftermath of the Constitution’s ratification. The details of the
Merchant Marine Act included a combination of clauses alternately aimed at protecting
and coercing the labor of merchant seamen. This approach to regulating the merchant
marine followed almost exactly the British model, who had long regarded their mariners
as “wards of the admiralty,” entitled to certain protections from the government while
simultaneously subjected to extraordinary regulatory measures based on a perception of
their deficient character and considered appropriate based on the extraordinary conditions
under which they worked.26 Following this approach, the 1790 American legislation
included protective stipulations that guaranteed a mate’s right to request inspections of
vessels, placed limits on the amount of debt that could be collected from a seaman on a
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given voyage, and established requirements for medical supplies to be carried on board,
as well as setting a minimum number of seamen per a ship’s given tonnage.
Simultaneously, the 1790 Act established an equally formidable list of coercive
measures, including mandated penalties for seamen who failed to report to a ship at the
appointed hour, penalties for harboring “fugitive seamen,” and a 300% wage penalty for
each day that a contracted seaman went missing from his ship. If a seaman was absent
from his vessel for more than forty-eight hours, he forfeited his wages and any
possessions that remained on board, in addition to being charged a fee meant to
compensate the master of the ship for the expense of finding a replacement. Most
significant to the case of the Arago, seamen could be arrested for refusing to sail on a
ship deemed seaworthy after inspection, or if he deserted his vessel entirely. The master
of a vessel had simply to demonstrate that a seaman had signed a contract in order to
legally have him detained, at which point he would be held in prison until his vessel was
ready to leave port, when he would be forcibly escorted to the vessel and commanded to
resume labor under threat of re-imprisonment.27 This is exactly what happened to the four
deserters in Astoria in 1895.
Both in concept and in language, the coercive clauses of the 1790 Merchant
Marine Act that established penalties for desertion served as a direct model for the
phrasing of the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act, a fact seized upon by Furuseth and the SUP in
referring to the 1790 Act as the “Fugitive Sailor Law.”28 The text from the 1790 Act that
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addresses desertion is worth quoting here in its entirety:
If any seaman who shall have signed a contract to perform a voyage shall, at any
port or place, desert, or shall absent himself from such vessel, without leave of the
master, or officer commanding in the absence of the master, it shall be lawful for
any Justice of the Peace within the United States, upon the complaint of the
master, to issue his warrant to apprehend such deserter, and bring him before such
Justice; and if it then appears that he has signed a contract within the intent and
meaning of this title, and that the voyage agreed for is not finished, or altered, or
the contract otherwise dissolved, and that such seaman has deserted the vessel, or
absented himself without leave, the Justice shall commit him to the House of
Correction or common jail of the city, town or place, to remain there until the
vessel shall be ready to proceed on her voyage, or till the master shall require his
discharge, and then to be delivered to the master, he paying all the costs of such
commitment, and deducting the same out of the wages due to such seaman.29

Although desertion was technically illegal throughout the nineteenth century,
seamen encountered varying levels of enforcement depending on the time and place of
their actions. As Richard B. Morris has demonstrated using the port of Baltimore as a
case study, the use of penal sanctions to enforce shipping articles was a fairly common
practice there throughout the mid-nineteenth century, but decidedly less common during
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the years leading up to the Arago case.30 In mining the Baltimore municipal archives,
Morris found 708 cases of seamen detained for desertion in that city alone between 1861
and 1893, when the city stopped keeping such records. Only 76 of those cases occurred
between the years 1880-1893, with no cases at all occurring in 1885, 1888, 1890, and
1891. Morris attributes this reduction to the general decline of the American merchant
marine over the course of the nineteenth century. The statistics support Morris’
interpretation. During the 1830s, U.S. merchant ships carried 90% of international cargo
out of American ports. By 1860, that number had fallen to 50%; by 1890 it was 9%, with
the British making inverse gains in their percentage of the world’s maritime commerce
during those same years.31 Due to such a drastic reduction in the American merchant
fleet, instances of the use of penal sanctions to enforce shipping articles had become
increasingly rare by 1895, especially in relatively new ports outside of the Northeastern
U.S. Furuseth’s biographer Hyman G. Weintraub corroborates this trend: writing about
the arrest of the Arago deserters in Astoria, Weintraub observed that “seamen had long
realized that… owners had the legal right to take such action, but in practice it had not
happened within the memory of any of the coasting sailors… The actual arrest of a
deserter shocked the [SUP].”32 By combining Morris’ data from Baltimore jails with
Weintraub’s anecdotal evidence, it is reasonable to assume that the use of penal sanctions
against merchant seamen who broke shipping articles was rare in the port towns of the
Pacific Coast by 1895.
The declining number of deserting seamen who found themselves imprisoned was
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due not least to the Maguire Act of 1895.33 Sponsored by Rep. James Maguire of San
Francisco, and long a priority of the SUP, the bill abolished the use of penal sanctions to
enforce shipping articles on coastwise journeys. Shipowners and others with a financial
stake in the administration of maritime commerce overwhelmingly protested the bill,
denouncing it as “arbitrary and unjust,” “communistic and subversive of discipline,” and
bemoaning the “premium” that it placed on desertion, language typical of laissez-faire
absolutism that privileged an abstracted and “natural” free market system devoid of
“unnatural” interferences.34 In the face of such opposition, the bill’s passage in February
1895 was a testament to the growing strength of the SUP and its political supporters.
Despite the significant victory for seamen’s rights advocates, the Maguire Act contained
substantial loopholes that left seamen vulnerable to disciplinary action that the Act
intended to eliminate. First, the bill’s protections were worded vaguely enough to allow
for creative interpretations by certain masters and shipowners. Second, the lack of any
central body capable or willing to enforce the law left such enforcement to the seamen
themselves and their representatives.35
Largely a product of the malleability of the Maguire Act, the initial historical
significance of the Arago case was in the challenge it posed to the recently passed law. In
his letter to Furuseth, seaman Robertson claimed that when he and his fellow deserters
were brought before the local shipping commissioner in Astoria, Robertson cited the
Maguire Act as reason for the legitimacy of their actions. According to Robertson, the
shipping commissioner claimed that he had never heard of the Maguire Act. Upon having
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its contents explained to him, the commissioner declared that it did not apply to the
Arago case because the seamen had signed articles for a trip that included a stop in
Valparaiso, Chile, thus rendering it exempt from the protections that the Act afforded
seamen on coastwise journeys.36 The shipping commissioner’s on-the-spot response to
Robertson’s invocation of the Maguire Act proved to be more durable than it first
appeared, as his opinion was repeated in the District Court of Northern California’s
rejection of the seamen’s suit.
Having deserted in June 1895, the Arago seamen were forcibly escorted back to
their ship after spending sixteen days in an Astoria prison, and arrested again on July 7th
at San Francisco. On the evening before their trial before U.S. Commissioner Heacock,
officers of the SUP, convened to come up with a strategy of defense to present the
following day on behalf of the seamen, who were being held at the Alameda jail. An
article in the San Francisco Call quotes Furuseth, then Secretary of the Union, as saying
that “it was a question whether seamen could be forced into involuntary servitude in the
coast trade or be permitted to choose their own ships and masters.”37 Such a statement
suggests that Furuseth and the SUP were already formulating an argument challenging
the parameters of involuntary servitude that would take the case to the Supreme Court.
The significance of the Arago case was apparent to both parties and onlookers
from the beginning of the trial process. One account published in the San Francisco Call
a week after the trial referred to it as “[o]ne of the most far-reaching legal battles ever
instituted in the United States circuit court.”38 A different article in the Call described the
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large public crowd that had gathered in the San Francisco courtroom to hear the Arago
seamen’s defense, including “both ship-owners and sailors, and quite a number of
skippers… as the question to be decided is almost of as vital importance to them as to the
owners and sailors.”39 The author of the same article, which appeared the day after the
trial, had a keen sense of what exactly was at stake in the ruling: “Should it be decided
that sailors have a right to [quit] work after having signed for a voyage it will take from
the ship-owners their most effective weapon in fighting the Sailors’ Union, and also in its
engaging deep-water sailors.”40 Harkening back to shipowners’ objections to the
proposed Maguire Act, the Arago seamen’s case put before the District Court of Northern
California posed the same challenge to shipowners’ control over a seaman’s labor that the
1895 law did. If a seaman was allowed to break his contract without facing
imprisonment, he would retain a new entitlement to legal mobility that could be used
against his employers. This process of negotiation over control between shipowners,
captains, and mates and the seamen under their command had been taking place since the
advent of wage labor on ships, albeit under informal and explicitly illegal
circumstances.41 Should the Arago seamen’s challenge to the legality of penal sanctions
have proven successful, they and their fellow seamen would be granted new legitimacy
and legal rights in pursuing control over the terms and nature of their own labor.
The seamen’s central argument focused on the nature of their exceptional status
under U.S. labor law. As argued in court, a ruling in favor of the seamen would grant
them the same right to quit work without facing penalties other than a loss of wages that
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other free laborers had long possessed.42 As the Los Angeles Herald described it, the
seamen were challenging their imprisonment based on the fact “that it is an unlawful
discrimination against one class of the population–since men in other gainful occupations
cannot be imprisoned, fined, impressed and coerced into service for failure to comply
with their contracts.”43 The same article describes the argument put forward by the side
of the shipowners: essentially, without such extraordinary measures of regulation and
control over a seaman’s labor, the entire enterprise of merchant shipping would quickly
descend into a spiral of terrifying ineffectiveness resembling “Byron’s Dream of
Darkness, wherein ships, sailorless, rotting on the seas, would soon be realized; that the
American flag would soon be driven from the sea in the era of chaos and pandemonium
that would ensue.”44 Such fantastic rhetoric is indicative of the seriousness of the threat
that the Arago deserters posed to the established order of a disciplined, profitable U.S.
merchant marine.
With little judicial fanfare, the shipowners won the first battle at the District Court
level. The Arago seamen quickly appealed, and honed their argument to focus on the
assertion that a violation of habeas corpus had occurred, claiming that they were put on
board in Astoria against their will and had a right to refuse to work on the way to San
Francisco. With attorney H.W. Hutton representing the seamen before Judge Morrow, the
seamen called upon the Judge’s sense of American freedom, arguing that a law allowing
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for the arrest of seamen who deserted their ship was “an arbitrary one, and deprives men
of their liberty. In that respect it is not an American law and should not be recognized in
American courts.” Identifying themselves with other free laborers who populated the
postbellum industrial labor system, the seamen contested that “Congress had no more
right to make laws to punish sailors for violating their civil contracts than it has to punish
tradesmen who refuse to carry out their agreements.” In the end, Judge Morrow was not
persuaded. While he allowed that the seamen were American citizens, and therefore
entitled to certain rights, he concluded, “[t]he fact remains… that there is a vast
difference between land laws and sea laws. The latter have never been properly defined,
and they may never be.” With that, he ruled against the Arago seamen and proceeded to
launch into “a classical dissertation about the days of ancient Greece and Rome to carry
out his points.”45
The Arago seamen were far from finished, however. In the days following the
trial, it had become clear that their case had outgrown the limitations of the District Court
of Northern California. Before Judge Morrow had even delivered his decision, the Los
Angeles Herald predicted that “[t]he contest will be speedily carried to the [S]upreme
[C]ourt of the United States.”46 The case of the Arago deserters touched on essential
questions with potentially broad implications for all marginalized American laborers in
1895: what exactly did the Thirteenth Amendment protect against, and who exactly did it
protect? And what did involuntary servitude mean as it was banned by the Thirteenth
Amendment? The Supreme Court were in position to deliver answers to these questions
when the Arago decision was brought before it as Robertson v. Baldwin.

45
46

San Francisco Call, July 24, 1895.
“Four Mutinous Sailors Will Contest Their Legality”

96

Robertson v. Baldwin
The Arago seamen and their legal counsel waited the better part of 1896 before
receiving an opportunity to argue their case before the highest court in the nation. During
that time the seamen’s case had been expanded beyond the particularities of the Maguire
Act to focus primarily on the claim that their imprisonment for breach of contract
constituted a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment’s abolition of involuntary servitude.
On January 25, 1897, the Court delivered its opinion, ruling against the seamen and
upholding the decision of the District Court of Northern California. Justice Brown wrote
the majority opinion, taking the issue at hand as an opportunity to express the majority’s
interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment, which he argued “depends upon the
construction to be given to the term ‘involuntary servitude,’”:
Does the epithet ‘involuntary’ attach to the word ‘servitude’ continuously, and
make illegal any service which becomes involuntary at any time during its
existence; or does it attach only at the inception of the servitude, and characterize
it as unlawful because unlawfully entered into?

Brown ultimately sided with the latter interpretation, arguing that a contract lawfully
entered into can never be considered unlawful, and insisting that such an interpretation
ensured the viability of forms of essential servitude that would otherwise be undermined
by an unrestricted right to abandon contractual obligations. Brown identified such
essential labor as that of a soldier at war or a merchant seaman aboard a vessel, who
Brown worried might be inclined to “abandon his ship at any intermediate port or
landing, or even in a storm at sea…” Putting aside how useful an option voluntarily
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abandoning ship during a storm at sea would be, Brown made clear that he and the
majority sided with freedom of contract over freedom of person, but seemingly only as
applied to some classes of laborers. But while freedom of contract served to override the
seamen’s claim to have been subjected to involuntary servitude, the use of penal
sanctions to enforce their contracts was another matter:
“The breach of a contract for a personal service has not, however, been
recognized in this country as involving a liability to criminal punishment, except
in the cases of soldiers, sailors, and possibly some others, nor would public
opinion tolerate a statute to that effect.”
Brown’s statement suggests that while “public opinion” would not tolerate the use of
penal sanctions in enforcing the contracts of ordinary workers, their use in holding
soldiers, sailors “and possibly some others” to the terms of their labor agreements would
indeed be appropriate. In approving the use of penal sanctions to enforce contracts on
certain classes of laborers, Brown and the Court majority were in step with the
momentum behind the devolution of nineteenth century free labor ideology, the strength
of which had propelled the nation into the Civil War, through the pangs of
Reconstruction, and into the Gilded Age of capitalism in which the Arago decision was
delivered. The dramatic devolution of Reconstruction, was indicative of a more
widespread constriction of free labor ideology that retreated into a narrowly conceived
adherence to freedom of property on which the legitimacy of labor systems would be
evaluated through the first decade of the twentieth century. Within this system, an
individual’s labor was considered to be his own property, and said individual had the
exclusive right to contract out that property under his own terms, free from external
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interventions.47 With this trajectory in mind, Robertson v. Baldwin was a harbinger of the
so-called Lochner Era of the Court. Given this timeline, the Arago case proved to be a
testing ground for the Court to outline principles regarding freedom of contract that
would guide their decisions well into the 1930s.
Brown and the Court majority’s next task was to justify the classification of
merchant seamen as an exceptional class of laborers to which penal sanctions could be
appropriately applied. Whereas the majority claimed that “public opinion would not
tolerate” similar methods of contract enforcement as applied to other laborers, seamen
were exempt from such considerations. To support his claim, Brown offered the
following:
From the earliest historical period the contract of the sailor has been treated as an
exceptional one, and involving, to a certain extent, the surrender of his personal
liberty during the life of the contract. Indeed, the business of navigation could
scarcely be carried on without some [guarantee], beyond the ordinary civil
remedies upon contract, that the sailor will not desert the ship at a critical
moment, or leave her at some place where seamen are impossible to be
obtained—as Molloy forcibly expresses it, ‘to rot in her neglected brine.’ Such
desertion might involve a long delay of the vessel while the master is seeking
another crew, an abandonment of the voyage, and, in some cases, the safety of the
ship itself. Hence, the laws of nearly all maritime nations have made provision for
securing the personal attendance of the crew on board, and for their criminal
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punishment for desertion, or absence without leave during the life of the shipping
articles.

As precedent, Brown reached far back in time, offering the Ancient Rhodians, the
fifteenth century Catalonian Consulate of the Sea, the twelfth century Rules of Oléron,
the Horseatic League of 1597, and the Maritime Ordinance of Louis XIV as examples of
laws put in place to keep seamen from deserting their vessels. But was it always as
simple a motivating factor as maintaining the safety of vessels at sea that was behind this
lineage of coercive laws? Brown’s concluding paragraph suggests otherwise:
Indeed, seamen are treated by Congress, as well as by the Parliament of Great
Britain, as deficient in that full and intelligent responsibility for their acts which is
accredited to ordinary adults, and as needing the protection of their parents and
guardians… The ancient characterization of seamen as “wards of admiralty” is
even more accurate now than it was formerly.

In addition to his inventory of ancient precedents, Brown could have produced an equally
impressive list in which the consensus opinion among men of both the state and the
public reflected a shared perception that seamen were indeed deficient in character, and
therefore entitled to unique status as wards under U.S. law.48 Merchant seamen had long
been considered unique citizens under the law of various countries, the United States
being no exception. Amplifying this perception, merchant seamen had grown
increasingly foreign over the course of the nineteenth century, both in a national and a
cultural sense, as the industrialization of the American maritime shipping industry
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changed the nature and character of its labor systems. Surveying the work of maritime
historians regarding these issues gives additional weight to Brown’s concluding passage,
and suggests that this other-ness of American merchant seamen, who by 1897 had been
pushed to the extreme margins of respectable society and acceptable forms of contract
labor, may have accounted more for their exceptional status under U.S. law than any
other factor. Any other appeal made by the Court to the imperatives of maintaining
stability and safety on merchant ships was secondary to the larger, more potent realities
of the threat that merchant seamen, empowered with the right to desert their vessels,
would pose to maritime commerce, and by extension national economic prosperity and
the projection of naval power internationally.
Justice Harlan, in delivering his dissenting opinion, attempted to make clear the
obvious disconnect involved in denying a certain class of workers their due protections
under the Constitution:
In view of these principles, I am unable to understand how the necessity for the
protection of seamen against those who take advantage of them can be made the
basis of legislation compelling them, against their will, and by force, to render
personal service for others engaged in private business. Their supposed helpless
condition is thus made the excuse for imposing upon them burdens that could not
be imposed upon other classes without depriving them of rights that inhere in
personal freedom. The constitution furnishes no authority for any such distinction
between classes of persons in this country.
Turning the logic of the Court’s majority decision on its head, Justice Harlan argued that
the very idea of legally constraining the rights of certain individuals based on their having
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been identified as wards of the state was unconstitutional, and therefore the plaintiffs in
Robertson v. Baldwin should be granted their freedom. This counter-argument would
gain traction in the months following the resolution of the case, but at the time of the
decision, Justice Harlan’s voice was silenced by the majority ruling of the Court.
The Court’s decision in Robertson v. Baldwin had immediate and far-reaching
consequences for other workers at the margins of American society in 1897. Returning to
Richard B. Morris’s study, the 708 cases that he unearthed from Baltimore city jail
records in which merchant seamen were arrested for desertion between 1861-1893
indicates that the use of penal sanctions to enforce seamen’s contracts not only persisted,
but at least in the instance of Baltimore, thrived in the years following the ratification of
the Thirteenth Amendment, leading Morris to conclude that “emancipation and the
Thirteenth Amendment did not end legal pressure for the specific performance of labor
contracts,” in fact, “the Baltimore jail records are proof of the fact that the last ‘slaves’ to
be emancipated were the seamen of all races and nationalities.”49 While Morris clearly
overstates his point in comparing merchant seamen to chattel slaves, he presciently
gestures towards a more useful interrogation of the effectiveness in using emancipation as
the point at which truly “free” labor replaced various former “unfree” labor systems that
thrived prior to the Civil War.
Robert J. Steinfeld seeks to complicate this understanding of the creation of
modern free labor, arguing that all exceptions within the so-called free labor market
following emancipation and the Thirteenth Amendment–such as black peonage, “coolie”
labor, and merchant seamen–were products of a failure to resolve a fundamental
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contradiction that existed within contemporary liberalism’s commitment to “freedom,”
consisting of competing adherences to liberty of person and liberty of contract. Robertson
v. Baldwin clarified the legal parameters of the labor market for marginal workers by
coming down definitively on the side of liberty of contract. As Steinfeld concludes, “For
more than a decade Southerners had passed legislation to penally enforce labor contracts,
but rarely had this legislation punished contract breaches directly. More often, subtle
subterfuges were used… Under the logic of Robertson v. Baldwin, such subtlety would
be unnecessary.”50
Within the new rules established by Robertson v. Baldwin, the Supreme Court
entered into a nascent warmup to the Lochner Era, demonstrating a sustained antipaternalist approach to the judiciary that adhered to an increasingly laissez-faire political
economy that privileged freedom of contract as a remedy to the supposedly corrosive
social impact of wardship. During this period, the Supreme Court expanded its powers by
placing itself in the position of “paternalistic patriarchs,” enacting a paradox that
embraced extraordinary regulation, control, and restriction enforced in the name of antipaternalist freedom of contract while simultaneously taking it upon itself to provide
special protections as needed to those designated as wards, such as women and children
laborers, American Indians, and merchant seamen, who in Justice Brown’s phrasing,
were in need of protection “against the consequences of their own ignorance and
improvidence.”51
This fundamental paradox was prevalent not just in the courts of the United States
in 1897, but also among the general public from whom social opinion was generated and
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distributed. The final section of this chapter examines the reactions to the Arago decision
of three groups belonging to this public venue: the press, labor unions, and maritime
ministry organizations. In examining the rhetoric employed by these groups in the wake
of the Supreme Court’s decision, this chapter illuminates the process described by
Steinfeld as the “moral resolution of fundamental conflicts within liberalism” by
attempting to document the “political events and moral standards” involved in the Arago
case and its aftermath. In so doing, it will become evident that the paradox of paternalism
did not exist solely at the state or federal level, but also included actors from all sections
of society. Only through resolution of said paradox in the public arena would the status of
merchant seamen under U.S. law come to be reformed.

Reaction
Looking back on the Arago decision in his memoirs, Rev. Archibald R.
Mansfield, first Superintendent of the Protestant Episcopal Church Missionary Society
for Seamen, later the Seamen’s Church Institute of New York (SCI), recalled his
bafflement upon hearing the decision of the Supreme Court: “[the] judicial logic made it
clear to the public that there existed a class of men who had to work no matter how they
were treated, that their contract carried no implication of decent treatment, but that
arbitrary bad treatment was merely a sort of occupational risk which their contract
obliged them to assume.”52 Mansfield was not alone in his reaction to the decision.
Newspapers from every corner of the nation ran articles detailing the case, many with
strong editorial commentary condemning the Court’s decision and speculating as to its

Alfred J. Nock, Mansfield Biography, (unpublished, [1932?]), Series 2: Director’s / Superintendent’s
Files, Records of the Seamen’s Church Institute of New York and New Jersey.
52

104

potential implications. As Mansfield writes, the Arago decision “focused public attention
on the matter at issue and precipitated all the humanitarian sentiment in the country in
behalf of fair dealing with the sailor.”
Surveying the nation’s newspapers in the aftermath of Robertson v. Baldwin
confirms that the interest and energies of the press had indeed been aroused. An article
titled “An Important Decision” from the Cook County Herald of the Lake Superior port
town Grand Marais, Minnesota provides a typical example. Beginning with a detailed
description of Justice Brown’s majority opinion, the article then compares the case to the
Dred Scott decision and the 1842 Prigg v. the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania decision,
which interpreted the Fugitive Slave Law as overriding a Pennsylvania state law
protecting blacks from being taken out of the state into slavery, claiming that the latter
represented such a close model for Robertson v. Baldwin that if “the words ‘fugitive
sailor’ be substituted for ‘fugitive slave’... it would exactly cover the present case.”
Evaluating the potential impact of the Arago decision, the article claimed that the Court’s
ruling could mean “that the [T]hirteenth [A]mendment of the constitution is wiped out
completely.”53 An almost identical article ran in The Broad Ax of Salt Lake City, Utah,
echoing comparisons to Dred Scott and Prigg, and lamenting the Court’s apparent
disregard for the Thirteenth Amendment, “savior and champion of personal rights and
personal liberty, [which] declared to every citizen of the United States, I will make you
free indeed. Surely the liberty of a citizen is more precious and sacred in the eyes of the
law, than a private contract.”54 Similar articles summarizing the case ran in newspapers
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from Wichita, Kansas55 and Omaha, Nebraska56, as well as Washington, D.C., San
Francisco, Astoria, Seattle, and New York City.
Many reporters, as well as reformers and labor leaders, employed a version of
anti-slavery rhetoric that focused on the opposition between freedom of contract and
freedom of person central to the questions posed in the Salt Lake City Broad Ax article.
Steinfeld identifies this opposition as the “fundamental conflict within liberalism” during
the second half of the nineteenth century. By comparing the status of merchant seamen
with that of chattel slaves, these reactors to the Arago decision drew on a long tradition of
anti-slavery sentiment, repurposing that tradition in order to inspire reform. Significantly,
such comparisons were also explicitly situated within the context of Southern peonage
labor, which took hold during Reconstruction and proliferated when the North restored
“home rule” to former-Confederate states in 1877, abandoning prior direct interventions
intended to restructure the labor systems of Southern plantations. An article in the San
Francisco Call from May 1897 articulates this context in relation to the Arago decision,
declaring that:
[I]t is alarming to contemplate the extent to which contract slavery may be forced
upon the landless laborers of the country, white as well as black… prompted by
the plainest inducements of self-interest on the part of employers, to exclude such
landless and therefore helpless and dependent laborers from employment until
they shall be compelled by their privations to sign such contracts for personal
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servitude as will bind them for life or for long terms to the contract and dominion
of individual masters.57
The persistence of such a racially defined framework of contract labor, informed directly
by the nation’s traumatic timeline of chattel slave labor and emancipation, is indicative of
the challenges that the Arago case posed to the viability of postbellum conceptualizations
of freedom following the Thirteenth Amendment. The rhetoric of anti-slavery, a long and
well-established tradition of dissent within nineteenth century America, provided a
framework within which opponents of the Supreme Court’s decision could frame their
criticism, revealing a consensus of expectations and an arsenal of rhetorical pressures that
those critics forced on the state regarding the regulation of contract labor.
In addition to editorializing news reporters, labor unions added their voices to the
swelling opposition that spoke out against the Robertson v. Baldwin decision. Through
pamphlets, letters, and convention speeches, labor leaders adopted an anti-slavery
rhetoric similar to the press’s in articulating the uniquely oppressive status of merchant
mariners under U.S. law. Marchers at a parade in San Francisco to celebrate the twelfth
anniversary of the SUP in December 1897 carried signs that made clear how seamen
themselves interpreted the Arago decision. A sign displayed prominently at the front of
the march plainly declared that “The people are with us,” and was followed by dozens
more, including:

“The United States Supreme Court construes the laws;
the people make them.
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We carry our case up”

“In 1862 Lincoln proclaimed all persons free.
In 1897 the United States Supreme Court declared the seaman a serf”

“In 1856 Dred Scott decision
reversed by the people 1861-1865
In 1897 Arago decision
will be reversed by the people”
and:
“In 1790 fugitive sailor law passed
In 1793 fugitive slave law passed.”

The reportage on these signs gives a rare archival glimpse into how Robertson v. Baldwin
was processed by merchant seamen with boots on the ground in the early years of their
labor organization. The similarities between the rhetoric they employed in their parade
and the editorial musings of the nation’s press suggest a pervasiveness of opposition that
transcended class or social identity.
In addition to opposition on the street, the administrative bodies of the San
Francisco Labor Council and the Central Labor Unions of New York, Brooklyn, and
Washington, D.C. all held meetings in the months following the Arago that were covered
by the local press. Samuel Gompers himself attended meetings of the American
Federation of Labor in Nashville and Kansas City, where the Arago decision was
denounced, as did Eugene Debs at the Labor Leaders’ Convention in St. Louis.

108

Transcripts of speeches reprinted in newspapers capture the heightened rhetoric used to
rally solidarity among those in attendance, and recall fiery condemnations of slavery that
were common in the antebellum North. H. E. Highton addressed a raucous mass-meeting
at the Metropolitan Temple in San Francisco on February 2, 1897 amidst a band playing
“inspiring airs” between speeches and a packed crowd that included Mayor Phelan. “The
thought that an American sailor,” Highton began, “should ever be called upon to carry in
his mind the thought that at some time or some place his back was laid open by the lash
of some petty tyrant rouses my blood almost to the point of revolution.”58 Highton was
followed by several speakers who repeatedly impressed upon the crowd the need to
“abolish [the] slavery of American sailors,” with one speaker reflecting that “this country
had fought out the question of slavery of the black man and had set him free. That white
men should be held in bondage in this same fair land [is] a circumstance not to be longer
tolerated.” James H. Barry concluded the meeting by lamenting the persistence of
“chattel slavery” in the United States, insisting that “[slavery] does exist, but, by the great
Jehovah, it shall be abolished,” before launching into an extended critique of the Supreme
Court.59
Andrew Furuseth made a trip to Washington, D.C. in January 1898 to lobby
before Congress on behalf of the Arago seamen. In an article in the San Francisco Call
documenting the trip, Furuseth is quoted as saying that “the imprisonment of a sailor for
violation of a civil contract is a species of slave labor and is a relic of barbarism,” a
sentiment that was echoed in an elaborate pamphlet printed by the SUP that credited
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Furuseth as its author. The cover of the pamphlet is divided into two halves, its left side
titled “THIS IS THE FUGITIVE SAILOR LAW ENACTED 1790,” with an excerpt
from the 1790 U.S. Merchant Marine Act pertaining to the use of imprisonment to
enforce desertion printed below. The right side is titled “THIS WAS THE FUGITIVE
SLAVE LAW ENACTED 1793,” followed by an excerpt from that law pertaining to the
return of fugitive slaves. Below the excerpt, Furuseth interjects: “[the Fugitive Slave
Law] is supposed to have been made void by the Thirteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States. In view of the Supreme Court decision in ‘Robert
Robertson et al. vs. Barry Baldwin,’ January 25, 1897, IS IT VOID?”60
Furuseth’s provocative question gets to the essence of what motivated the
overwhelming outrage and apprehensiveness with which Robertson v. Baldwin was met
among news reporters and union leaders. In excluding certain citizens from the
protections of the Thirteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court opened old wounds left by
moral debates over slavery leading up the Civil War. That catastrophic war had
seemingly resolved the issue once and for all. But in the wake of Robertson v. Baldwin,
those with particular interest in the case, as well as the public at large, were left to
question how much had, in fact, been left open to interpretation.
Maritime reformers played an essential role in the interpretation of the Arago
decision and the mobilization of moral capital and legislative negotiation required to
temper the scope of its impact. On December 30, 1896, the Joint Conference for the
Protection of Seamen, a consortium of seamen’s missions and maritime law practitioners
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that included representatives from the American Seamen’s Friend Society (ASFS) and
the Seamen’s Church Institute of New York (SCI), was founded under the leadership of
SCI administrators J. Augustus Johnson and Rev. Archibald R. Mansfield. The first issue
facing the Joint Conference was the fate of the Arago seamen, a case which had farreaching consequences for merchant mariners nationwide. In studying the records of
ASFS and SCI, the motivations and logic behind missionaries’ efforts at reforming the
legal status of seamen provide crucial insights into the popular perception of American
merchant seamen in the late nineteenth century. Maritime reformers approached the
“problem” of seamen’s marginal status in ways that reaffirmed powerful stereotypes
classifying seamen as morally deficient citizens who were consequently at the mercy of
abusive captains and mates at sea and unscrupulous middlemen ashore. This process of
other-ing marginalized seamen socially, culturally, and geographically on land made
possible and reinforced abusive cycles of labor at sea and exploitation during time spent
ashore that maritime missionaries bemoaned and were dedicated to reforming. Maritime
missionaries offered strategies of reform that focused on a mixture of evangelical
Christian conversion and legal advocacy, targeting the laws that empowered and
protected those who made their business exploiting seamen. The paradoxical rhetoric
employed by reformers on behalf of seamen was often naïve in its approach to solving
the problems that merchant seamen faced at the close of the nineteenth century, but just
as often those same reformers evidenced a deep understanding of the legal system they
were attempting to reform, and a shrewd ability to manipulate legislatures to accomplish
certain goals. Studying the implementation of this rhetoric leading up to and immediately
following Robertson v. Baldwin provides insight into the contradictions that both
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subjected merchant seamen to extraordinary treatment under U.S. law and produced
motivations for reform of that same treatment in legislative victories of 1898 and 1915.
With the Arago decision fresh in the minds of both the members of the Joint
Conference and the public at large, the Joint Conference chose to put forward an agenda
that prioritized neutralizing the waterfront’s crimps at the expense of pursuing a full
achievement of seamen’s rights. Tellingly, the Conference made two crucial
compromises during the legislative process of a bill that would eventually become the
White Act of 1898, revealing the limitations of their own powers in regard to reforming
the status of merchant mariners under U.S. law. Furuseth and the SUP had pushed
legislation aggressively in the months following Robertson v. Baldwin, enlisting the
support of Senator Stephen White of California in drafting a bill that would extend the
provisions of the Maguire Act of 1895 by establishing legal protections for seamen who
deserted their vessels on coastwise journeys, among several other provisions. In
reviewing the proposed bill, the Joint Conference decided to submit their
recommendations to the New York City Marine Association, an organization of
businessmen involved in the city’s maritime commerce industry. The Association advised
the Joint Conference to back down on the bill’s strict abolishment of wage allotments,
arguing that such a clause could prove damaging to the city’s shipping industry. As
Mansfield explains, “They remembered the experience of owners and captains in 1884,
when allotments were abolished, except to relatives, and the crimps struck back by tying
up the whole port. With this in mind, the Association was naturally not in favor of any
measure that was in any way likely to jeopardize shipping, even temporarily, and it was
convinced that regulation of allotments would not work any better in 1897 than it did in
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1884.”61 The abolition of allotments was a key issue for the SUP, and the Joint
Conference’s acquiescence to the Marine Association’s recommendation widened a rift
between the union and maritime ministry organizations that would persist well into the
twentieth century. Looking back on the decision years later, Mansfield expressed regret
for giving the union reason to distrust the Joint Conference:
It was just the kind of thing to confirm Furuseth and the seamen’s union in their
suspicions. For their own part, they were not interested in any compromise, but
they were not as yet strong enough to carry both measures through. The first bill
passed, but the more important second bill, with its provisions about shipping
agents and allotments, was held over to the next session. We lost a chance there,
for with the support of the Joint Conference it would not doubt have passed.62
The rift with Furuseth’s union was compounded by the Conference’s decision to
leave language regarding the legality of imprisoning seamen as punishment for desertion
vague enough so as to be left to the inclinations of local courts. Mansfield attributed this
decision to the necessity of compromising on some points in order to get the larger bill,
with its many other provisions, passed.63 Regardless, the fact that the Joint Conference
was willing to let the issue of desertion recede into the background reveals that their
priorities in reforming the waterfront lay elsewhere, specifically in those issues that
applied to the functional regulation of maritime commerce and the restoration of
respectable society to waterfront districts rather than issues related directly to seamen’s
rights. Even given the relatively conservative agenda of the Joint Conference, their
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platform proved too radical for some members. ASFS representatives who attended early
meetings quickly dropped out, refusing to offer financial support to fund a General Agent
in port, and expressing a reluctance to join in any collaborative advocacy work at the
expense of the independent operation of their own Society. The Marine Association too,
after making its recommendations regarding allotment notes, dropped out of the
Conference in the wake of the White Act’s passage in 1898, having become “convinced
that the Conference was merely a group of impractical visionaries.”64 SCI was left to take
over primary responsibility for the operation of the Joint Conference, with Mansfield and
lawyer J. Augustus Johnson continuing their leadership roles during the years leading up
to the 1915 LaFollete Seamen’s Act, which finally banned the use of imprisonment to
punish desertion once and for all.

Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s decision in Robertson v. Baldwin placed an emphatic
restriction, albeit temporary, on the mobility and individual liberty of merchant seamen
engaged in the waged labor of an industrializing economy of maritime commerce. The
outcome of the case ultimately proved that the mechanism of desertion, which merchant
seamen had harnessed for centuries as a tactic to maintain control over their own labor,
proved to be an essential threat both ideologically to a U.S. political economy that
increasingly privileged freedom of contract over freedom of person, and practically to the
agents of maritime commerce and its financiers. So great was the threat of desertion that
the Supreme Court was willing to put forward a distorted interpretation of the Thirteenth

64

Nock, Mansfield, Chapter Sixteen.

114

Amendment in order to put a stop to it. By the end of 187, the Arago deserters and all
merchant seamen found themselves excluded from the protections of the U.S.
Constitution and, by extension, the full rights and protections entitled by citizenship.
Other workers at the margins of the U.S. economy were similarly impacted by the
precedent that the Court’s decision had established. After Robertson v. Baldwin, a series
of decisions at the state and federal level involving potentially coercive contracts
explicitly drew on the Arago decision, including cases involving the long-term contracts
of black sharecroppers in the South and the contracts of Northern lumber workers who
were arrested on the charge of false pretense, or a failure to fulfill the terms of signed
contracts. Perhaps the most widely debated legal implication stemming from Robertson v.
Baldwin involved the annexation of Hawaii in July 1898; many politicians, labor leaders,
and members of the press feared that the Arago decision provided sufficient precedent for
Hawaii’s existing system of indentured servitude to be legally absorbed into the U.S.,
sparking an explosive political controversy that recalled the “popular sovereignty”
debates over the expansion of slavery into U.S. territories during the 1850s.65 In addition
to Hawaii, a rash of state and federal cases broke out centered on the imprisonment of
laborers for not fulfilling contracts under a “false pretense” clause that derived from the
Supreme Court’s handling of the Arago seamen.66 Such coercive contracts were not
exclusive to the South. During the first decade of the twentieth century, three Northern
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states–Minnesota in 1901, Michigan in 1903, and Maine in 1907–enacted false pretense
statutes that were designed to keep workers who had received transportation to remote
lumber or mining sites under work schedules as specified in contracts signed in advance
under threat of imprisonment.67 By 1911, the tide had started to turn. In Bailey v.
Alabama (1911) the Supreme Court struck down false pretense statutes as violating the
Peonage Act of 1867.
Merchant seamen, who were protected from imprisonment if they deserted within
a U.S. port by the White Act of 1898, were still subject to such punishment in foreign
ports until the Seamen’s Act of 1915, which brought seamen into a system of labor that
was gradually modernizing as it emerged out of the spirit of reform that defined the
Progressive Era. The Seamen’s Act of 1915 marked the legislative realization of a turn in
public opinion against the exceptional status of merchant seamen under U.S. law that
began with the Arago seamen and their encounter with the Supreme Court. This
exceptional status, one that had been imposed upon seamen since the earliest years of the
Republic, pushed the Arago deserters to the margins of the U.S. Constitution and
citizenship. The resolution of their case, and the awakening of sentiment that it induced
within the sphere of public opinion, gave belated shape to the parameters of contract
labor in the wake of the Thirteenth Amendment and set fundamental precedent as the
nation entered the twentieth-century. The sinking of Titanic would initiate another wave
of public attention and sympathy paid to the issue of seamen’s rights. The safety at sea
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movement, which prompted international inquiries, created a voracious public appetite
for reform, and provoked an awakening of radical maritime labor activism in British and
U.S. ports, leading to a political reckoning that resulted in the 1915 Seamen’s Act. This
reckoning, and the confrontations between a matrix of competing interests and agendas
that it involved, is the subject of Chapter Three.
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CHAPTER THREE

“The 1915 Seamen’s Act: The Titanic Disaster, the 1912 Transport Workers’
Federation Strike, and Progressive Era Maritime Labor Reform”
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Introduction

The decision of the Supreme Court in Robertson v. Baldwin went a step beyond
reinforcing the long-established legal status of merchant seamen as wards of the state. In
denying the Arago deserters protections under the Thirteenth Amendment, the Court
proved that it was willing to deny seamen their full entitlements as citizens of the United
States in order to uphold freedom of contract and protect the absolute power of masters
and mates in maintaining an orderly, productive maritime labor pool. In doing so, the
Court continued a long tradition of paradoxical regulation of the merchant marine; as
wards of the state, seamen were both entitled to extraordinary protections from the state,
and subject to extraordinary measures of control.
Robertson v. Baldwin aroused public sentiment and proved useful for maritime
labor unions in advocating for an abolition of imprisonment as penalty for desertion. The
1898 White Act ostensibly did just that in U.S. and foreign ports near the nation’s
coastlines, but its language was vague enough to allow for interpretation, and, more
problematic for seamen, the law neglected to protect them in foreign ports, where they
were often coerced into leaving their ships so that a new crew could be hired at cheaper
rates determined by local market conditions.
The sinking of the White Star Line’s “unsinkable” liner Titanic in April 1912
prompted another wave of public sympathy for those who worked on merchant ships, this
time on an unprecedented scale. Between April 15 and June 26, 1912, a period that
begins on the day of the sinking and ends with the declaration of a massive seamen’s
strike along the East Coast, the New York Times alone ran 1,192 articles that mentioned
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Titanic.1 A combination of the press, reformers, labor unionists, and politicians turned the
public’s insatiable appetite for news and content related to the disaster into a powerful
sympathy that was put to use in a number of ways. The International Seamen’s Union
(ISU), which had been active since 1898 in lobbying Congress for a revised version of
the White Act, found themselves in a position to push for even more aggressive
legislation than even they had previously thought possible. Certain Progressive
politicians, caught up in the interventionist fervor of the era, were eager to ally
themselves with maritime labor union leaders and acted on prevailing public sentiment to
introduce said legislation. And, reformers in New York City, the port to which Titanic
was bound and where its survivors arrived on board Carpathia, launched the next phase
of their maritime ministry project surreptitiously on the very morning that word about the
sinking reached shore.
Meanwhile, industrial maritime labor unions in Britain and the East Cost U.S.
initiated waves of direct action. Marine firemen on both sides of the Atlantic led walkoffs and an intersectional strike that placed demands on shipping companies to provide
more provisions to ensure safety at sea, better food and quarters on ships, and most
important of all in the U.S., recognition of the unions that collectively formed the
Transport Workers Federation, a fledgling syndicalist organization with a mission to
organize all of the industrial trades along the waterfront in port towns along the East
Coast.
Shipowners, on the other hand, were put on the defensive in publicly justifying
their business practices. J.P. Morgan, acting as both head of the recently formed shipping
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combination the International Mercantile Merchant Company, and Board member and
lead donor to the Seamen’s Church Institute’s new headquarters at 25 South Street, found
himself the target of enraged and emboldened industrial maritime unionists in New York.
Pacific Coast shipowners such as magnate Capt. Robert Dollar were called before a series
of Congressional committee hearings considering maritime labor reform following
Titanic’s sinking and offered testimony that opposed reforms, while facing harsh
questioning from committee members about the rights afforded to seamen on their
vessels, the methods by which they were compensated, and the measures in place to
ensure their safety. These three issues–seamen’s emancipation, equalization of wages,
and safety at sea–came to form the essence of the 1915 Seamen’s Act, introduced in
Congress by Republican Senator Robert La Follette of Wisconsin.
This chapter offers new insights into the 1915 Seamen’s Act by retracing the
political trajectory generated by confrontations between merchant seamen and shoreside
people and institutions. Part I focuses on April through July 1912, during which time a
remarkable series of interrelated events took place. The coincidental and tragic alignment
of Titanic’s sinking with the ceremonial opening of SCI headquarters at 25 South Street
created momentum for the development of philanthropic rhetoric that emphasized
merchant seamen’s status as wards, energized public sympathy regarding safety at sea
issues, and provided a powerful justification for the Institute’s audacious maritime
ministry project in the heart of Manhattan’s sailortown.
Less than two weeks later, the firemen of Titanic’s sister ship, Olympic walked
off their jobs in Southampton in protest over unseaworthy lifeboats just minutes before a
scheduled departure, prompting the authorities to charge the men with mutiny, and
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sparking a crisis in the maritime labor market that led to a court decision that ultimately
protected the supposedly mutinous firemen on the grounds of the legitimacy of their
protests regarding safety at sea. Industrial unionism had taken hold in Britain under the
leadership of J. Havelock Wilson and the British Seamen and Firemen’s Union just one
year prior, and it took little time for its impact to be felt in British ports, and eventually,
across the Atlantic. In late June of 1912, tens of thousands of waterfront workers struck
up and down the East Coast of the U.S., called to a general transport workers strike by
industrial maritime unionists in New York. Inspired by their counterparts in Britain, the
fledgling TWF attempted to unite all of the disparate units of waterfront labor that rapid
industrialization had divided along the lines of trade, skill, and race.
Ultimately, a constellation of conservative forces tamped down the spirit of
industrial unionism in New York in 1912. Shipping companies fought back with strike
breakers. Local police launched attacks on sailortown. The Seamen’s Church Institute,
having declared war on the district’s nefarious elements, began construction on a milliondollar headquarters dedicated to saving the seaman from himself, backed by the funding
of J.P. Morgan and a long list of industrialists. Finally, the ISU, an affiliate of the
American Federation of Labor (AFL), which had persistently refused to support the
transport workers’ strike, focused instead on its partnerships with Congress to push ahead
with a legislative agenda that coopted the energies of industrial maritime unionists to
secure passage of a signature legislative accomplishment in 1915.
Part II of this chapter transitions from the contexts leading up to the bill’s
introduction in 1912 to focus on the mechanisms of its eventual passage in 1915.
Whereas seamen’s emancipation and safety at sea were issues that provided the bill’s
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advocates with powerful rhetorical weapons, the greatest impact of the 1915 Seamen’s
Act was the range of mobility that it afforded merchant seamen in port. Robertson v.
Baldwin had shed light on the exceptional limitations on freedom of person that limited
merchant seamen’s entitlements as citizens. The reforms to seamen’s mobility in port that
began in 1898 with the White Act were radically reshaped in 1915. The fundamental
right to shore leave for all seamen, long established and honored, combined with the
newly won right to quit without fear of imprisonment that the 1915 Act guaranteed,
created a maelstrom of confrontations between seamen, masters and mates, and shoreside
agents that would take decades to resolve. Specifically, the Act unwittingly created a
means to circumvent immigration laws that would steadily develop into a full-fledged
political crisis known as the “alien seamen” problem. Asian seamen, especially Chinese,
who had provided a cheap labor source for steamships operating in the Pacific, most
explicitly posed a challenge to the mechanisms of racial control put in place by the
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and the Immigration Act of 1907.
The 1915 Seamen’s Act was, in part, the product of the ISU’s rejection of the
TWF’s syndicalism, and the Union’s determination to pursue practical gains through
political means that would ultimately sustain protections for white, U.S. citizen, skilled
maritime workers and, by extension, bolster membership to their own organization. The
central irony at the heart of the 1915 Seamen’s Act was that in successfully tamping
down the momentum of industrial unionism in favor of the AFL’s brand of voluntarism,
the legislation that the ISU and their Progressive allies in Congress steered into law
would eventually lead to a crisis of U.S. citizenship in which merchant seamen were at
the center. Ultimately, Progressive reforms to seamen’s emancipation, equalization, and
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safety at sea once again asked questions of and challenged the boundaries of U.S.
citizenship as codified in immigration law. This chapter investigates these motivating
factors, impacts, and fallouts that produced and were produced by the 1915 Seamen’s
Act.

Part I: Confrontations

The Cornerstone-laying Ceremony at 25 South Street
April 16, 1912 was supposed to be a day of celebration for supporters of the
Seamen’s Church Institute of New York (SCI). After years of planning and fundraising,
the Institute was finally ready to start construction on its new “million-dollar home for
sailors” at 25 South Street in lower Manhattan. The finished building would have
thirteen-stories of dormitory-style rooms and offer banking, employment, postal, and
medical services for the half-million seamen who annually passed through New York’s
busy downtown port.2 The Institute’s benefactors, including some of the city’s wealthiest
philanthropists, could rejoice in the fact that the unscrupulous boardinghouse keepers and
saloon owners of New York’s sailortown now had formidable competition.
To mark the day, SCI officials joined members of local government and
prominent clergy in the auditorium of the unfinished building to lay the cornerstone.
Mayor William Jay Gaynor and Episcopal Bishop of New York David H. Greer led the
ceremony, offering speeches praising the work of the institute and the humanity of the
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seaman.3 But the intended atmosphere of the gathering was dramatically affected by news
of a tragic coincidence: the unsinkable Titanic had been lost in the early hours of April
15th. The newspaper boys on the sidewalks outside the building shouted out headlines
reporting that fifteen hundred people had perished along with the ship. The pride of the
White Star Line, whose owner, J. Pierpont Morgan, had personally donated $100,000
toward construction of the SCI’s new building, would never reach her American home
port of New York.4
The news hit hard the shipping magnates and distinguished guests gathered inside
25 South Street. With so many of them directly affected by the tragedy, the cornerstonelaying ceremony transformed into an improvised service of mourning. Forced to address
the unthinkable loss, speakers made last-minute edits to their speeches. SCI became a
central site for the collective commemoration of Titanic’s sinking in the immediate
aftermath of the disaster. The newly dedicated building at 25 South Street became a point
of cultural intersection between the upper-class benefactors of the Institute and the
working-class seamen of the Port of New York, from the moment news about the sinking
of the ship first hit New York, and over a period of time that spans the “safety at sea”
reform movement and the violent waterfront protests that took place in the weeks after
the disaster.
The editors of The Lookout, SCI’s institutional publication issued monthly since
1910, devoted most of the April 1912 issue to an article titled “The Cornerstone Laid,”
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which detailed the ceremony at 25 South Street. Noting the “peculiar significance” of the
day, the writer describes the coincidental circumstances surrounding the ceremony:
And yet it seemed particularly appropriate that on this day, when heart and mind
were turned toward the sea and the sailors who had gone down beneath the deep
waters, there should be gathered a notable company of men and women to join in
a service marking one of the final steps in the completion of a tremendous project
solely for the benefit of seamen and their families.5

Considering its origins and the list of donors who contributed to the New Building Fund,
the cornerstone-laying ceremony represented a major event in the history of Lower
Manhattan. The mayor himself was on hand to personally lay and seal the stone along
with a Bible, annual reports of the Institute, and copies of the New York daily papers
with headlines of Titanic’s sinking. The mayor then delivered a brief speech, remarking
that “The fact that so many people came here to this remote part of the city to participate
in this ceremony shows more interest in it than I had anticipated, and shows that it is
certain to be a success.”6
The following day, The World ran a story about the institute’s new building with
the headline: “Deep Grief Told at Stone Laying of a Sea Home: Titanic Disaster Gives
Tragic Tone to the Formal Ceremony at the Church Institute, South Street.”7 The new
SCI headquarters was off to a solemn start.
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On April 18th, 220 survivors from Titanic’s crew arrived at Pier 54 in New York
on board RMS Carpathia.8 While some of the surviving passengers returned to their
homes or to the homes of friends or relatives, crewmembers were afforded no such
comfort. Still under employment of the White Star Line, the crew was ordered to remain
secluded aboard a moored ship in New York Harbor until the company was prepared to
ship them back to Southampton on Lapland.9
The surviving crew managed to escape their seclusion on April 19th hours before
Lapland's departure, to attend a service in their honor and receive some much-needed
refreshment at the American Seamen’s Friend Society, a seamen’s relief agency that had
been the leader in the field for much of the nineteenth century. Working in collaboration
with agents from SCI, the Society distributed to male crew members new sets of clothing,
underwear, shirts, socks, boots, a cap, suspenders, a safety razor, and a comb.
Additionally, twenty stewardesses were given complete outfits.10 Of equal value to the
survivors was an opportunity to escape from the captivity of their employers. The New
York Herald wrote on April 20th that the crew had decided to defy the men charged with
keeping them confined to Lapland to attend the service.11
In addition to charity, the crew’s escape also gained them access to the New York
press, to whom they were eager to express their discontent over how things had been
handled after the ship sank. The public sympathy that the sinking had sparked literally
overnight on the 12th granted the Titanic seamen a political power that they were quick to
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put to work for their own interests against their employers. Their quotations in the local
press on the 19th represent an early incarnation of laborite activism that the Titanic
disaster spawned in its wake, which would repeat itself several times leading up to
passage of the 1915 Seamen’s Act.
For some of the surviving crew, grievances began while they were still in the icy
water. Speaking to reporters, some of the crew complained of the “millionaire’s boat,” a
name given to one particular lifeboat containing some of the ship’s wealthier passengers.
The sailors who manned that particular lifeboat were supposedly given handsome
bonuses after Carpathia picked them up.12 The New York Herald identified the gracious
donor as Mrs. John Jacob Astor and claimed that the crewmembers who rowed her to
safety were each given $20 in gold.13 One of the ship’s surviving firemen who was on a
different lifeboat expressed his frustration to the New York Times: “And we…we who
saved immigrant women and their children, we get nothing. It ain’t fair…”14 An editorial
to the New York Times from an “ex-purser” echoed the fireman’s indignation, suggesting
that some of the thousands of dollars donated toward relief of the ship’s third-class
passengers should go to the crew, “many if not all of whom manned the lifeboats.”15
A major issue for the crew was that their pay schedules stopped midocean with
the sinking of the ship, despite having signed articles for a full voyage.16 Able seaman
Ralph White, of Southampton, was quoted in the New York Evening Journal as a
spokesman for the crew:
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We signed up for the entire voyage, but the White Star officials claim that our
wages ceased when the Titanic went under. In the face of these circumstances it
would have been better had we all gone down with the ship as in that case our
families would have been provided for by the workingmen’s compensation law,
and we would not have faced actual starvation as now seems to be our lot.17

The same New York Evening Journal article claimed that in addition to denying the crew
full compensation for the voyage, the White Star Line denied the crew money to wire
home to their families to tell them that they were safe, and that the crew would have to
work during their return voyage to Southampton to pay for their passage aboard
Lapland.18
While the surviving crew’s three days in New York were not without controversy,
the day after their departure on Lapland was dedicated to mourning and commemoration.
A service was held at SCI’s Church of the Holy Comforter on 341 West Street on Sunday
April 21st. It was attended by 400 people, three-fourths of whom were sailors who:
…sat together in the pews on one side of the church. Their faces were sad, for
many of them had friends among the Titanic crew, and to those who had no
intimate associations with any of the victims there was brought with renewed
force the realization of the terrors and dangers of their lives at sea.19

The sinking of Titanic hit the New York City waterfront hard. As the benefactors
of SCI sermonized on the tragedy of the sailor’s life, working seamen mourned the loss
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of friends who had gone down with the ship. The tragedy gave a public voice to the
crew’s survivors, and stirrings of resentment began to surface in the press that would
echo strongly in the following weeks of labor protest and reform.
The forces of nature had consumed Titanic, and in the months following the
tragedy, forces of an entirely different nature would consume the New York City
waterfront. Safety at sea, or lack thereof, was in the public conversation, and the
waterfront unions saw their opportunity for much-needed reform.

Mutiny on the RMS Olympic
As Lapland made its way back across the Atlantic, RMS Olympic was making
final preparations for its April 24th departure in the opposite direction. Olympic was a
White Star Line sister ship of Titanic and had received the doomed vessel’s distress call
at sea the night of April 15th. Captain Haddock of the Olympic ordered his ship full speed
ahead for a reported eighteen hours before receiving a wireless message from Carpathia
reporting that all lifeboats had been picked up and that there was no more that could be
done. Olympic’s crew changed direction and headed back to their home port dejected and
“amazed at the magnitude of the disaster,” according to the Southampton press.20 Capable
of taking on 1,400 passengers for transatlantic voyages, Olympic was selected to replace
Titanic on the sailing list and continue operation of the White Star Line’s fleet of giant
luxury liners.21
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By Monday the 22nd, workmen were busy installing collapsible lifeboats on
Olympic, which was due to sail for New York on the 25th. “With the boats already
swinging from the great liner’s davits,” the Southampton paper Southern Daily Echo
optimistically reported, “there will be now ample accommodation for every soul on board
her in the boats in case of emergency.”22 The crew, however, was not quite ready to get
back to business as usual. Titanic’s sinking had raised legitimate questions about how
capable passenger ships were of handling disasters at sea. The issue of lifeboats, both
their quantity and quality, was emerging as a particularly urgent problem. Further, as
would be become evident, the crew of the Olympic were emboldened by the wave of
public sympathy that had developed in reaction to the sinking of their sister ship. Like the
surviving crew in New York before them, Olympic’s crew took full advantage of the
moment to take action against the White Star Line, inciting an audacious walk-off and
strike that would bring many of them before the bench of the Portsmouth courts under
charges of mutiny. Whereas the Olympic mutiny was isolated to Southern England,
similar confrontations between seamen and the state would quickly spread to the U.S.
For the firemen of Olympic, the collapsible lifeboats provided on board were
simply not good enough. With the vessel in its final preparations for departure from port,
a contingent of firemen, greasers, and trimmers walked down the only gangway still in
position at the stern of the ship and “trooped ashore in Indian file with their kit bags over
their shoulders.” A crowd that had gathered to see the liner off was left to gawk at “the
faces of tier upon tier of passengers” looking down on a “strange and unrehearsed scene
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in puzzled wonder.”23 The New York Times reported that the striking crew justified their
actions by claiming that the collapsible lifeboats, which had been transferred to Olympic
from a troopship, were “rotten and unseaworthy and would not open.” Just twenty
minutes before Olympic was scheduled to leave port, a significant
number of the crew had “collected their kits, and left the ship, singing, ‘We’re All Going
the Same Way Home.’”24
The striking crew stalled Olympic in port, and the incident received international
attention, riding on the wave of public interest generated by the sinking of Titanic just
nine days prior. With her noontime scheduled departure passed by, Olympic’s passengers
found themselves stranded on board, now witnesses to what the New York Times
described as “pandemonium on the quay.”25 A crowd of firemen led by an improvised
“tin-whistle band under the direction of a self-appointed conductor” gathered about the
ship and prevented anyone from getting on board. A hurried meeting convened by the
British Seafarer’s Union was held in a nearby shed. Arthur Cannon, Secretary of the
Union, led the crew in a vote, and “with complete unanimity” the men voted against
returning to the ship.26
The following day, with Olympic still in port, the striking firemen were allowed to
test the collapsible lifeboats themselves. Four boats were launched, and, while three
appeared seaworthy, the fourth had been badly damaged and leaked profusely. Local
press reported that the striking crew remained unsatisfied with the collapsible lifeboats,
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and that during the inspection “one of their number had pushed his thumb through the
canvas hull” of a boat that was clearly unseaworthy. 27 The White Star Line agreed to
replace any of the lifeboats judged to be unsatisfactory, but the strikers had a new
demand: dismiss all of the firemen who had remained on board the ship the previous day
when the decision was made to strike.28
Members of the British Seafarers’ Union rallied in support of the strike, gathering
along the quay and blocking all entrances to the docks. The spectacle of the previous
day’s events continued, with the Union “stokers’ band” dispatched to the scene, “led by a
man dressed as a Redskin” who “directed the spirits of the men into a harmless
channel.”29 Meanwhile, the White Star Line had recruited a replacement crew in an
attempt to salvage the voyage. In addition to dismissing the firemen who refused to walk
off, the strikers now demanded that the replacement crew, who were non-union, be
dismissed as well. An official of the White Star Line sent a telegram to the local press,
affirming that any willingness to compromise with the striking crew had reached a
breaking point:
We are asked to dismiss non-Union substitutes obtained and those firemen
regularly signed on who refused to desert with majority. We have replied
agreement to provide non-Union men with special employment, but we
will abandon Olympic sailing rather than dismiss men who remained
loyal.30
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The White Star Line’s hard line stance provoked an unexpected response from
their remaining “loyal” crew. Deck hands, learning of the arrival of non-union
replacement crew, with spirits aroused by the company’s treatment of their fellow sailors,
promptly dropped everything, “scrambled on board the tug which had brought the new
firemen, and refused to any further duty.” At this point, the Shipping Commissioner
involved himself by pulling alongside the tug in a harbor vessel and accusing the deck
crew assembled there of mutiny and ordering them to return to their ship. The crew
refused, and soon thereafter the police had 53 deck hands in custody. The seamen, for
their part, reportedly “offered no resistance to the police and were quite cheerful in their
demeanor, smoking their pipes, and chatting together, as they were marched off.31
The 53 prisoners were brought before the court in Portsmouth and charged under
section 225 of the British Merchant Shipping Act, which stated that “if any seaman was
guilty of willful disobedience to lawful command he should be liable to be imprisoned for
a period not exceeding four months.” The defense claimed that the deck hands walked off
not because the replacements were non-union men, but because they were a “scratch”
crew with little or no experience, and that they “refused to risk their lives with such
men,” instead electing to jump ship and join the firemen in striking. Additionally, more
“sensational suggestions” were made regarding the life-saving equipment and manning of
Olympic.32
Upon hearing arguments from both sides, the Bench reached the decision that the
men had indeed willfully disobeyed the lawful commands of Olympic’s captain, finding
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the defendants guilty of mutiny. The court’s sentencing of the mutineers, however,
proved almost as sensational as the men’s actions themselves, and provides evidence of
the prevailing mood of the public and, in this case, the rule of law, regarding issues
related to safety at sea in the immediate wake of the Titanic disaster. “Now comes our
difficulty,” began Chairman Thomas, in delivering the court’s decision:
We are all human, and these men are human and the question is what are we to do
with them? What punishment to inflict? We have been passing through a very,
very serious time and everybody is obsessed with the frightful calamity which
took place in the Atlantic Ocean. We can’t drive it out of our minds, and it is
apparent to us that it is in the minds of these men, and they did on this occasion
what, under other circumstances, they would not have done.
Thomas continued, praising the behavior of the men in court, the kind words that
Captain Haddock had testified regarding the character of his crew, and stated that the
court “would like to see confidence restored among them.” He maintained that the court
simply could not sentence the men to terms of imprisonment, nor could it fine them.
Rather, “having regard to all the circumstances under which the offense was committed,”
the court dismissed the case outright and ordered the men back to work. The headlines
that followed summarized the remarkable proceedings: “Charge Proved but Men
Dismissed: Don’t Do it Again!”33
The sinking of Titanic directly informed the mutiny on Olympic, meaning that just
nine days after the ship went down, the conversation about safety at sea had taken on a
decidedly radical tone. Furthermore, public sentiment regarding the crisis of safety at sea
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had directly affected the decision of the Portsmouth court in their exceptionally lenient
sentencing of Olympic’s mutinous crew. The resolution of the case, in which themutinous
seamen were found guilty of all charges but released without any sentence to
imprisonment, or any other punishment, speaks volumes about not only prevailing public
sentiment, but also the gradual tilt of the court system in support of a class of workers
whose labor the Titanic disaster had revealed to be worthy of public support and the
protection of the state. Both of these impacts stemming from the Titanic disaster would
endure in scale and duration, reaching New York City and the sailortowns of the eastern
seaports of the U.S. in the months that followed.

The Transport Workers General Strike in New York
On May 25th, one month after the Olympic mutiny, the Marine Journal printed an
article titled “Seamen’s Unions and the Titanic Disaster,” criticizing maritime unions for
the “ridiculous and unbearable demands” made in the wake of Titanic’s sinking and
accusing the labor groups of “using this catastrophe as a club…to hold over the heads of
vessel owners.” In addition to stricter safety requirements, union leaders in London were
now demanding that at least two white seamen in addition to a white coxswain be
employed for every lifeboat on board, a response to an influx of Asian seamen working
for American and British companies. Citing the Olympic mutiny as an example of the
lengths to which unions would go to get their way, the writer then praises the safety
record of the maritime industry: “There will always be risk in travel on sea or land, and
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what the genius of man has done to conquer the former in making it safer…commands
the admiration of all right-thinking men and women.”34
By late June, the American unions were making demands for comprehensive
reform. The White Act of 1898 had been a significant win for seamen and maritime labor
activists in ending imprisonment of seamen who quit their vessels in U.S. ports,
abolishing corporal punishment, and establishing minimum requirements for living
conditions on board. Andrew Furuseth and the International Seamen’s Union (ISU)
prepared to build on this legislative victory by cooperating with Progressive Democrats in
Congress to introduce the first iteration of the 1915 Seamen’s Act. Meanwhile, rank and
file maritime workers in New York faced an expiring contract that they had negotiated
with the shipping companies in June 1911. That contract had been signed by members of
the Waterfront Federation, formed through an alliance of three previously distinct unions
of cooks, seamen, and firemen that had struck for nine days during negotiations. The
alliance was formed during the winter convention of the ISU in Baltimore, when the
prospect of establishing an industrial department of maritime workers in the American
Federation of Labor (AFL), to which the ISU belonged, was rejected, prompting many
cooks, seamen, and firemen along the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts to federate. On April 15,
1912, the same day that news of Titanic’s sinking reached shore and the Seamen’s
Church Institute laid its cornerstone at 25 South Street, the new Federation moved to
change to the National Transport Workers’ Federation of America (TWF), with the
express objective to unionize all of the industrial trades associated with waterfront labor,

34

“Seamen’s Unions and Trade Demands.”

137

including the firemen, oilers, engineers, cooks, stewards, coalpassers, watertenders,
teamsters, seamen, hoist engineers, and longshoremen.35
The transformation of the U.S. merchant shipping industry from sail to steam
engine technology had profound impacts on maritime and waterfront workers.
Industrialization divided seamen on their own ships, separating engineers and other
skilled occupations from the firemen, oilmen, stewards, and other so-called “unskilled”
trades. Industrialization also intensified craft divisions between seamen and waterfront
workers such as longshoremen and hoist engineers who were responsible for loading and
unloading cargo. In addition to craft, seamen persistently struggled to overcome other
divisions that were inherent to the industry, such as geography, type of carrier, race, and
ethnicity. These trade distinctions produced divisions within organized labor, with each
trade forming its own union and typically resisting intersectional alliances. As one
Federation leader put it during the strike, “[t]he trouble seems to be that we have too
many unions and not enough unionism.”36
Maritime labor in Britain, which had adopted steam technology at a pace that was
several decades ahead of the U.S., had reckoned with these divisions in 1911 when the
National Sailors’ and Firemen’s Union led a national seamen’s strike against the British
Shipping Federation and its interests, uniting many disparate maritime and waterfront
workers and winning recognition from many shipping companies in the process. Back in
the U.S. in 1912, workers from around the country followed the International Workers of
the World-led textile strikes in Lawrence, Massachusetts, in which unprecedented
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solidarity across race, ethnicity, and craft demonstrated the potential that industrial
unionism had in fighting against American business combinations. The membership of
the TWF were directly inspired by these concurrent developments in international
organized labor, printing articles in both English and Spanish translation about the textile
strikes as they developed in their newsletter Labor Culture, and inviting J. Havelock
Wilson, head of the NSFU, to come to New York to speak to striking firemen two weeks
into the strike. The formation of the Federation itself was an act of solidarity, uniting the
Marine Firemen, Oilers and Watertenders’ Union of the Atlantic and Gulf, the Atlantic
Coast Semaen’s Union, the Harbor Boatmen’s Union of New York and Vicinity, and the
General Longshoremen of the Port of New York under one masthead. The NSFU itself
was listed as an “affiliated union” on the eve of the strike in 1912.37
In attempting to build solidarity along the waterfront and maritime trades, the
Federation positioned itself in direct opposition to the ISU and, by extension, the AFL.
For members of the Federation, the ISU had become “influenced by the conservation
tactics” of the AFL, whose leaders they accused of having “been allowed year after year
to slip by without accomplishing anything.”38 Denouncing “parliamentarism” and craft
unionism, they openly criticized the AFL in print for its “reactionary politics,” for
“compromising with capitalists,” and for “merely seeking, at best, to patch up the
increasing holes made by that system.”39 Under the masthead of Labor Culture, the
Federation boldly proclaimed its motto: “SYNDICALISM, GENERAL STRIKE,
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DIRECT ACTION.” Thus, it is no surprise that Andrew Furuseth and the ISU largely
remained on the sidelines for the duration of the transport workers’ strike, not only
withholding direct support, but deliberately subverting the Federation’s efforts by
exacerbating divisions between trades.
On June 28th, Federation leaders met with officials from various steamship lines
at the offices of the Old Dominion Steamship Company at 81 Beach Street.40 The
meeting did not go well. On the following day, the Evening Mail reported “Thousands Go
Out in Coast Line Strike.”41 Thirty-three thousand men along the coast had reportedly
joined the strike by July 1st.42 Their list of demands included more sanitary sleeping
quarters, better quality food, and a work schedule of four hours on and eight hours off.
Most important of all was their demand for recognition of the union, which would
guarantee that seamen would be in control of hiring, circumventing shipping offices and
their agents.43
Whereas the shipping companies might have been receptive to the seamen’s
demands for changes to working conditions and hours, they were far less willing to
relinquish control of the manning process to the union and its agents. In the local papers,
officials from the shipping companies depicted the seamen’s demand for recognition of
the union as unreasonably invasive, suggesting that such recognition would mean that the
companies could only employ men supplied by the union, that all men in the engine room
would be under review by the union and subject to immediate discharge if they refused to
join the union, and that a union delegate would need to be employed on every ship to
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ensure that no violations of the terms of contract were committed by the officers and
engineers.44 As one shipping company representative put it, “maritime laws from time
immemorial have provided that the captain is the supreme authority on board ship. Proper
discipline cannot be obtained if the captain divides his authority with the union.”45
For the union men, without control over hiring the shipping companies would
continue to require men to ship out from their offices, continuing a practice that had
plagued the waterfront with corruption since the days of the notorious crimps of
nineteenth century sailortowns. Writing in Labor Culure, the TWF’s editors predicted
dire consequences for relinquishing control to the shipping companies: “[w]ere the Union
not recognized, were men not shipping through its offices there would spring up again
like mushrooms those men who, by an organized system of graft, would see that those
only whom they wish are shipped or discharged.”46
Sailors’ boardinghouses lay at the heart of the conflict over hiring between the
shipping companies and the seamen. Boardinghouse keepers were at the center of the
crimping scheme, designed to bilk the seaman out of his money while ashore, and force
him into a sort of peonage from which all involved profited except the seaman himself.
Chief engineers involved in these schemes would take payments from boardinghouse
keepers, who made sure that only seamen who stayed at their houses and accumulated
debts would ship out on outgoing vessels. Indebted seamen would have their wages
turned over by the shipping companies directly to the boardinghouse masters to whom
they owed money from their last time in port. The editors of Labor Culture compared the
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agent of this system to a “White Slaver” who “commerces in the bodies of the poor”
through prostitution trafficking. “Why, if we wanted a job,” the article continues, “we
had to eat at their place [boardinghouse] and spend our earnings there. Then we were sold
to a chief engineer for a box of cigars or a dollar or two.”47
With the strike on and the boardinghouses full of striking seamen, speculation
arose along the waterfront “as to which side these landlords would take.”48 Prevalent
opinion seemed to suggest that the chief engineers, siding with the shipping companies to
end the strike so as to return to the old system of hiring, would enlist the boardinghouse
keepers to aid them in undermining the striking Federation. However, not all keepers
came out against the strikers. “For a time the boarding masters wavered,” Labor Culture
reported: “[n]ow they have sided with the striking firemen, which gives evidence of our
power.” The Federation followed their claim of support with a series of letters sent to the
Marine Firemen’s Union from Spanish boardinghouse keepers in Manhattan, expressing
their solidarity and offering material support for the strikers. Among the authors of these
letters were José Boasoa García of 362 West 11th Street, Juan Barreiro Lopez of 167
Perry Street, Pedro Rodríguez of 174 Perry Street, Juan López of 168 South Street, Juan
Bareia of 313 Water Street, Juan Lavalle of 171 Perry Street, and more than a dozen
more, all offering free lodging and food to striking firemen. Some of the keepers reported
that they were currently providing free lodging for fifty men, with resources to provide
for another hundred. Smaller houses offered what they could, such as free haircuts, or the
offer of open lines of credit.49
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It is likely that such offers were exaggerated in print by the Federation to project a
reassuring sense of solidarity to its readers, or in an attempt to intimidate the shipping
companies by publishing evidence that the striking firemen had such material support,
“even if it be for more than a year,” as one keeper’s letter proclaimed. Two things,
however, are indisputable. First is the fact that ethnic solidarity among Spanish
waterfront workers played a major role in initiating and maintaining the strike. James
Vidal, a Spanish immigrant, leader of the Marine Firemen’s Union, and editor of Labor
Culture, estimated that in 1912 sixty percent of firemen, oilers, and water tenders in New
York were of Spanish descent. The ISU had previously attempted to organize these
Spanish maritime workers but had been unsuccessful. Vidal and the Marine Firemen’s
Union had more success, communicating in the workers’ native language through mass
meetings, lectures, and Labor Culture, which was printed in both Spanish and English
translations, with the message of solidarity against not only the shipping companies, but
also nefarious boardinghouse keepers and engineers who were forming combinations to
exploit them. In addition to Spaniards, the union succeeded in recruiting Portuguese,
Greeks, and maritime workers “of other Latin races” to join.50
Second, the boardinghouses that served as temporary homes and decentralized
headquarters for strike operations posed a formidable threat to local authorities tasked
with restoring order to the city’s shipping industries. In addition to the Federation’s
headquarters at 225 West Street, strikers used boardinghouses scattered throughout lower
Manhattan as hubs for the exchange of information, planning, and comradery. For
example, strikers established a subsidiary headquarters at the boardinghouse at 17
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Hamilton Avenue, where police reported there was a consistent crowd “of fifty or sixty
men always hanging about the place.”51 These congregations often provoked open
conflict with the police and coordinated violence from both sides of the strike. July 8th
was a day of particularly pitched violence, in which one rioter and two policemen were
shot, and Spanish and Greek oilers were at the center of a “wild throng” following a fight
at a boardinghouse and bar at the intersection of Cherry and Roosevelt Streets that pitted
strikers against strike breakers. When police arrived on the scene, they were met pistol
fire and a shootout that took place in the streets of the Fourth Ward. Two policemen were
shot, and one striking Spanish fireman, Jose Palmiera, was killed. The melee continued as
“roving strikers moved up and down South Street defying the police and assaulting men
that they supposed were strike breakers. The night concluded with a police raid on a
sailors’ boardinghouse at 21 James Slip, and the arrest of 37 strikers.5253
Other events over the course of the strike’s timeline suggest an intersectional
solidarity within Manhattan’s lower wards that extended beyond the boardinghouses and
even the maritime trades. On July 10th, after police had shot and killed striking fireman
Andreas Rodriguez, the TWF led a massive demonstration, carrying his coffin down the
length of West Street, around the Battery to Whitehall and South Streets and on to the
heart of sailortown down Roosevelt and Cherry Streets. A hearse led a procession of
some eighty carriages, but the strikers stopped the procession and removed the coffin,
lifting it overhead and marching to a Spanish funeral chant, with onlookers,
longshoremen, and other waterfront workers encouraged to walk off their jobs and join
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the strike.54 Such a demonstration was meant to foment intersectional solidarity among
the strikers and working-class residents of lower Manhattan. This tactic was repeated a
few days later on July 12th, when striking firemen, oilmen, and water tenders gathered
along the Hudson River to harass strike-breaking cooks and firemen leaving the Morgan
Line piers. At the sight of an arriving police squad, “the tenements about emptied
themselves, and soon the streets were filled with fighting men and women.” In the midst
of this riotous scene, “from roofs and windows there came a storm of bricks and stones”
that struck and injured several policemen. Order was restored when the police
successfully beat back the men, women, and children who had poured out of their
apartments into the streets back into the tenement buildings.5556
Local police reacted to such demonstrations of strength in numbers by revoking
licenses for parades, raiding and arresting strikers en masse, and locking down entire
neighborhoods of Lower Manhattan in as attempt to stifle dissent. Strikers, for their part,
focused their ire on J.P. Morgan, the “archmillionaire” and shipping magnate. The owner
of the International Mercantile Marine Company prevent all eight of his subsidiary
companies that operated out of Atlantic Coast ports from acquiescing to any of the
strikers’ demands.57 In turn, the TWF focused its rhetorical attack on Morgan and the
“gigantic beast of capital” in his control. Additionally, the Federation capitalized on
public sentiment regarding “safety at sea” and the recent memory of Titanic’s sinking to
sway public opinion against scabs and in support of the more skilled, competent, and
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experienced strikers. When the passenger liner SS St. Louis attempted to leave port with
an inexperienced scab crew, strikers flooded the pier holding signs that read “Passengers,
S.S. St. Louis is manned with an incompetent crew. Remember the Titanic.”58 The
strikers dispatched wagons displaying similar messages on banners in large font and
littered the waterfront with handbills in an attempt to prevent the liner’s departure.59
Ultimately, the strikers’ efforts were futile, and St. Louis got under way with its ragtag
crew and bewildered passengers. The rhetoric of safety at sea, however, proved a potent
weapon in critiquing the shipping companies for endangering their passengers, cargo, and
crew, as well as undermining solidarity among the strikebreakers. Early in the strike,
companies operating passenger liners ordered their ships to leave port and weigh anchor
in New York Harbor to allow time to recruit replacement crews. Eventually, many of
these ships successfully left port, according to Labor Culture, “under the guidance of
tailors and shoomakers [sic]” and “mere apprentices seeking a sea voyage at the
Companies’ expense.”60
While the number of striking seamen in New York was strong, the group
ultimately relied on the longshoremen to join them in order to truly disrupt waterfront
commerce.61 The shipping companies had anticipated the strike by training replacement
workers three weeks prior to the strike’s first day, and ships generally were able to
continue operating with minimal delays as a result.62 By July 1st, several papers reported
that thousands of longshoremen had joined the strike; but just a day later, the New York
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Times ran an article reporting that too few longshoremen had come out to cause the
shipping companies any significant disruption.63
Labor Culture ran several articles after the strike had been officially called off,
analyzing the reasons why it had ultimately been a failure. Reportedly, as early as June
30th, divisions within the union along lines of trade and ethnicity undermined the TWF’s
efforts to encourage intersectional solidarity and provoke a general transport strike in
New York. First, the marine cooks union abandoned the Federation to initiate their own
negotiations with the shipping companies. Then, the longshoremen and hoisting
engineers bowed out, leaving only the firemen and the seamen. The ISU, for its part, was
highly selective in what tepid support they offered the strike, losing vigor as time passed.
The TWF openly accused the ISU of neglecting to aid in recruiting the longshoremen,
offering a limited presence at mass meetings and parades, and failing to show up
altogether at the funeral procession of Andreas Rodriguez, fomenting deep resentment
between the trades.64 While some of the unorganized longshoremen joined the strike, the
majority of the AFL-affiliated International Longshoremen’s Union remained on the
sidelines. According to James Vidal, this division was drawn along ethnic lines, with the
English-speaking longshoremen refusing to join the Spanish-led strike.65
The ISU, through its leader Andrew Furuseth, turned its back on industrial
unionism and intersectional solidarity that spanned craft, race, and ethnicity in favor of
political reform through an alliance with Progressive politicians. Whereas the Union’s
determination to pursue practical gains through political means resulted passage of the

“4,000 Join Sea Strike, Expect 110,000 More,” Evening Journal (New York, NY), 1 July 1912 and “Few
Longshoremen Answer Strike Call,” New York Times, 2 July 1912.
64
“Strike Ended, War Begun! Betrayed!” Labor Culture, August 3, 1912.
65
“Facts About the Strike,” Labor Culture, August 3, 1912.
63

147

landmark 1915 Seamen’s Act, the Act’s core objectives of seamen’s emancipation, wage
equalization, and safety at sea would have unintended consequences. Rather than
protecting white, U.S. citizen, skilled merchant seamen labor, the 1915 Act would lead to
a crisis of U.S. citizenship at which merchant seamen were at the center.

Part II: Reform
The public interest in safety at sea reform that the tragedy of Titanic elicited,
combined with the clamor of the ensuing waterfront conflicts in both London and New
York City, brought the issue of maritime safety regulations and workers’ rights into the
public conversation. As Andrew Furuseth of the International Seamen’s Union (ISU)
described the public mood between 1912-1915, “The great sacrifice of life resulting from
the loss of the British steamship Titanic aroused the public mind of the civilized world to
a realization of the great and manifestly growing dangers of travel by sea.”66 In part
responding to this public appetite for reform, Progressive politicians took up the mantle
of safety at sea and made it a core component of their legislative efforts. The Democratic
Party platform for 1912 included a section on the U.S. merchant marine that called for the
“speedy enactment of laws for the greater security of life and property at sea.”67 In
addition to addressing safety at sea, Democratic politicians detailed plans for rebuilding
an American-citizen merchant marine that would simultaneously bolster U.S. trade
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overseas and provide the auxiliary support necessary for national defense and
increasingly urgent military ventures.
Woodrow Wilson, the Democratic nominee for President in 1912, delivered an
acceptance speech in New Jersey in which he commented at length on this aspect of the
Progressive political agenda. “Without a great merchant marine,” Wilson proclaimed,
“we can not take our rightful place in the commerce of the world.” Advocating for reform
of registry laws and tariffs on imports, Wilson continued:
Merchants who must depend upon the carriers of rival mercantile nations to carry
their goods to market are at a disadvantage in international trade too manifest to
need to be pointed out… Our industries have expanded to such a point that they
will burst their jackets if they can not find a free outlet to the markets of the
world; and they can not find routes they want them to go—and prefer the interest
of America in their sailing orders and their equipment.68

Finally, the Democratic party expressed support for the abolition of imprisonment of
seamen charged with desertion, stating that “[s]uch laws and treaties are un-American,
and violate the spirit, if not the letter, of the Constitution of the United States.”69
These three issues—seamen’s emancipation, the levelling of competition between
U.S.-flagged vessels and foreign operators, and safety at sea—came to form the essence
of what would become the 1915 Seamen’s Act. Whereas safety at sea dominated the
public’s attention and was the focus of more than half of the text of the 22-page bill, the
most radical components of the 1915 Seamen’s Act can be found in its sections detailing
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an architecture for seamen’s emancipation and equalization of wages that finally
provided resolution to debates and contestations over merchant seamen’s legal
entitlement to mobility in port.
The architects of the 1915 Seamen’s Act, designed principally by Furuseth and
navigated politically by La Follette, skillfully turned a range of rhetorical principles that
had been used in the past to impose restrictions on seamen’s mobility, liberty, and
masculinity into a powerful argument for unprecedented rights and entitlements for white
American seamen that were intended to equalize wages and bolster union membership.
Free labor, the paradoxical status of merchant seamen as wards of the state, and safety at
sea all provided rhetorical fodder for the bill’s advocates. White supremacy and flexible
capacity, as Justin Jackson has convincingly argued, were at the heart of advocates’
argument for the bill’s passage. This combination of principles represented a well of
bipartisan interests from which advocates could draw to construct speeches and detailed
defense strategies in the press and at Congressional hearings.

Historical Context
Foreign shipping increased fivefold during the years between the end of the Civil
War and the turn of the 20th century.70 During that time, the U.S. experienced a period of
broad and rapid industrialization. American shipbuilding was an exception to these
transformations, lagging behind Britain and other European nations that had been early
adopters of steam engine technology, leaving the U.S. behind in the twilight of its past
dominance during the Age of Sail. By 1905, of the 11,365 British ships were engaged in
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foreign trade, less than 20 percent were vessels that operated under the power of sail. By
contrast, of the United States’ meager 1,333 ships engaged in foreign trade, 73 percent
sailships. These disparities in both size and technological capacity of fleets produced an
imbalance in the total amount of cargo under each nation’s respective control. By 1905,
Britain had control of 17 million tons of the foreign trade, while the U.S. accounted for
less than 1 million tons, a number that the German, French, and Italian fleets all
surpassed on their own.71
As maritime policy historians Andrew Gibson and Arthur Donovan describe it,
these imbalances produced two corresponding “maritime scenarios” in the United States:
first, the steady industrial and civilian decline of maritime power produced an anxious
national desire to recapture lost American glory as an international maritime power; and
second, as the U.S. became increasingly entangled in global imperial competition, the
American government became newly determined to develop the diplomatic and military
instruments necessary to protect American interests overseas.72 Both of these scenarios
depended on seapower. The impacts of Alfred Thayer Mahan’s 1890 treatise on the
subject were profound, infiltrating political economic thought and shaping U.S. foreign
policy for decades following its publication. In The Influence of Seapower upon History,
Mahan theorized that oceans represented a “great common,” in which the balance of
exchange, trade, and wealth between nations were all determined. Merchant shipping,
protected by armed navies, was therefore essential for a nation to thrive economically.73
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The Spanish-American War had exposed the U.S. merchant marine as a major
point of vulnerability in U.S. foreign policy. The lack of U.S. citizen merchant mariners
forced American shipping companies to employ non-citizens on ships acting as
auxiliaries for naval operations during the War, relying particularly on Chinese seamen to
work in the Pacific. Following the War, Congress convened a Merchant Marine
Commission in 1903 to investigate the roots of the nation’s weaknesses in global
maritime shipping. The Commission found three principle flaws preventing the U.S. from
maintaining a viable merchant fleet and stable maritime labor pool of U.S. citizen
mariners. First, the high capital cost of American ships was preventing shipping
companies from expanding their fleets without relying on foreign shipbuilding and
foreign flag registry. Second, the high operating costs incurred by American ships,
primarily due to the cost of labor relative to cheaper foreign competition, discouraged
shipping companies from recruiting and employing American mariners. Third, American
shipping companies were competitively disadvantaged by a lack of government subsidies
that operators in Britain and European nations enjoyed.74
The 1903 Commission proposed solutions that represent what H. David Bess and
Martin T. Farris call the three “pillars of maritime policy”: subsidy, preference, and
cabotage. Government subsidies were distributed to shipping companies in the form of
mail carrier contracts. The 1904 Cargo Preference Act stipulated that all supplies moved
by sea for the U.S. armed forces had to be carried by American vessels under U.S.
registry, or in vessels owned by the U.S. government itself. Additionally, longstanding
cabotage laws that restricted maritime trade along U.S. coastlines to U.S.-owned, U.S.-
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built, and U.S.-crewed vessels were extended to Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and
Guam.75 Through its actions to bolster the U.S. merchant fleet and maritime labor pool,
the federal government indicated its embrace of Mahan’s theories regarding seapower
and its willingness to respond to the symptoms of decline identified by the 1903
Merchant Marine Commission.
The impacts of government action would take time to manifest, however.
President Roosevelt’s Great White Fleet, launched in 1907 with the intention of
demonstrating the regained glory and might of the U.S. Navy, was hampered throughout
its tour of the Pacific by a lack of adequate provisions for bunkering coal, forcing the
government to purchase and charter foreign tramp ships to keep the Fleet in motion. As
maritime historian Samuel Lawrence summarizes the scene, “this grand demonstration of
American power was attended by a motley array of colliers, tankers, and tenders bearing
the flags of the world.”76
The problems that the 1903 Merchant Marine Commission identified would linger
up to the outbreak of the Great War in Europe, casting new urgency on the issue of
American preparedness (or lack thereof) for engagement in international conflict on the
high seas. Long before U.S. entry into the War, U.S. export shipping was crippled by
persistent weaknesses in the nation’s merchant fleet. War meant that the two largest
merchant fleets, Britain and Germany, had been removed from global routing commerce,
leaving a relatively tiny American fleet to attempt, and fail, to pick up the slack.77
President Wilson’s administration responded immediately in order to get cargo moving
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again, establishing a Bureau of War Risk Insurance to underwrite potential losses for
American shipowners operating in hostile waters, liberalizing ship registry provisions
established by the 1912 Panama Canal Act to allow for transfer of certain foreign vessels
to the American registry, waiving certain stipulations requiring officers and crew to be
U.S. citizens, and suspending cabotage laws for the duration of the war.78
With the sinking of Luisitania on May 7, 1915, President Wilson gained
widespread public support for immediate military preparedness, which included direct
government funding of shipbuilding through the Shipping Act of 1916 and the
Emergency Shipbuilding Program. The 1915 Seamen’s Act, which determined the future
of government regulation over the U.S. maritime labor pool, was, in many ways, a
predecessor to these emergency measures to bolster the U.S. merchant fleet.

Political Context
While labor historians such as Leon Fink hail the Act as a signature Progressive
achievement of its time, some maritime policy historians are less celebratory, questioning
the Act’s impact while attributing the dramatic changes to U.S. merchant shipping and
maritime labor to the conditions of the command economy that World War I created.
More recent scholarship, such as that of Justin Jackson, has emphasized the white
supremacist and economic nationalist roots of early twentieth century maritime labor
reform, of which the 1915 Seamen’s Act was the culmination. In reality, the politics
behind the bill’s development was a nuanced combination of all of these factors.
According to Hyman Weintraub, the primary focus of Furuseth and the ISU in the wake
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of passage of the White Act was to advocate for protectionist legislative measures meant
to exclude Asian seamen from work on American vessels. The first incarnation of
legislation containing provisions for the abolition of imprisonment of seamen who
deserted in foreign ports was introduced in March 1904 by Rep. Edward J. Livernash of
San Francisco. Livernash’s bill also provided for the right of foreign seamen to desert in
American ports without fear of imprisonment, a clause that would become the most
radical aspect of the 1915 Seamen’s Act. This proposal was met with emphatic
opposition from a minority of legislators who objected to the U.S. interfering in
regulation of commerce in foreign nations, as well as the specter of an influx of “the
scum of all the foreign sailors.” Indeed, when a later version of the bill eventually was
passed in both the Senate and the House of Representatives in 1912, President Taft
vetoed it in one of the final acts of his presidency on the grounds that it might create
“friction with the commerce of foreign nations.”79
The elections of 1910, swept by Progressive Republicans and Democrats
including the United Mine Workers’ William B. Wilson, who joined with La Follette to
reintroduce the bill, and the incoming presidency of a seemingly sympathetic Woodrow
Wilson in 1912 gave the bill new momentum. The sinking of Titanic lent rhetorical
weight to Furuseth’s advocacy. As Weintraub describes it: “Safety was the new theme
now used to drive home the need for the seamen’s bill.” Statements from survivors of the
sinking and reports from subsequent investigations were introduced during committee
hearings as evidence of the need for immediate reform.80
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After more than a year of fits and starts, the bill was reintroduced and finally
passed in February 1915. Senate stalwarts like Henry Cabot Lodge and Elihu Root
maintained opposition to the bill’s provisions granting seamen the near-universal right to
desertion based on its potential impact for “unilaterally abrogating commercial treaties”
that might lead to “serious international complications.” President Wilson, as it turned
out, shared these concerns. In correspondence with Furuseth, he shared his concerns
about signing the bill: “What is troubling me at this moment is that it demands of the
government what seems a truly impossible thing, namely the denunciation of some
twenty-two commercial treaties.” Furuseth responded by paying the President a personal
visit during which he offered a final plea. Wilson came out of the meeting convinced, and
eventually announced his support, albeit with a lingering reluctance: “I debated the
matter of signing the bill very earnestly indeed, weighing the arguments on both sides
with a good deal of anxiety, and finally determined to sign it because it seemed the only
chance to get something like justice to a class of workmen who have been too much
neglected by our laws.”81
The political economy behind the Seamen’s Act ostensibly focused on revising
existing maritime labor law so as to bring the industry up to modern standards regarding
freedom of contract, acceptable working conditions and accommodations on ships, and
safety reforms for both passengers and crew in the wake of public outcry over the sinking
of Titanic in 1912. The Act’s provision granting seamen the right to quit work without
facing imprisonment, whether in U.S. or foreign ports, had deep roots that manifested
itself in the Arago Supreme Court case Robertson v. Baldwin in 1897, as explicated
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above. Regulations regarding hours worked while at sea and in port, as well as minimum
standards established for provisions and sleeping quarters addressed complaints that
merchant seamen had put forth for centuries. Finally, safety provisions did much to
address public concern awakened by the blockbuster news story of Titanic and the
subsequent new consciousness about the danger and extreme isolation of life at sea.
The Act, however, went significantly farther than simply modernizing an industry
that had long represented an archaic and dangerous system of marginalized labor.
Perhaps most innovative of all the Act’s clauses was the fact that Congress approved
extension of its regulations beyond American ships and ports to apply to all foreign
vessels as well. In establishing such high marks for conditions on American ships, and
requiring such relatively accommodating treatment of American seamen, Congress ran
the risk of creating a “race to the bottom” in which shippers would enlist foreign-flagged
vessels and employ foreign seamen to carry out their trade. By attempting to extend
American-drafted and resolved regulations over American ships and the labor of
American merchant seamen to foreign ships and vessels, American policy-makers were
attempting to pre-emptively address the issue of outsourcing’s downward pull that would
prove to be the primary trajectory of American industrial labor in the second half of the
twentieth century.
Fink offers an in-depth analysis of this strategy that posits the extension of
regulations to foreign competition as an attempt to protect American seamen and
shipowners from the effects of direct competition with cheap international maritime labor
both at home ports and abroad. In addition to extending the Act’s provisions to foreign
competition, legitimizing a merchant seaman’s right to desertion enabled sailors to take
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advantage of higher wages and/or better working conditions in foreign ports. In allowing
for the imprisonment of merchant seamen who quit their vessels, the U.S. government
was effectively aiding foreign shipowners in maintaining lower wage rates and standards
than those prevailing in American ports and on American ships. Eliminating a ban on
desertion on a global scale would have essentially created free market competitive
conditions that would have ultimately benefited the American industry, which would take
the lead in providing well-regulated wage rates and provisions that made for attractive
jobs for merchant seamen. By positing a single world market for maritime labor in the
foreign trade, and allowing maritime labor to “float” at market price like any other
commodity, U.S. legislators would be forcing all employers seeking labor into paying a
competitive wage rate and adhere to expectations regarding provisions and working
conditions in order to remain competitive.82
Thus desertion had been transformed from an offense punished by imprisonment
as late as the 1897 Arago seamen’s case, to a tool used to reverse “race to the bottom”
employment conditions and create a competitive incentive for higher wages and better
conditions for merchant seamen on the free market. While internationalist in its scope,
the protectionist roots of the Seamen’s Act actually represented an extreme version of
nationalist approaches to labor and commerce regulation.
The 1915 Seamen’s Act was a complex piece of legislation that harnessed the
rhetorical power of safety at sea and seamen’s emancipation to achieve the true goal of its
architects: equalization. Furuseth, La Follette, and the many merchant seamen that they
represented were able to successfully repackage rhetoric that had previously been used to
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control seamen as wards of the state and of charitable society into a powerful argument
for radically protectionist maritime labor policies. These policies were motivated by
xenophobia and racism, but also intended to equalize wages between white American
sailors and the foreign seamen with whom they competed, and to ensure the selfpreservation of a maritime unionism that was dependent on a membership of skilled,
white, U.S. citizen sailors. Their arguments consistently put shipowners on the defensive,
forcing them to concede most of the bill’s provisions regarding safety at sea, the abolition
of flogging and the threat of imprisonment for desertion, and minimum standards for
condition on ships. Capt. Dollar, facing questioning in front of Congress, summed up the
general feeling of the shipowners’ regarding their situation, and the inevitable momentum
of reform that they found themselves swept up in: “I am not accustomed, Mr. Chariman,”
Dollar began, “to this police court kind of investigation… I do not know that I ever
undertook a thing that I hated as much, and that hurt my feelings as much, as to come
here before you gentlemen today.”83

White Supremacy
As both Fink and Jackson argue, practically all facets of the bill were directly or
indirectly motivated by white supremacy and a nativist protectionism that was
characteristic of West Coast labor unionism, as well as Progressive era labor politics in
general. Jackson pushes further, arguing that the doctrine of “flexible capacity,” in which
an American citizen merchant marine would theoretically provide a reserve fleet capable
of independently supporting military operations during times of war, was also essential to
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the bill. During and immediately after the Spanish-American War, labor unions and
Progressive politicians projected their vision of white supremacy overseas, expanding the
colonial footprint of the United States to the Caribbean and the Philippines as an act of
civilizing racial influence, for which the state would require a merchant marine capable
of providing the auxiliary support necessary to sustain these imperial projects.84
The position that merchant seamen and their union representatives found
themselves in by 1915 was determined, in large part, by the impacts of an industrializing
maritime industry. The transition from sail- to steam-powered vessels had radically
disrupted traditional hierarchies of labor on ships and, by extension, changed the nature
of the maritime workforce in terms of skill, ethnicity, and culture. Specifically, the
absence of sails on a modern steamship, “with her short masts, little rigging, and almost
no sails” meant that some aspects of traditional skilled labor were no longer necessary,
replaced, as W. M. Brittain, Secretary of the American Steamship Association testified
before the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, by “the most ordinary kind of unskilled
labor that can be imagined, consisting for the most part of washing decks, scrubbing
paint, and polishing brass work.”85 Britain continued by claiming that the “center of
gravity” of skilled labor on ships had shifted from the deck to the engine department,
with most of the “heavy work” on deck operated by machinery controlled by the ship’s
engine.
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Section 13 of the proposed bill was designed to counter these forces. Most
notorious of that section’s provisions, the requirements that 75 percent of a ship’s crew
be able “to understand any order given by the officers” explicitly intended to counter the
wave of foreign labor being hired by shipping companies, especially on the West Coast,
and specifically Chinese, Japanese, and “Lascar” seamen from southeast Asia. This
provision was also designed to simultaneously prevent unskilled laborers from filling
jobs that were previously held by white American seamen. A second provision, requiring
that 65 percent of a ship’s crew be manned by sailors with a rating of no less than able
seamen, reinforced this attempt to restore skilled labor on steamships. Finally, a third
provision requiring that a seaman have three years’ experience before attaining the rating
of able seamen further emphasized the desire to restore skilled, white, American labor.
More than any other facet of the bill, shipowners opposed these provisions. “In
the old days of sailing ships,” testified Capt. Robert Dollar of the Pacific-going Dollar
Steamship Line, “this was necessary; but on the modern steamers such experience is
altogether unnecessary… the real object of it [Section 13] is to put the entire shipping of
sailors by law in the hands of the sailors’ union, who in time of a strike could effectually
tie up the entire shipping… in American ports.”86 Dollar, who frequently acted as
spokesman for West Coast shipowners during Congressional committee hearings,
repeatedly attempted to package the threat of unbalanced power in the hands of maritime
unions with arguments that warned of the threat of foreign competition, extolled the
principles of freedom of contract, and insisted that sailors were inherently irresponsible
and therefore not to be trusted with their own wages in port

U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, “The Seamen’s Bill,”
(Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1914), Part II, 33.
86

161

Safety at Sea
In the weeks following the Titanic disaster, the United States Senate and the
British Board of Trade both launched inquiries that investigated the cause of the incident
and made recommendations for preventing similar incidents in the future.87 The
American inquiry held its initial hearing on April 19th, while many of the surviving crew
and some passengers were still in New York City. J. Bruce Ismay, managing director of
the White Star Line, and Arthur Henry Rostron, captain of Carpathia, offered testimony.
Guglielmo Marconi was also in attendance to provide consultation regarding operation of
the ship’s wireless radios.88 The inquiry lasted eighteen days, during which a series of
officers, crewmembers, and passengers who had survived the accident were questioned.
A London commission carried out a similar inquiry beginning in May and lasting thirtysix days.89 The American committee issued its report on May 28th while the British report
followed on July 30th. The inquiries resulted in an international conference held in
London that produced recommendations for reforms to life-saving equipment and
practices on merchant ships, presented for adoption to a consortium of nations, including
the United States.
In March 1914, La Follette presented remarks prepared by Furuseth and V. A.
Olander, also of the International Seamen’s Union, before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations. The remarks were titled “Welfare of American Seamen, A Memorial
of the seamen of the United States praying for the disapproval by the Senate of the
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International Convention on Safety of Life at Sea, signed at London, January 20, 1914,
and for the enactment by Congress of S. 136,” referring to the bill introduced by La
Follette and designed by Furuseth and his collaborators. Their main objection to the
regulations proposed by the London conference, relating to safety of life at sea,
navigation, construction of ships, radiotelegraphy, life-saving appliances and fire
protection, and safety certification ostensibly boiled down to a nationalist argument for
maintaining independent control of such regulations, with a nod toward what would
become axioms for the bill’s advocates: foreign competition and flexible capacity. As
Furuseth wrote and La Follette presented, “It appears to your petitioners that by the
adoption of these articles the United States will surrender its power to regulate foreign
vessels coming to its ports. We believe that as a result of such action foreign ships will
continue to have the advantages over American ships which, in the past, have been one of
the main factors in destroying the American mercantile marine in the foreign trade.”90
Furuseth went further, claiming that the provisions for safety at sea put forward
by the London Conference were simply not stringent enough to address the problem of
lives lost at sea. Indeed, the bill favored by Furuseth and his allies set extensive and
painstakingly specific requirements for new ships operating in U.S. ports. 13 and 1/2
pages of the 22-page bill in its final form were dedicated to safety at sea provisions,
including section 14, which set standards for life-saving boats, including type,
construction, strength, buoyancy, capacity, weight of persons, marking of lifeboats,
equipment on lifeboats, stowage, handling, manning, embarkation, and several pages of
text concerning regulation of davits. Additionally, the bill set standards for the use of
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qualified sailors as replacements for lost crewmembers, requirements for the keeping of
continuous watches, and subjected vessels thought to be unseaworthy to inspections from
shipping agents.91
Rather than attempt to fight advocates of the bill on these numerous and detailed
points, shipowners seemed resigned to accept these aspects of the bill, perhaps reluctant
to move against the tide of public sympathy that Titanic had produced. Dollar,
representing shipowners of the West Coast, in fact “cheerfully and willingly agree” to all
conditions reached at the London Conference regarding safety at sea, and offered only
minor resistance to a few points of the bill’s safety provisions while testifying in front of
Congress.92
Furuseth, on the other hand, was being less than genuine in claiming that differences
in safety at sea provisions were his only objections to the possibility of the U.S. adopting
the London Conference resolutions. As with the rhetoric of white supremacy and flexible
capacity, Furuseth and other allies of the bill repeatedly utilized the rhetoric and
overwhelming public support for safety at sea provisions in order to mask these more
radical aspects of the bill: emancipation and equalization.

Emancipation
As with the case of the Arago deserters, the issue of “emancipation” for merchant
seamen loomed large in debates over the 1915 Seamen’s Act. Whereas Robertson v.
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Baldwin had focused exclusively on the issue of imprisonment as punishment for
desertion, emancipation in the 1915 Act was a complex of provisions that directly or
indirectly impacted the range and extent of a seaman’s mobility in ports both domestic
and foreign. Specifically, the bill prioritized the abolition of imprisonment for desertion
in foreign ports, the abolition of flogging or corporal punishment on American ships, and
the abolition of advances and partial pay to seamen, the latter being an attempt to disrupt
systems of crimping.
Rhetorically, this complex was packaged in the oratorical gamesmanship of
Furuseth and La Follette, who insistently linked seamen’s status under the law with the
ideology of anti-slavery and free labor. “Abolish the slave laws,” Furuseth wrote boldly
in a pamphlet read before Congress by La Follette: “[l]et American freedom extend to the
decks of the American ship. Let American soil become free soil for seamen as it is for all
other men.”93 Such high rhetoric demanded the attention not just of Congress, but of the
American public. In reality, the 1898 White Act had all but accomplished this very goal
by abolishing imprisonment for desertion in American and nearby foreign ports.
Furthermore, by 1915 the issue of abolishing imprisonment was not one that shipowners
contested. In fact, Dollar testified that not only he, but the entire body of the San
Francisco Chamber of Commerce, and “the shipowners of the Pacific Coast” had
instructed him to testify that they were “opposed to any further imprisonment of sailors
on American ships, or on foreign ships either.”94 Dollar off-handedly mentioned that
shipowners no longer took action on the letter of the law, even in foreign ports where
imprisonment was still legal. The same went for flogging, which the proposed bill finally
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and explicitly abolished. “It is a dead letter,” Dollar insisted, “as I have not heard of a
man being flogged in the past 50 years. By all means abolish it.” As for the provisions of
the bill that called for minimum standards for rations, sleep quarters, and washing
stations, Dollar testified that his ships already met union demands and more, producing
before his Congressional audience a bill of fare that detailed the meal schedule from one
of his ships as evidence.95
As with the issue of safety at sea, advocates of the bill put the public attention and
sympathy generated by sensational anti-slavery rhetoric to use as a cover for more
nuanced, and ultimately more radical, reforms. Section 16, which abolished
imprisonment for desertion, was indeed at the heart of these reforms. But Section 4,
entitling seamen in every port that the ship loaded or delivered cargo to one-half of his
wages earned, applicable to both American and foreign vessels “while in the harbors of
the United States,” and Section 11, making it illegal to pay advances to seaman who
signed shipping articles, were essential to Furuseth’s plan for “equalization:” essentially,
to allow the rate of wages in port float in an open market so that ships seeking crews in
low-wage foreign nations would be forced to raise their standards so as to compete with
U.S.-flagged ships and attract seamen to sign shipping articles with their vessel.
Vigorously opposed by shipowners who anticipated that their crews would be enticed to
desert in every port, Furuseth insisted that these provisions, too, were necessary for
seamen to achieve full emancipation. “If a sailor can not get any money out of his
vessel,” he testified, “and can not pawn his body for a few dollars, then he is tied to the
vessel.” According to Furuseth, without such provisions as Sections 4 and 11 provided, a
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seaman’s freedom under Section 16 would be a useless gesture: “if they are going to take
as liquidated damages all the wages that are due to him… and then place him in a
position so that he can not get any credit… if they can keep the man from getting some
money the freedom will be barren right.”96

Equalization
As Fink argues, perhaps most innovative of all the Act’s clauses was the fact that
Congress approved extension of its regulations beyond American ships and ports to apply
to all foreign vessels and ports as well. The irony of the U.S. Congress taking on such an
internationalist approach to industry regulation is that it was done with the objective of
protecting the nationalist interests of American shipowners and shipping companies. In
establishing such high marks for conditions on American ships, and requiring such
relatively accommodating treatment of American seamen, Congress ran the risk of
creating a “race to the bottom” in which shippers would enlist foreign-flagged vessels
and employ foreign seamen to carry out their trade, in search of the most lax regulations
and lowest rates in terms of wages, provisions, and working conditions that they would
be required to follow by law.97
As Rep. Rufus Hardy of Texas summarized in Committee, “[t]he idea you [Furuseth]
are presenting is, that by doing away with this involuntary servitude—arrest for desertion
and presenting the foreign vessels which come here with cheap crews from holding them
subject to arrest in our port for desertion—that you will equalize, or practically raise the
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wages of seamen the world over.”98 Legitimizing a merchant seaman’s right to desertion
enabled sailors to take advantage of higher wages and/or better working conditions in
foreign ports. As the bill’s proponents argued, in imprisoning merchant seamen who quit
their vessels, the U.S. government was effectively aiding foreign shipowners in
maintaining lower wage rates and standards on deck than those prevailing in American
ports and on American ships. Eliminating a ban on desertion on a global scale would
essentially create free market competitive conditions that would ultimately benefit the
American industry. American shipping companies would adopt the role as a leader in
providing well-regulated wage rates and provisions that made for attractive jobs for
merchant seamen by positing a single world market for maritime labor in the foreign
trade, and allowing maritime labor to “float” at market price like any other commodity.99
V. A. Olander, President of the Lake Seamen’s Union, offered an anecdote involving
seamen on the British-flagged Carlo in 1900 that exemplified the problem under the law
prior to the 1915 Act:
One evening as I was standing at the rail of my ship I saw two policemen come
down with two men carrying their bags; saw those two men taken aboard of the
Carlo... I saw those men taken aft; saw the mate open their bags, take out a set of
overalls and give them to the men; and saw the men go forward into the
forecastle. They came up again and handed their shore clothes over to the mate,
he taking the bag and clothes into his room and locking them up. I knew then, of
course, what was going on. These men, finding that the prevailing wages in the
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country in which they were working were three times the wages that they were
being held at, did not like to continue under such conditions and tried to quit. The
law and the treaties governing these questions were brought into force, and they
were brought back on board the ship…”100

For Olander, Furuseth, and their allies, the laws preventing seamen from pursuing
better wages were artificial distortions placed arbitrarily upon what should otherwise
have been a free market created by competition between shipowners. “Imagine two
ships,” Furuseth implored his audience, “one flying the American flag, the other a foreign
flag, moored at the same dock in New York. The crew of the American vessel has been
hired in New York at American wages; that of the foreign ship at some low-wage in the
Mediterranean. The two crews come into contact, each discovering the wages and
conditions of the other. What is the natural result? Unless prevented by force, the crew of
the foreign vessel would either get the same wages as paid on the American vessel or
they would quit.”101
Once again, advocates of the bill were successfully able to turn bipartisan
rhetoric, this time of free labor and the free market, against their opponents to argue for
radical policy reforms that would restructure the very nature of maritime labor, making it
more difficult for shipowners to turn the profits that they were accustomed to, and
endowing merchant seamen and their union representatives with unprecedented
negotiating power in the market of maritime commerce. Collaterally, these newly earned
rights, specifically the right to desertion without fear of imprisonment, produced a new
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crisis of mobility that would worry the nation’s legislators for decades; namely, the “alien
seamen” problem.

Conclusion
The impact of the Seamen’s Act has been the subject of substantial debate.
Whereas Fink hails the Act as visionary in its prescient approach to confronting the
downward pull of a globalizing economy, other historians attribute any gains claimed by
Furuseth and the ISU in the wake of the bill’s passage to the fleeting conditions of the
command economy created by World War I. Gibson and Donovan point out that while
union membership and wages were indeed exponentially higher at the war’s end, these
increases were the result of direct government intervention through the 1916 Shipping
Act and the Emergency Shipbuilding Program. With the government replacing private
industry as the major employer in the shipping industry during the war years, these gains
proved unsustainable when the war ended and private companies returned to old
practices. By 1921, wages had returned to the prevailing prewar rate, and the steep
decline in government cargo sent the entire U.S. shipping industry spiraling into
depression.102 The U.S. citizen maritime labor pool that had been temporarily reenergized
by the war found themselves unemployed “on the beach” or leaving the industry
altogether for other work.
Given these statistics, it is difficult to contest the conclusion Joseph Goldberg
reached regarding the Act’s legacy: “The most that could be said for the Seamen’s Act
was that it had provided seamen with the same freedom to work or quit which was
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available to shore workers. In its effort to protect and entrench the seafaring crafts, and to
equalize wages and working conditions nationally, and even internationally, it failed.”103
However, that right to quit that seamen had won with passage of the Seamen’s Act was
far more impactful than Goldberg’s passing dismissal does justice. Seamen’s mobility,
having been subjected to mechanisms of containment by nineteenth century maritime
ministry reformers and officially denied by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1897, had been
enshrined in law as a fundamental right for all seamen.
The preservation of a seamen’s right to mobility was only part of the complicated
legacy of the 1915 Seamen’s Act, however. As Fink and Jackson have argued, white
supremacy was a consistent motivating factor that fueled passage of the Act. In one of his
speeches before Congress on the Seamen’s Bill, Furuseth began his comments in a
manner that made this clear in no uncertain terms. “I shall speak to you to-day,” he said,
warming up to his defense of the proposed bill, “if I am able to do so, as I never spoke
before, because I think that this is the last struggle of the white man to maintain himself
on the seas and the last chance of the United States to ever become a sea power.”104
As Jackson documents, arguments for the preservation of a white, U.S. citizenmanned merchant marine were inextricably tied to national defense and the concept of
flexible capacity. According to this line of reasoning, the decline of American seamen,
caused in part by falling wages and conditions on ships produced by the hiring of foreign
crews, not only impacted the livelihoods of white American seamen but also impaired the
ability of the U.S. to defend itself and conduct military operations overseas. Furuseth
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equated the crisis of competition from foreign maritime labor with the crisis of a
diminished flexible capacity that the U.S. merchant fleet was capable of providing: “The
Caucasian is leaving the sea; the Oriental is filling the vacancy. Sea power is in the
seamen; vessels are the seamen’s working tools; tools become the property of nations or
races who handle them.”105
Furuseth and the ISU wholeheartedly embraced this narrative of a declining white,
U.S. citizen merchant marine and rejected the TWF’s more radical syndicalism, in part
based on the threats that such intersectional industrial unionism posed to the stability of
the ISU’s skilled, white membership. Choosing instead to pursue practical gains through
political means that were undergirded by potent ideologies of xenophobia and white
supremacy, the ISU and its Progressive allies in Congress succeeded in winning
overwhelming support for the 1915 Seamen’s Act, which would theoretically sustain a
steady pool of white, U.S. citizen, skilled merchant seamen while adding to the ISU’s
strength through increased membership and political clout. The central irony of this
legislative achievement was that in solidifying and extending merchant seamen’s right to
mobility in port, the 1915 Seamen’s Act unwittingly compounded legal problems and
anxieties over the presence of non-white, non-U.S. citizen merchant seamen in American
ports. The “alien seamen problem,” as it became known following the Act’s passage,
created crises for both civil society and the state that involved confrontations over
seamen’s morality, spirituality, and citizenship.
Asian seamen, specifically Chinese, were at the heart of this narrative. Under the
1882 Exclusion Act, Chinese seamen were not explicitly codified as a category unto
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themselves. Therefore, they fell under special rules and entitlements as a de facto result
of prevailing maritime law. Chinese seamen were entitled to the same privileges as any
other nationality of alien seamen, specifically the right to shore leave, with the caveat that
should a Chinese seaman desert while in port, the shipping company with which he had
been employed would be fined. Subsequently, a “bond rule” developed in which masters
of vessels were required to post $500 for each Chinese seaman afforded shore leave, not
to exceed thirty days in the U.S. Additionally, a photograph and complete personal
description was required to be attached to each bond posted.
This system inevitably resulted in shipowners denying shore leave to the Chinese
seamen that they employed. As Furuseth testified, “it is financially a business interest for
the shipowner to keep them [Chinese seamen], and he hires them because he can keep
them,” not only under a continual and reliable contract, but at wage rates far lower than
their white American competition. Thus, the white American seamen’s mobility, in
addition to the higher wage rates that he commanded, made competition with foreign
labor untenable. The laws on the books following the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act
empowered ships’ masters who employed Chinese labor with the protections of “not only
his own watchman and his own personal interest, but he has got the Government
officials; that is, the Immigration Service, in keeping his cheap crew on the vessel.”106
Whereas the bond rule appears to have been standard practice in ports up to 1915,
federal district courts in the wake of the 1882 Act’s passage were quick to rule in favor of
the right of Chinese seamen to shore leave, establishing that they did not qualify as
“laborers” under the law, and were therefore entitled to the same mobility in port as any
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other nationality of non-citizen seamen.107 In 1907, the Second Circuit Federal Court
ruled that the clause of immigration laws requiring shipping companies to “take
precautions to prevent the landing of aliens at time or place not designated” did not apply
to seamen, and that shore leave did not constitute “landing.” The Court concluded its
ruling with the proclamation that “sailors should go ashore.”108
The 1915 Seamen’s Act passed on March 4, 1915 in the exact form that it was
introduced by Senator La Follette, meaning the shipowners had lost the debate in decisive
fashion. The law’s provisions abolishing imprisonment for desertion and entitling seamen
to partial pay at every port provided a legal platform that simultaneously resolved
longstanding confrontations between merchant seamen and the state over restrictions on
mobility in port, and provided to non-citizen migrants an enticing means to circumvent
increasingly exclusionary immigration laws passed by Congress. A new era of contested
citizenship originating in U.S. sailortowns had begun. Chapter Five will investigate the
origins and responses to the so-called “alien seamen problem” at both the local and
national levels.
As the maritime industry progressed into the twentieth-century, a new industrial era
propelled American shipping toward increased reliance on foreign labor and increasingly
exploitative conditions on ships, despite the intended protections of the 1915 Seamen’s
Act. These changes produced a new class of bluewater men who were, from the
perspective of reformers such as the Seamen’s Church Institute, simultaneously more
threatening and more vulnerable to the moral and spiritual pitfalls against which they had
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been campaigning since 1843. In response, the Institute heightened their strategy of
infiltration, consolidated their operations, and attempted to monopolize control over
every aspect of the seamen’s life ashore.
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CHAPTER FOUR

“’The Million-Dollar Home for Sailors’ and the War for New York’s Sailortown,
1894-1945”
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Introduction
The era of the Floating Church of Our Saviour (1843-1906) coincided with
widespread international adoption of steam engine technology, led by the British, that all
but ended American dominance of shipping that had characterized the Age of Sail,
ushering in a new industrial age of global shipping. By the 1890s, British steamships
dominated the world’s maritime shipping economy, creating a pull toward foreign
maritime labor, exploitative conditions on ships, and a more diverse (and from the
evangelical reformers’ perspective simultaneously more vulnerable and more threatening)
class of bluewater men teeming at the edges of Manhattan’s waterfront.
Having embedded themselves in the heart of the city’s sailortown, the Seamen’s
Church Institute (SCI), through their agent Rev. Parker, launched a missionary project
based on an inverse colonial model in which the ebb and flow of the city’s waterfront
washed ashore potential converts just as it pulled them away on voyages out to sea. Here
on the city’s margins, the next phase in taming the urban frontier was taken up by a
young and ambitious preacher, newly ordained, who would lead SCI into a new era of
heightened infiltration into sailortown through consolidation of its operations and
monopolization of the Institute’s control over every conceivable aspect of the sailor’s life
ashore. Ultimately, this revised strategy was founded on criteria of inclusion and
exclusion that recruited predominantly white, skilled merchant seamen to SCI’s services
while further marginalizing those were non-white and unskilled. In this way the
Institute’s mission following the opening of 25 South Street aligned almost identically
with the objectives of Furuseth and the ISU, as evidenced in Chapter Three, and put them
in direct confrontation with more radical maritime unions that developed in rapid and
direct proximity to the Institute during the 1920s and 30s.
177

As SCI progressed into the twentieth century, it assumed a role as unofficial
auxiliary of the federal government. Following the market crash of 1929, the federal
government enlisted private charities like SCI to provide relief to seamen, allocating funds
to the Institute to be distributed to destitute seamen who were clogging sailortown’s
boardinghouses and relief houses alike during the years of the Great Depression. The
maritime ministry project that SCI administered during the 1930s served a nationalist
economic role in stabilizing an urban labor force that was experiencing the shockwaves of
unemployment and that was being recruited into an increasingly radical front of organized
labor. Additionally, acting within the doctrine of “flexible capacity,” which perceived the
merchant marine as a civilian reserve force that could be called upon during times of war,1
SCI provided a space in which mariners could be held, restrained, and prepared for service
as an essential arm of the U.S. national security apparatus. SCI’s auxiliary relationship to
U.S. national security was made explicit when the U.S. entered World War II, and SCI was
called upon to serve as an official training and reserve station for the nation’s rapidly
expanding merchant marine. The fact that President Franklin D. Roosevelt had served on
SCI’s Board of Managers since 1907 when was Assistant Secretary of the Navy only
strengthened the connections between 25 South Street and the U.S. military.
SCI’s ministry work thus had deep-seated connections to the nation’s economic,
political, and international interests. As Olivier Zunz argues, the federal government’s
longstanding recognition of philanthropic institutions as public assets (principally
through their exemption from taxes), “has not only nurtured philanthropy in society, it

For an analysis of the impact that “flexible capacity” had on maritime policy and labor reform, see Justin
Jackson, “‘The Right Kind of Men’: Flexible Capacity, Chinese Exclusion, and the Imperial Origins of
Maritime Labor Reform in the United States, 1898-1905,” Labor 10, no. 4 (2013): 39-60.
1

178

has entrenched it.” This “government-civil society cooperation” has resulted in a “mixed
political economy of giving” that has produced experiments and strategic interventions in
“essential debates on citizenship, opportunity, and rights.”2 The sober, domestic sphere
that 25 South Street was constructed to replicate through its post office, savings bank, and
“boozeless bar” and soda fountain was in constant and direct economic and political
competition with sailortown’s commercial, leisure, and radical labor spheres which stood
to benefit from the “corruption” of their clientele, rendering them politically subversive
and unfit for national service if and when their nation needed to call upon them. By the
1930s, SCI had expanded the scope of its target to include radical unions that had
infiltrated the waterfront and were actively recruiting the same men whom SCI coveted
as clientele. This was indeed a high-stakes philanthropic project. For SCI and FDR’s
federal government, U.S. economic recovery, political stability, and national security
depended upon its success.

Rev. Archibald R. Mansfield
Born in 1874, Archibald Romaine Mansfield spent the first thirteen years of his
life enjoying a pastoral childhood, given license to enjoy his rural upstate New York
surroundings by his minister father and indulgent mother. The descendent of a long line
of ordained leaders of the Episcopal Church, the young Mansfield initially had no
intentions to follow suit. That all changed–likely by design–when Mansfield’s father
dispatched him at the age of thirteen, without his mother’s knowledge or consent, to St.
John’s Military School at Sing Sing. There, Mansfield came of age under the “clocklike

2

Olivier Zunz, Philanthropy in America: A History (Princeton University Press, 2012), 4-6.

179

routine” of the school’s administration, subject to “thrashings for freshness,” and was
introduced to a long list of habits that he would carry with him for the remainder of his
adult life: an obsession with precise and economic management, the careful turning of his
bed in the morning, and a particular attention paid to blacking the heels of his shoes when
polishing.3
From Sing Sing, Mansfield went on to St. Stephen’s College (now Bard College)
in Hudson Valley, New York, where he was drawn to ministry work with the town’s
farmers and Scandinavian immigrants. After receiving his degree, he began studies at the
General Theological Seminary in Manhattan. In 1894 Mansfield took a position with a
“powerful and successful Church leader and organizer” to administer Sunday School with
some 1,500 boys in the notorious Lower East Side, a district of Manhattan teeming with
immigrants, tenement houses, and various networks of criminal activity and vice
associated with the city’s notorious Five Points intersection. Working in the Lower East
Side, Mansfield gained insight into the complex of challenges and problems that these
immigrant youths faced in growing up poor and alienated along the city’s margins.
Mansfield describes this experience in his memoirs:
“As I visited houses here and there on side streets leading off the then notorious
Bowery and through those sections radiating from Chatham Square made famous
by Jacob Riis in his book ‘How the Other Half Lives,’ I did not dream that in
another year my lot would be cast there among the “other half.’”4
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That same year, Mansfield received summons from Benoni Lockwood, manager
of SCI, and took over management of a very unusual parish: the East River Station,
consisting of the Floating Church of Our Saviour, a reading room for seamen and
Chaplain’s residence at 34 Pike Street, and a boardinghouse for seamen under the
Institute’s control at 52 Market Street. During his fateful meeting with Lockwood,
Mansfield followed him into the depths of sailortown, a section of Manhattan with which
the young seminary student had been theretofore entirely unfamiliar. Encountering the
spectacle of the Floating Chapel at Pike Street, Mansfield recollected that “having
crossed the Atlantic” himself, he had never given much of a thought at all to seamen, nor
had he ever heard that there was such a unique church docked along the East River.
Seamen, as Mansfield explains, were “a very special and distinct class of men” who were
“completely isolated” and who “did not have a chance in the world.” Like most people,
he had thought of seamen as “always at sea, never on land,” and therefore far from his,
and the public’s, thoughts.5
Within this context, Mansfield’s tour of sailortown takes on the resonance of a
spiritual awakening. His walk with Lockwood took him down to South Street and
Coenties Slip, “along the East River under the bowsprits of sailing vessels from far and
near which lined the Street,” and then to the Floating Church, “not many blocks above
the Fulton Fish Market.” Strolling side by side, Mansfield and Lockwood reconnoitered
the perimeter of sailortown, examining its inhabitants and the cultural geography of their
strange, marginalized world:
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“So this was Sailortown! I could take in very little in the few minutes we were
there, but what I saw in my brief view was appalling. All about me lay horrible
filth, broken-down dwellings that had been turned into dirty, squalid boardinghouses; countless doggeries so low and vile that it would be base flattery to call
them saloons; rows of ‘tailor-shops,’ alternating with dives of the most odious and
repulsive type. At the merest glance, which was all I had that day, I could see
every conceivable organization of vice and crime, ready to exploit the sailor and
strip him, in the shortest possible time, of every hard-earned cent he had.”6

This sordid description of depravity referred to a condensed and uniquely laid out
pocket of the city’s marginal outskirts. According to Mansfield, sailortown was bound by
Dover, New Bowery, Division, and Grand Streets, as well as South Street along the East
River, an area encompassing much of the First, Second, Fourth, and Seventh Wards in
Lower Manhattan. At its lower end, the river bends to the east; at its upper end, the river
swings back around Corlear’s Hook, epicenter for much of the city’s shipbuilding during
the nineteenth century. Its streets were laid out perpendicular to the river, on a different
axis than any other part of the city; anchored, seemingly, on an entirely separate
gravitational plane and giving it the resemblance of a vortex, with its streets, shops,
residences, and inhabitants all clinging to an incline that led directly to the waterfront. Its
center within a center, the heart of sailortown itself, consisted of the blocks between
Cherry and Water Streets, from Cherry Hill (now Franklin Square) to Pike Street.
Mansfield describes the lower blocks of Bowery Street, which extended away
from the waterfront off Catherine Street, as the “Broadway of Sailortown,” containing a

6

Ibid.

182

mix of high and low culture, famous for its theatres–Thalia, People’s Windsor, National,
Harry Miner’s–and of course, its saloons, where a nickel glass of beer came with a cheap
lunch. The Mariner’s Temple, a spot particularly popular with seamen, offered coffee, a
stale roll, and pea soup for a penny. Boardinghouses lined every block, especially in the
Fourth Ward. Word of establishments like McGuirk’s spread internationally through
advertising cards carried by seamen across the ocean to other sailors’ boardinghouses all
over the world.7
Within this labyrinth of humanity, Mansfield identified the object of his
missionary labor: the sailor, whom he described as “the official victim of the district,” a
group of men at the mercy of businesspeople and other “land sharks” whose sole
entrepreneurial purpose depended on the constant exploitation of seamen, who had “no
land status at all, not even if he were by nationality American… no vote… and
therefore… quite outside the charmed circle of political protection.”8
Despite this pessimistic interpretation, Mansfield found an alternative quality
within sailortown that was worth preserving:
“For the other side, the strange kaleidoscope of life that thronged the streets, the
kindliness and democracy of the [neighborhood]; the decency and self-respect
maintained against the greatest odds–for this one must turn to the reminiscences
of the district’s native sons, many of whom look back almost with regret to the
[neighborly], good-hearted, give-and-take existence of the ‘slums’.”9
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It was this side of sailortown that Mansfield would seek to bring to the surface
through his missionary work. Following his stroll through the district with Benoni
Lockwood in 1894, Mansfield agreed to come on as Superintendent and remained in that
position until his death in 1934.

Fig. 7: Rev. Archibald R. R. Mansfield, Superintendent of SCI from 1894-1934.
(Image: Seamen’s Church Institute of New York and New Jersey)
SCI’s failures at the sailors’ boardinghouse that the Institute operated at 52
Market Street inspired a revised approach to monopolizing and centralizing control.
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Wherever the sailor ate, drank, socialized, read a newspaper, sat for a game of checkers,
read his mail, or took up employment, SCI sought to step in and provide that service for
him. A major step towards the expansion and centralization of the Institute’s missionary
project was the take-over of the British Shipping Office at 2 State Street at the tip of the
Battery at the lowest point on the island of Manhattan. By the turn of the twentieth
century, widespread adoption of steam engine technology had dramatically increased the
number of British merchant ships at sea. An abundance of American lumber and a worldrenowned craftsmanship among American shipyard laborers working with wooden hulls
and masts had created a global dependency on American ships during the Age of Sail.
Partially in reaction to this dependency, the British were early adopters of steam
technology and had been in the process of shifting their fleet over to steam ships for
decades before the U.S. followed suit. The result of these market developments was that
by 1900, the majority of shipping to come in and out of the Port of New York was under
the British flag, and most of sailortown’s deep-water seamen took work on British ships,
under British captains and British admiralty law once at sea.
These conditions made the British Shipping Office the central site in the Port of
New York where labor agreements, including the terms of shipping articles and the
payoff of seamen, were negotiated. To SCI, the British Office also represented a potential
choke-point in their efforts to monitor the exploitation of seamen who were signing on
and off ships while in port. In fact, the Port of New York had achieved a level of infamy
for its reputation as a den of exploitative labor agreements involving seamen that had
reached international proportions. J. Havelock Wilson, British M.P. and leader of the
National Sailors’ and Firemen Union lamented the conditions for British seamen sailing
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out of the Port of New York in a speech to the House of Commons in June 1899,
describing it as a “den of crimps, touts and thugs,” and claiming that he had witnessed
first-hand while in New York an attack on a sailor who had refused to turn his wages
over to his assailants.10
Mansfield, reflecting on the state of affairs from 1900-1902, recalled similar
conditions in port:
“It is hard even for those of us who lived in it to realize now what the port of New
York was like for sailors of that time, when the Bishop of London referred to it as
the worst port for seamen in the world. For that matter, conditions were pretty bad
everywhere, on sea as on land. I can only use the phrase I have so often used: the
seamen were slaves.”11

Mansfield and SCI saw the British Shipping Office as an extension of the boardinghouses
that they sought to force out through competition with the opening of 52 Market Street.
As such, SCI embarked on a campaign that Mansfield describes as “military
entrenchment” at 2 State Street. First, the Institute convinced the apparently very
impressionable agent stationed at the Office, Sir Percy Sanderson, to allow SCI to open
up a savings bank inside the very room in which seamen signed off their shipping articles
and were paid for their labor. This would ensure that SCI agents would be among the first
to see the sailor after he had been paid, creating a blockade between seamen in port and
the crimps who would otherwise intercept the sailor and his cash before he had a chance
to deposit it, or transfer it back to whatever home and family he might have.
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Second, Mansfield arranged for the purchase of offices at 1 State Street, a
building immediately adjacent to and sharing a wall with the British Shipping Office.
Over the next few years, SCI slowly enlarged their ownership at 1 State Street, eventually
approaching Sir Percy with a proposition:
“In May, 1906, we took over the building at no. 2, next door, where the consulate
was, and we succeeded in getting the consul’s permission to do the most unusual
thing of breaking a doorway directly into the consular office, thus getting an
immediate and convenient access to everything that went on there. I still have Sir
Percy’s letter of April 6, 1906, giving me permission to ‘proceed with the new
doorway’ at my convenience.”12
This brazen act of brick-and-mortar takeover of the city’s epicenter of maritime labor
negotiations and the site of reckoning for the sailor’s financial independence was
combined with a more decentralized approach to surveillance, coercion, and control over
sailortown. In 1900, SCI hired J. W. Abbott as a private officer who would patrol the
streets and establishments of sailortown, independently enforcing the rule of law and
otherwise coercing agents of the waterfront to conform to the vision of moral behavior
that SCI was attempting to impose upon the district. As Mansfield describes it, Abbott
“became acquainted with all the boarding-house keepers, runners, and crimps in the port,
and kept his eye on them, working on an average nine hours a day.”13 Between 19001904, Abbott reported having scrutinized the paying off and signing on of 17,000
seamen; aided in the arrest of 22 “offenders against seamen, on various complaints”; 32
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summonses; obtained clothing or dunnage for 226 seamen; sent home for seamen, or held
for them $2,404.25; obtained naturalization for 39 seamen who wished to enter the navy;
and investigated 100 boardinghouses.14
By 1905, Mansfield and SCI had come a long way from the days of the Floating
Church. In addition to less successful endeavors in the boardinghouse business,
Mansfield oversaw the modernization of the sailor’s home at 34 Pike Street, updated a
similar home along the North (Hudson) River, had installed Abbott as the Institute’s
private roving officer to patrol sailortown by foot, and had literally knocked down the
wall between SCI and the British Shipping Office in the Battery. Moving forward,
however, Mansfield had his sights set on a much larger objective: raising money for a
million-dollar “home for sailors” at 25 South Street. As he described it, the home would
be a monumental testament to the mission of the Institute:
“to do for the sailor’s good exactly what the crimps had been doing for his harm.
They were the first to greet him in the [harbor]; so should we be. They offered
him friendship and advice; so should we. They stood by him at the pay-off and
took care of his money; so should we. They arranged for his food, lodging,
clothing and amusements; so should we. They provided him a gathering-place for
companionship and social life; so should we. Finally, they got work for him when
he signed off; so should we. Our whole social [program], in short, should be
practically identical with that of the crimps, the only difference being that ours
should be disinterested while theirs was not. Merely putting the crimps out of
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business would leave the sailor high and dry. The thing was to do for the sailor
just what the crimps did, but to do it right.”15

Beginning in 1905, the Institute’s newly formed Building Committee purchased a
plot of land at Coenties Slip and began a fundraising campaign to finance construction of
a centralized headquarters for the Institute. The campaign rallied the city’s philanthropists
to the cause of maritime ministry, soliciting major contributions from industrialists,
shipping companies, and the city’s powerful and wealthy religious leaders. Combined
with support from the same august supporters behind the Board of Commissioners for the
Licensing of Sailors’ Boardinghouses, as detailed in Chapter One, the Institute soon met
its goal to raise $1,000,000 and began construction on their new headquarters at 25 South
Street. SCI’s own Board of Managers was a veritable who’s who of monied industrialists,
shipping magnates. Andrew Carnegie, Henry C. Frick, Augustus D. Julliard, and three
Vanderbilts (Frederick, William, and Alfred) all donated substantial amounts of money
towards SCI’s maritime ministry project. As is documented in Chapter One, J.P. Morgan,
who was SCI’s most generous donor, had vested interest in the industrial productivity of
New York’s waterfront, having recently formed the International Mercantile Marine
Company, to which the famous White Star Line was a subsidiary.

25 South Street: The “Million-Dollar Home for Sailors”
On April 15, 1912, a delegation that included Mayor William Jay Gaynor laid the
cornerstone of the Seamen’s Church Institute’s new headquarters at the corner of South
Street and Coenties Slip. The Institute was consolidating; the Reverend Archibald
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Mansfield had been made Superintendent in 1910 and under his and longtime board
member Edmund Baylies’ direction, all of SCI’s operations were brought together under
one roof. The new building would be capable of housing 580 seafaring men in its
dormitories, with rates as low as 15 cents per night.
Inside SCI’s headquarters, the new facilities offered more than just beds. Its
designers set out to build a center where seafarers could come to relax, be entertained,
and feel at home. To this end, amenities such as a soda fountain and a luncheonette were
established, offering affordable meals and non-alcoholic drinks to seafarers. An early
photograph of the luncheonette reveals the cornucopian variety that hungry seafarers
were greeted with: a liverwurst, American cheese, bologna or egg sandwich at the cost of
ten cents, while Swiss cheese and salami cost 15. For the parched seafarer, five cents
would buy him a coffee, tea, milk, or a glass of Spur Cola, Seven-Up, or Dr. Pepper.
SCI’s “Boozeless Bar,” as it was referred to in a New York Daily News article, was
designed as an alternative to the saloons that seafarers typically frequented while in Port.
SCI’s soda bar was made to look the part, according to the Daily News:
“It is going to be a real bar, all right. None of these imitation marble, be-mirrored
and gilded soda water contraptions. Except that it will be cleaner, every detail will
suggest to the men that they have their foot on the same old brass rail and are
polishing the mahogany of the same old place they frequented before the advent
of the ‘boozeless bar’.”16

In addition to food and drink, 25 South Street housed a game room, where
seafarers could shoot pool or play board games. A post office was maintained where
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seafarers could send and receive letters and packages. Many seafarers made 25 South
Street their permanent address and would have mail waiting for them each time they
arrived in port after finishing another stint aboard a ship. The Savings Department
allowed seafarers to deposit money earned from their voyages where it could gain interest
and would be safe from the crimps. Almost as soon as SCI opened the doors at 25 South
Street, the sailor nearing New York harbor could look out into the horizon and see the
steady green light beaming from the Titanic Memorial Lighthouse and know that there
would be a place for him to get a cheap meal, relax, and spend the night on the other side.

Fig. 8: SCI’s 13-story headquarters at 25 South Street towered over its neighbors
along the East River waterfront when it opened in 1912. (Image: Seamen’s Church
Institute of New York and New Jersey)
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The New York State Census, conducted in 1915 and 1925, and the U.S. Federal
Census, conducted once every ten years, provide snapshots of the boarders present at the
moment the census-taker(s) arrived at SCI’s doors. While the 1920 Federal Census seems
to have passed by 25 South Street entirely, other census-takers meticulously recorded
information about a staggering number of seamen who temporarily called SCI home.

Census

Total Boarders at 25 South Street

1915 New York State Census

398 boarders

1920 U.S. Federal Census

Passed over?

1925 New York State Census

1,049 boarders

1930 U.S. Federal Census

738 boarders

1940 U.S. Federal Census

1,073 boarders

Fig. 9: Total number of boarders at 25 South Street as recorded by New York State
and Federal censuses, 1915-1940.

Fig. 9 shows the total number of boarders at 25 South Street as recorded by the
New York State and U.S. Federal Census from 1915 and 1940.17 In 1915, SCI had only
just opened its new headquarters, and had yet to build the “annex,” an expansion that was
designed to accommodate even more seamen than the 398 who were recorded as boarders
in the state census that year. Due to an apparent oversight in 1920, the next set of data
comes ten years later in 1925, by which time the number of boarders had increased to

Census data was compiled as part of a Maritime Heritage Program grant awarded to the Seamen’s
Church Institute by the National Park Service in 2015. Any analysis or interpretation beyond objective
compilation of the data is the work and responsibility of the author, and does not reflect the opinions of the
Seamen’s Church Institute, National Park Service, or any of the other members of the grant project team.
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1,049. As mentioned above, SCI offered 580 single dormitory rooms, meaning that the
census recorded nearly twice as many boarders at 25 South Street than for which SCI had
accommodations. There are several potential explanations for this significant disparity.
First, it is possible that the census taker(s) took data related to SCI’s Post Office and
recorded individuals with accounts as boarders; many seamen used 25 South Street as
their permanent residence. Second, the census taker(s) might have simply recorded
information for everyone inside the building on the day(s) during which the census was
conducted. Given SCI’s extensive network of services, this explanation would account
for many–potentially hundreds–of seamen who were inside the building without renting
dormitory rooms. Instead of listing a ship in port or a distant connection as their
permanent address, SCI came to stand in as home for these men not only in the strategy
and propaganda of its ministry project, but also in the official records of the state and
federal census.
Regardless of the explanation, the numbers on total boarders inarguably attest to
the fact that SCI was successful in attracting seamen to make use of the services and
lodgings provided at 25 South Street. However, these raw numbers should not be taken as
proof that SCI’s ultimate goal of eradicating the boardinghouses and leisure places of
sailortown was also necessarily successful. On the contrary, sailors’ boardinghouses
continued to thrive in the district despite sharing the market with 25 South Street, and the
services of the Board of Commissioners for Licensed Sailors’ Boardinghouses continued
to be of use. The 1922 annual report of the Board lists 44 houses that were issued
licenses, just four less than the 48 that the Board granted in 1902. In 1927, SCI itself
applied for a license, emphasizing in their application that they did not employ runners
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and did not offer alcohol on their premises. It would appear that the Institute’s successes
developed alongside sailortown’s indigenous cultures, rather than replacing them entirely
as Mansfield had hoped.

Janet Lord Roper, “Mother to 50,000 Seamen”
With the opening of 25 South Street, SCI had consolidated the previously
dispersed components of its maritime ministry project into a single 13-story building that
contained every imaginable service for seamen in port, thereby launching an effort to
completely eradicate the economic and leisure spheres of the city’s sailortown. Moving
forward with their project, SCI hired Janet Lord Roper, a Yankee minister’s wife and
veteran of Boston’s waterfront, as 25 South Street’s “House Mother.” Her unpublished
biography, based on interviews conducted with Roper shortly before her death, represent
documentation of the front lines of reform efforts directed at individual seamen, whose
primary sins and weaknesses, according to the reformer’s perspective, was their distance
from home and domestic stability. SCI, through Roper and other mechanisms, attempted
not only to control the sailor at leisure and in the maritime labor market, but also his
masculinity, imposing regimes of domestic training through responsible finances, a purity
of diet, and a connection to distant mothers, sisters, wives, and girlfriends whom he had
left behind for a life at sea. Roper’s memoirs and her correspondence with seamen and
their estranged family members and loved ones lend insight into the architecture of
gendered ministry work along the city’s waterfront, designed primarily to facilitate and
encourage a type of conversion narrative in which the estranged sailor was reunited with
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female partners that represented the stable, domestic life that he abandoned when he
chose to go to sea.
In 1915, three years after SCI opened the doors at 25 South Street to the district’s
seamen, the Institute’s administrators, led by Mansfield, made the unconventional
decision to hire Janet Lord Roper, recently widowed by the itinerant seamen’s chaplain
Rev. Harry Roper. Before coming to New York City at the summons of Mansfield, Roper
had spent twenty-one years working alongside her husband at seamen’s missions in
Gloucester, Massachusetts, Portland, Oregon, and in New Brunswick. Before meeting her
husband, an 18-year-old Roper began her life’s work at the Boston Seamen’s Friend
Society where she established herself as both confidante to the city’s merchant seamen
and a force to be reckoned with among the waterfront saloons and boarding houses. By
the time of her death, her career of service to seamen inspired a letter of condolence from
President Roosevelt, which read in part: “men of the sea from all over the world brought
their problems to her in full confidence of sympathetic understanding and practical
helpfulness.”18 Soon thereafter the Liberty ship SS Janet Lord Roper slid off the rails at
the shipyard in Fairfield, Maryland and into service at sea during the Second World War.
Roper arrived in New York City alone in 1915, summoned from the Portland
mission by Rev. Mansfield, and quickly found herself wandering the labyrinthine halls of
25 South Street. At first bewildered and unsure of her place in such a massive and
masculine social structure, Roper received instructions from Mansfield to “find your own
job,” challenging her to figure out her place in his newly constructed “dream hotel” for
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seamen.19 In part, Mansfield’s challenge was based in gendered politics and expectations.
Indeed, the hiring of a female administrator had apparently been met with great
skepticism by the Board of Managers. Back in Portland, Roper’s role consisted of a
mixture of conventional maternal hostess and substitute leader in place of her ailing
husband. Roper found herself hosting “biscuit parties” at her home one day and leading
sermons and meetings at the waterfront mission the next. In New York, Mansfield
recruited Roper to give his formidable sailors’ home a touch of “woman’s influence.” In
the paraphrased language of her biographer Jonathan Finn, it was expected that Roper
would act as “mother, confidante, and confessor, strong enough to relieve human
tragedies and sympathetic toward weaknesses that produced them; she would have to be
religious but with an all-encompassing faith; she would have to be worldly, yet basically
spiritual.”20
Before Roper could define her role at the Institute, she had first to win the respect
and trust of its patrons. Finn recounts a formative experience in which Roper appeared
before hundreds of seamen on stage in the building’s auditorium. Reflecting on the war
that was raging overseas in 1915, Roper recited an inscription she had read on a memorial
plaque on one of the building’s upper floors: “Faithful in duty; friendly in spirit; firm in
command; fearless in danger. He saved the women and children and went down with his
ship.” As Finn describes it, the men responded to Roper’s sentimental overture by
erupting in laughter. Finn quotes an embarrassed Roper as she attempts to retract her
gesture: “I am only a woman. Maybe I don’t understand.” At this, the men “applauded
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vigorously,” and broke out into a suggestive song: “Every nice girl loves a sailor, / Every
nice girl loves a tar. / For there’s something about a sailor,- / Well, - you know what
sailors are.”21
In Finn’s retelling, Roper recovered from her embarrassment, braced herself to
remain on stage, and even joined in with the seamen’s song. The incident served as a rite
of passage for Roper. Confronted with the overwhelming masculinity and skepticism of
the seamen who filled SCI’s auditorium, Roper was first rejected and dissuaded from her
romanticized and sentimental attempt at making a connection with her clientele.
Realizing her error, the resourceful matron quickly shifted her strategy and allowed the
men to dictate the tone and tenor of the encounter. By joining in on the song, its lyrics
simultaneously affirming Roper’s gendered acquiescence while raucously articulating the
masculine cultural dominance of the overwhelmingly male auditorium, Roper
demonstrated that she was a collaborator rather than a didactic figure with whom seamen
would have been familiar from past experiences with more pious seamen’s missionaries.
Roper thus self-consciously and deliberately presented herself to her clientele as someone
who could be, as Finn puts it, “sentimental without dripping sentiment, who could be
religious without preaching, who could scold without being abusive.”22 This selfpresentation was fully realized in Finn’s narrative when Roper appeared on stage in the
same auditorium several weeks following the first incident. Responding to a joke popular
among the seamen comparing Roper to Maggie, a bare-knuckled, tobacco-spitting
daughter of a Scottish nautical instructor, Roper addressed her audience in a manner that
reflected the success of her cultivated respect: “My name is not Maggie, and I have never
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made Liverpool pantiles [a biscuit made from the crumbs of hard tack], but I am an
expert with baking-powder biscuits. I wouldn’t think of offering them to tough men like
you.”23 Mocking the femininity of her role in her previous life in Portland, Roper opened
the way for a new definition of her duties among the “tough men” of South Street.

Fig. 10: The auditorium at 25 South Street. (Image: Seamen’s Church Institute of
New York and New Jersey)
During and after the First World War, family members inundated Roper’s office
with mail searching for missing seamen, lost amidst the chaos of global conflict. In
response, Roper established the Missing Seamen’s Bureau, a department of SCI that
dispatched bulletins listing missing men to every major port in the world. The work of the
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Bureau continued well after the end of the War, with Roper managing a permanent
department dedicated to reuniting seamen with estranged family members.
Story after story recounted in her biography involves a wayward seaman who one
way or another finds himself in “Mother” Roper’s office, opening up about past
transgressions that led to an abandoned wife, or a decision to leave home without looking
back. Indeed, Roper, as her biographer wrote, conceived of the “home” as “the basic
factor of our civilization” and “the family”; ignoring the home represented “a threat to the
realization of human happiness." 24 These convictions were essential to Roper’s definition
of purpose during her time at SCI. Embracing this perspective, Roper took on the
matronly labor of reuniting families and matchmaking, often through voluminous
correspondence with estranged female figures from “back home,” sometimes writing
explicitly on behalf of seamen themselves, other times acting as an intermediary or
proxy.25 Roper also dispatched a network of agents that she amassed over time with
instructions to remind wayward seamen to write home, or open a savings account in the
name of a “hypothetical wife.”26 Sailors sought Roper out for “intimate help and
guidance” as to what clothes to wear or what gifts to purchase for sweethearts. She even
took up the practice of reading tealeaves to evaluate a potential wife or help steer a sailor
down the right and proper path towards domestic happiness.27
For Roper and, by extension, SCI, a young man’s decision to go to sea
represented the ultimate refusal of an idealized domestic life, whether it be in the
maternal care of a mother or in the stable heterosexual union embodied by committed
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marriage to a wife. Writing about her missing son who had gone to sea, a mother’s letter
to Roper expresses the sentiment of deep violation that rejection of a domestic life
represented: “He had every comfort. A Morris chair, radio, pipe and books. Each evening
he came home his slippers were laid out…”28 Through correspondence with family
members, Roper reached out beyond the waterfront and penetrated into the far-flung
domestic spheres of the seamen who were her clientele. SCI thus came to operate under a
dual –mission. It took, on the one hand, Mansfield’s vision of the Institute as a proxy
home for transient seamen and a competitive alternative to the exploitative underworld of
crimps who operated in the bars and boardinghouses of sailortown, and combined it with
Roper’s perspective. To her, 25 South Street served as headquarters for a project of
reforming and repairing domestic and familial relationships that took on a global scale.
25 South Street was thus both proxy home for seamen and a site in which the “true”
homes of seamen were actively reshaped and managed.
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Fig. 11: Mother Roper at work with an elderly sailor. (Image: Seamen’s Church
Institute of New York and New Jersey)
As is discussed in Chapter One, the literature of nineteenth century seamen’s
missions commonly featured conversion narratives involving merchant seamen. The
publication of the American Seamen’s Friend Society, The Seamen’s Friend, is filled
with “testimonials” from seamen who had found Christian religion and reformed their
ways, usually manifested in the signing of a temperance pledge and a resolution to stay
clean in avoiding the moral pitfalls of the world’s sailortowns. “Mother” Roper defined
her job at SCI in terms of facilitating conversion narratives of a different sort; by
presenting herself as a reasonably secular “listener” for transient men who were either
single or estranged from their families, Roper mediated conversions by reconnecting men
with stable, domestic lives, often in the figure of a mother, wife, or daughter. Instead of
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finding religion, seamen “found” their roles within the domestic familial spheres they had
missed or avoided by going to sea and resolved to “come clean” in conforming to the
expectations placed upon them by the middle-class reformer mentality that Roper
embodied.

Fig. 12: The writing room at 25 South Street. (Image: Seamen’s Church Institute of
New York and New Jersey)
To accommodate seamen under Roper’s influence, SCI maintained a spacious
writing room in which silence was strictly maintained and pens and paper consistently
stocked. The sailor in Fig. 12 considers the painting of a matronly older woman
strategically hung before him as he sits, pen in hand, and begins to draft a letter. The shot
neatly summarizes Roper’s approach to domesticating her wayward flock; by harnessing
the power of the institutional space of 25 South Street as a surrogate domestic
environment and bringing her own feminine influence to bear on its clientele, seamen
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could indeed be convinced to take efforts to reunite with the real thing back home,
wherever that might be.

Fig. 13: Letter from a sailor to Mother Roper. (Image: Seamen’s Church Institute of
New York and New Jersey)
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SCI’s writing rooms, Post Office, Missing Seamen Bureau, and the persona of
Mother Roper combined to impose a potent force upon sailors’ personal, familial lives.
No doubt, Roper achieved many successes during her life that warranted the
congratulatory letter from President Roosevelt upon her death cited at the beginning of
this section. Fig. 13 is a typical letter preserved in the archives from a sailor named
Adams, whose address is a simple P.O. Box at 25 South Street. In childish script, he
writes to “Mother”:
DEAR MOTHER
MISS ROPER
Helo [sic] mother just a few lines while I am sitting thinking of some one to write
to I think of you. So am writing you a few lines as I have reply coming home
from any one…
The letter’s introduction is pathetic enough in its own right, but it continues with Adams
drafting a song for his surrogate mother:
Song
OH mother dear please listen
here, to what I have to tell
you. The horse knows the
way to carry the slay that’s [sic]
why they are holding me here.
if I had wings like a giro [sic]
an airoplane [sic] I would be, I
would fly to the unbeknowing
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and live in the air and be
free. If I had wings like
giro [sic] an airoplane [sic] I would
be, I’d defy all my knowledge, I’ve never been to
college, and I would roost
in an acorn tree. I’d love
to be home with my family
and I would love to be home…”
Adams’s song is nonsensical, a stream-of-conscious type of writing consistent only with
the casual and off-handed way that he introduces the letter. Nonetheless, Adams’s song
returns to the central themes of home, family, and the sailor’s reunion with the domestic
realm that he left behind in going to sea. It would seem, at least in Adams’s case, that
Roper had a lasting impact on the sailor’s psyche. After a number of lines of whimsical
nonsense, Adams brings the letter to an abrupt end that he knows will resonate with his
“mother.” Mother Roper’s influence on her dispersed brood of wayward seamen was
deliberately cultivated and promoted in direct contrast with the proprietors and house
“mothers” of sailortown’s boardinghouses. Recall “Mother” Olson, the poker playing,
booze-swilling proprietor of 52 Market Street known for rolling drunken seamen into an
attic hideaway in order to pass unannounced inspections. SCI put Janet Roper’s persona
and the imagery that it produced to work in promoting the mission of the Institute and
setting a model for wholesome, matronly relationships between transient merchant
seamen and a woman in port.
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Fig. 14: The lobby at 25 South Street. (Image: Seamen’s Church Institute of New
York and New Jersey)
Fig. 14 is a shot of the Institute’s lobby, which is decorated with an impressive
bunting of international flags, a framed collection of flag pins arranged around the figure
of the Statue of Liberty, and a framed portrait of Mother Roper. Seamen mill about and
halt their conversation to look up at the camera for a candid shot. The entrance to the
Institute’s chapel can be seen in the background. The imagery of 25 South Street was
intentionally curated by SCI to convey the symbols of its core mission: the iconography
of the Statue of Liberty and Mother Roper as patron saints, the row of flags suggesting
accommodations for a global maritime workforce, the chapel offering a safe and sober
alternative to the boisterous streets of sailortown. But there were cracks in this façade. As

206

with other staged photographs that SCI used for self-promotion, the imagery often strains
under the artifice, and the intended message is undermined by persistent, perhaps
irrevocable conflicts between merchant seamen and the shoreside people they
encountered in port. Later chapters will explore this conflict through sailors’
confrontations with the state, but this first section has interpreted encounters between
agents of maritime ministry and seamen in New York as a productive lens through which
to investigate and analyze the nature of sailors’ social, cultural, and economic lives when
they came back ashore.

Public Relations
SCI administrators were skilled and relentless self-promoters. The scope and state
of preservation of their archives are a testament to rigor and seriousness with which they
embarked on a public relations campaign to support their mission. Whereas Rev.
Benjamin C. C. Parker’s journals document the daily encounters at the Floating Church
of Our Saviour, and Mansfield’s memoirs document his early years as Superintendent,
the opening of 25 South Street produced a trove of photographic records that document
not only the operations of the Institute, but also the revised and consolidated strategies of
maritime ministry that the Institute adopted under a single roof at their new headquarters.
Seth Koven has offered a useful methodology in assessing these publicity
materials in relation to the objectives and subliminal messaging that the Institute worked
to project. In studying the photographs of the Charity Organisation Society and the
philanthropist Dr. Barnado, Koven claims that he wishes to “save [Victorian reformers]
from misguided goodwill of those who would make them into saints and the smugness of
those who would dismiss them as marginal cranks, or worse yet, hypocrites,” and instead
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explore the “altogether messier mingling of good intentions and blinkered prejudices.29
Koven refers to the “unconsummated and unacknowledged desires” for exposure to and
interaction with “all sorts of taboo intimacies between rich and poor, clean and dirty…”
that his characters encounter in their forays into the Victorian leisure sport of slumming.30
Given these underlying desires, it is certainly equally true that philanthropists from the
Victorian era, as well as the early twentieth century, had narrowly defined objectives that
they deliberately set out to achieve through processes and institutions that shaped their
clientele. It is essential to keep this deliberateness at the forefront of any analysis of the
philanthropic encounter. Seen through Koven’s lens, philanthropic encounters are both
ripe with psychoanalytic undertones and evidence of the dual-objectives of selfless
charitable acts toward the downtrodden and wayward as well as a “nonprofit
entrepreneurship” that philanthropic institutions developed to simultaneously serve
clientele while also elevating their own administrators in salary and social status.31
During the nineteenth century, organizations like the American Seamen’s Friend
Society focused on religious conversions, either through baptisms or temperance pledges
that signified the spiritual transformation of an individual’s soul. Later techniques like
conversions, most obvious in the approach of “House Mother” Janet Roper, were less
overtly spiritual and more focused on a secular, moralized conversion from transient
waywardness to stable domestic responsibility, often embodied in a reconnection and
commitment to a feminine character (e.g., a mother, wife, or daughter). The evangelical
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“true narratives” that Koven places in opposition to the fact-based methodologies of the
Charity Organisation Society are most often enacted through the medium of photographs,
which were capable of “conveying moral messages in visual form.”32 Thus, before-andafter photographs, some of which were very obviously staged by Barnardo and his staff,
function as evidence of the conversion of the charity’s clientele, from ragged street
children to well-cared for young boys and girls, evidenced in their dress, appearance, and
demeanor. In light of this analysis, a close look at the staged photographs documenting
the reformatory structure of 25 South Street deserve close reading.
Reading against the archival grain, examining photographs from 25 South Street’s
opening in 1912 through the 1940s allows identification of essential points of the
Institute’s strategy to consolidate control over the economies of sailortown.33
Additionally, these close readings resurface evidence of the promotional messaging that
SCI sought to project through propaganda photography they distributed through their
monthly magazine, The Lookout, and, beginning in 1939, the production of a film titled
Home is the Sailor, for which many of the photographs that follow were staged and
produced. SCI began publication of The Lookout in 1910, two years before the
construction of 25 South Street, within which the Institute installed a full-scale printing
office capable of producing copies of their promotional print material in very large
numbers (Fig. 3). Subscriptions cost one dollar per year, and by 1914 SCI was spending
nearly two-thirds as much on the production and distribution of the magazine ($2,361.13)
as they were on “religious work” at 25 South Street ($3,272.00).34
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Fig. 15: The printing office at 25 South Street, where issues of SCI’s monthly
magazine was produced. (Image: Seamen’s Church Institute of New York and New
Jersey)

Age/Marital Status
The census data recording boarders at 25 South Street from 1915-1940 reveals
patterns that are collectively representative of the “typical” boarder at SCI: relatively
young, unmarried, and from SCI’s perspective, at risk.

Census

Average Age of Boarders (years)

1915 New York State Census

31

1925 New York State Census

n/a

1930 U.S. Federal Census

34

1940 U.S. Federal Census

42.2
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Fig. 16: Average age of boarders at 25 South Street.
In comparison to the census data on sailors’ boardinghouses from 1900, the
boarders at 25 South Street from 1915-1940 skew a bit older, from 31-years in 1915 to
42.2-years in 1940. This could indeed be evidence that SCI attracted older boarders, or it
could be indicative of changes in the industry, which was logically attracting less young
men into the maritime professions during times of depression in the shipping industry,
such as the 1920s and most of the 1930s.

MARITAL
STATUS

1930 U.S.
Federal Census

1940 U.S.
Federal Census

Single

684

897

Married

44

103

Divorced

4

36

Widowed

6

24

Fig. 17: Marital status of boarders at 25 South Street 1930-1940 (not recorded prior
to 1930).

211

Recorded Marital Status of Lodgers at 25 South Street in
1930 U.S. Federal Census

Single

Married

Divorced

Widowed

Fig. 18: Marital status of boarders at 25 South Street 1930.

Recorded Marital Status of Lodgers at 25 South Street in
1940 U.S. Federal Census

Single

Married

Divorced

Widowes

Fig. 19: Marital atatus of Boarders at 25 South Street 1940.
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Despite SCI’s relatively older clientele, boarders from 1930-1940 remained
bachelors by overwhelming margins. It was this characteristic of bachelorhood, or the
deliberate alienation from the institution of marriage and the influence of matrimonial
partnership with a woman, and the responsibilities of a nuclear family, that represented
the greatest threat to the wellbeing of the merchant seamen to reformers at SCI. Even if
men were in middle age, their distance from these civilizing influences ostensibly made
them vulnerable and at-risk of falling into the stereotypical pitfalls of the sailor’s life
ashore. 25 South Street, and all of its component parts, was constructed to redeem these
men through systematic control over every aspect of their financial, social, and spiritual
lives.

Dormitories
At the heart of the new building at 25 South Street were 580 dormitory rooms,
rented out at rates of less than 15 cents per night. Dwarfing any other sailors’
boardinghouse nearby in its 13-story shadow, the Institute was officially back in the
boarding business in spectacular fashion. Unlike 52 Market Street, which had fallen into
disrepute and was abandoned, SCI’s boarding operations could now be managed under
the same roof as all other administrative and pastoral services, ensuring tighter control
under the watch of Superintendent Mansfield and his staff. The photographs of sailors in
dormitory rooms produced by SCI were made to demonstrate the effect that 25 South
Street could have on their clientele and represent some of the most potent images that
survive in the archives, laden with the messaging of SCI’s maritime ministry project.
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Fig. 20: Exterior of 25 South Street. (Image: Seamen’s Church Institute of New
York and New Jersey)

Fig. 20 is a photograph shot from the perspective of a pier directly adjacent to the
towering superstructure of 25 South Street. Two men sit at the edge of the waterfront,
their gaze turned inward towards the building rather than out at the East River and
Harbor. Typically, a sailor returning to land from this perspective would have a
cornucopia of boardinghouses to select from. Now, after the construction of 25 South
Street, the image conveys a much different message. The background is out of focus and
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overexposed, making SCI the only option on the horizon. Much like the Titanic
Memorial Lighthouse that signals out to ships at sea from its perch at the apex of the
building in the frame, 25 South Street projects a beacon of hospitality onto the waterfront.
For seamen returning to New York from their voyages, their destination in port is now an
obvious choice.

Fig. 21: Boarder arriving at 25 South Street. (Image: Seamen’s Church Institute of
New York and New Jersey)

Fig. 21 depicts a man inside 25 South Street, clutching a suitcase and peering
warily out at the cityscape. Whereas the exterior is a modernist jumble of windows
protruding from high-rise buildings, the sailor is safely ensconced within the interior of
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25 South Street. He still wears his jacket and cap, suggesting, in addition to his suitcase,
that he is newly arrived. The moment of uncertainty upon reaching port, in which the
sailor must find safe room and board amidst the urban chaos of lower Manhattan, is
resolved. He is safe and at home at the Institute. Peering down on the city from his room,
the sailor has avoided the temptations and dangers of the city by following the beacon to
25 South Street.

Fig. 22: Boarder sewing clothing in a dormitory room at 25 South Street. (Image:
Seamen’s Church Institute of New York and New Jersey)

Fig. 22 portrays a young man in a dormitory room with needle and thread
repairing his jacket as he sits on the bed. He is dressed smartly in slacks, button-down
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shirt and tie (slightly askew), and polished dark shoes. One hand holds the garment in
place while the other teases the thread, with the spool placed neatly beside him on the
bed. The image portrays the sailor’s competency in a domestic skill, one not uncommon
to seamen who were often adroit with sewing and knitting materials for the practical
maintenance of their clothing, or for artistic endeavors such as crochet “woolies” made
for leisure during down time at sea. Common on ships, the skill here is depicted in the
surrogate domestic space of 25 South Street, implying that the sailor ashore could be just
as “at home” on land as he is at sea.

Fig. 23: Boarder reading a letter in a dormitory room at 25 South Street. (Image:
Seamen’s Church Institute of New York and New Jersey)
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Fig. 23 represents the ideal boarder from the perspective of SCI’s administrators.
He is young and innocent-looking, baptized in the light that pours in from the window.
He sits on the bed of a dormitory room, propped up by a laundry bag marked as property
of Seamen’s Church Institute of New York. His expression is serious and contemplative
as he gazes up from the letter in his lap. A small stack of unopened envelopes is piled
beside him, next to his cap. Here is the image of a potential convert: the sailor’s youth
means that he has yet to be corrupted by his profession or the temptations of the city that
surround him. Fortunately, this young man has found safe harbor at 25 South Street.
Perhaps he will even make use of the Institute’s writing room to draft a letter to his
mother or sweetheart back home. For the time being, 25 South Street is more than happy
to provide a convincing substitute.
These images collectively represent the idealized version of the surrogate home
that SCI sought to provide for seamen in the Port of New York. Beginning with the
dormitory rooms themselves, we see seamen in isolation, safely removed from the bustle
and corrupting influence of the city streets, engaged in rest, reflection, productive
domestic tasks, and connecting with loved ones through letters rather than socializing
amidst the rabble and purveyors of sailortown. Whether providing space for recovery for
older seamen or the protection and preservation of innocence for younger less
experienced seamen, SCI’s new headquarters was portrayed as an imposing fortress
against the nefarious forces of the waterfront. As is illustrated in Fig. 4, the sheer size and
position of the building in relation to its surroundings on the waterfront lent 25 South
Street a sense of inevitability in landing the patronage of seamen ashore: an inevitability
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that was once firmly in possession of the waterfront’s boardinghouse keepers and agents
of the sailortown economy.

Fig. 24: Boarder in a dormitory room at 25 South Street. (Image: Seamen’s Church
Institute of New York and New Jersey)

In Fig. 24, a weathered middle-aged man sits on a dormitory room bed, jacket still
on, clutching his suitcase between his legs. He is ruggedly handsome, with the look of a
man who works outdoors. The circular frame suggests that he is being considered for use
as copy for the promotional film “Home is the Sailor.” A small indecipherable tattoo is
visible on his right hand, giving a hint of authenticity to a scene that is otherwise clearly
staged. The bedcover bears the logo of the Institute and is decorated with concentric
circles of a floral pattern. The image projects a sense of convalescence. The sailor,
whether authentic or not, is depicted as having worked and lived a hard life before
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reaching the safe confines of 25 South Street. Here he is finally able to relax his body;
and, given his pursed lips, weary eyes, and furrowed brow, his mind.

Post Office
When the Institute opened in 1913 it offered 65 postal “call boxes” for use by
seamen. Prior to establishment of the Post Office, letters sent to a sailor at sea would
typically follow him from port to port, often arriving long past their expected arrival date.
Many letters never arrived at all, leaving seamen out of touch with their families,
intensifying their isolation, and further severing them from the familial connections they
left behind in going to sea. In establishing its popular Post Office service at 25 South
Street, SCI attempted to address what they (and many others, including the federal
government, as later chapters will argue) saw as the essential “problem” of the sailor: his
inherent transience and mobility. 25 South Street became a fixed address to which
sailors’ family and friends could send communications. The Post Office was thus more
than a service for seamen; it was a deliberate attempt to reconnect them with the domestic
values lacking in life at sea. As The Lookout described it in 1920, the post office “reaches
out with firm but gentle hand, and catches the drifters on life’s seas, and draws them to
the safety of the raft of their past….”

220

Fig. 25: The Post Office at 25 South Street. (Image: Seamen’s Church Institute of
New York and New Jersey)

In 1927 SCI dramatically increased the number of post office boxes for seafarers
to 900 and continued to offer the boxes at a discounted rate compared with other post
offices in New York. The clerks held mail at the office for up to six months to account
for seamen who spent long spans at sea or out of town, whereas typical post office
branches at the time held mail for only ten days. Finally, with the workload continuing to
increase, the federal government agreed in 1927 to take over operations of the post office
at 25 South Street. By then, SCI’s Post Office handled as much mail as a town of 20,000
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people, and 25 South Street had become one of the most well-known addresses in the
world.35
The motto of the U.S. Post Office posted at its new 25 South Street branch
succinctly expressed the mission and objectives underlying SCI’s investment in a postal
service for seamen:
“U.S. POST OFFICE
MESSANGER OF SYMPATHY AND LOVE
SERVANT OF PARTED FRIENDS
CONSOLER OF THE LONELY
BOND OF THE SCATTERED FAMILY
ENLARGER OF THE COMMON LIFE.”

Similar to the U.S. Post Office, SCI valued the powerful effect that domestic and familial
connections could have on the isolated sailor.

Health and Welfare
The themes of legitimacy, safety, and comradery that images of SCI’s Savings
Bank and Employment Bureau convey are also present in photographs of the Institute’s
extensive health and welfare services for seamen. In addition to providing for the sailor’s
needs for temporary boarding, finances, and employment, SCI established a one-stop
clinic for seamen, including medical, dental, and optometry services. These services
provided legitimate aid to seamen, especially for those who were out of work for more

“A Post Office with a Soul,” The Lookout, October 1928, Series 16.a: The Lookout, Records of the
Seamen’s Church Institute of New York and New Jersey.
35
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than 60 days and therefore ineligible for the services of the Marine Hospital on Staten
Island, which was part of a federally-owned and -operated hospital system funded by a
tax withheld from merchant seamen’s wages. The Marine Hospital Service, originally
established by act of Congress in 1798, changed its name to the Public Health and Marine
Hospital Service and eventually the Public Health Service to reflect the agency’s
expanding responsibilities, including the enforcement of quarantines in response to public
health crises and admitting newly-arrived immigrants deemed public health risks.
Returning to mariner-focused services and embedding them directly in the heart of New
York’s sailortown lured in seamen in need of care who might otherwise shy away from
more formal care in a typical doctor’s office. The Institute also put the imagery of its
medical services to work, positioning SCI as the primary caretaker of seamen in port in
order to fundraise and further marginalize the indigenous economies of sailortown that it
sought to replace.
SCI initiated its medical services soon after opening 25 South Street, launching a
rooftop radio medical program in 1920 that provided ships at sea with the means of
consulting doctors via radiogram. The Institute also published the Manual on Ship
Sanitation and First-Aid for Merchant Seamen in 1922 and distributed copies to seamen
in port before they embarked on their next job. In a 1927 letter to SCI President Edmund
Baylies, Mansfield expressed interest in bringing these services to the sailor in port.
“Having solved as far as possible the problem of incapacitated seamen afloat,” he wrote,
“I believe you will agree with me that it is now our duty and privilege to provide
adequate facilities for serving them ashore.”36
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Fig. 26: A sailor receives treatment at SCI’s Medical Clinic. (Image: Seamen’s
Church Institute of New York and New Jersey)

SCI established its Medical Clinic for seamen on the first-floor mezzanine of 25
South Street in 1925. Fig. 26 depicts a patient having his foot attended to by a doctor. The
sailor stares down with a deflated expression at his badly discolored big toe protruding
from the gauze wrap. The doctor is focused entirely on the sailor’s mangled foot. Medical
books line the shelf: proof of the doctor’s credentials, and the legitimacy of the Clinic. A
third man stands in an awkwardly formal stance, his arm draped over the patient in an
apparent attempt to console him. A single strip of white tape around the thumb of his left
hand suggests that he, too, might have recently received care. The staged scene is explicit
in emphasizing that the patient is not alone, nor is he among strangers, or those who
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might give his ailment less than full attention. On the contrary, he is literally wrapped in
comradery, most likely from that of a fellow sailor who has found himself in a similarly
vulnerable situation. Even a situation in which the sailor’s misfortunate is visibly
authentic was not beyond usefulness in SCI’s relentless promotional campaign.

Fig. 27: A sailor receives treatment at SCI’s Dental Clinic. (Image: Seamen’s
Church Institute of New York and New Jersey)

SCI opened both the Eye Clinic and Dental Clinic in 1931, available to active
merchant seamen, in response to an epidemic of seamen who had been turned down for
jobs at sea due to their poor eyesight or teeth. Both clinics charged low rates, offered free
exams, glasses with fitted lenses, and advice on diet and the proper care of teeth. Fig. 21
portrays a sailor in a pinstripe suit seated stiffly in the dentist’s chair. The doctor
examines the man’s front teeth with bare hands. A female assistant stands behind the
sailor, looking down on him with a warm expression while brandishing a plaque scraper
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inches from his face. A ring on her left hand reassures to the viewer of her position as a
matronly figure of beneficence. The theatrical lighting betrays the scene’s artifice, and
despite the sailor’s best efforts to demonstrate his appreciation of the doctor’s
examination with a smile, his distorted expression appears to convey, at the very least,
discomfort.

Fig. 28: A sailor picks up clothing at SCI’s laundry service. (Image: Seamen’s
Church Institute of New York and New Jersey)

In addition to its health clinics, the Institute ran an extensive laundry service,
employed a tailor, and kept a sloppe chest (a nautical term that typically refers to a ship’s
store but in SCI’s version involved a miniature warehouse of sea clothing, boots, hats,
and other gear that seamen might need before leaving port). The strategy behind these
services was to undercut sailortown’s shop keepers and middlemen who had profited
from the sailor, often on credit, fully confident that all debts would be paid through the
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crimping system. Recall Graeme Milne’s analysis of sailor James Hall’s bill from a
Tynemouth boardinghouse: in addition to the staggering amounts of alcohol and tobacco
that the keeper charged to Hall, clothing was also added to his tab.37 Such cases remained
common well into the twentieth century. By contrast, Fig. 28 captures a scene in which a
young laundress, smiling radiantly, prepares to wrap a neatly folded stack of clothing and
present it to an appreciative sailor, ticket in hand. The transaction, like the laundress, is
wholesome, benevolent, and attractive.
At 25 South Street, seamen could take advantage of the full-service laundry, have
new clothes made for them at the tailor, and purchase gear from the sloppe chest, all
under one roof, free from the interference of crimps and other middlemen of sailortown.
All of these transactions, including medical services, were part of SCI’s consolidated
strategy of maritime ministry and bore the guarantee of legitimacy and trustworthiness
that SCI cultivated through its promotional campaign.
However, much like the unfortunate sailor in the dentist’s chair, many of the
photographs that SCI staged to convey its authoritative control over the economies of
sailortown strain under the artifice, revealing undercurrents of falsity, or even resistance.
This is especially true of SCI’s efforts to replace sailortown’s most enduring, and for
many seamen, appealing characteristics. The Institute’s attempt to replace the
waterfront’s famous saloons, grog shops, and brothels with sober spaces designed for
wholesome recreation, “clean” diet, and reflective study would require all of the
promotional muscle that SCI could muster. Even then, the Institute’s attempts to coopt
the sailor’s leisure time often seem naïve, and, at times downright ridiculous.
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Leisure
Having provided for the sailor’s financial, employment, health, and welfare needs,
SCI turned its attention to his leisure time in port. The Joseph Conrad Memorial Library,
a maritime museum, lunch counter, soda fountain, and a cavernous game room were all
opened with the intent to keep seamen away from the attractions and temptations of the
“Broadway of Sailortown” that Mansfield encountered when he was first recruited by the
Institute.

Fig. 29: Sailors at the lunch counter and soda fountain at 25 South Street. (Image:
Seamen’s Church Institute of New York and New Jersey)
In Fig. 29, a clerk serves patrons at the “boozeless bar,” here resembling more of
a lunch counter than a bona fide sailortown saloon. A young sailor awash in the stage
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lights of the foreground raises a cup of coffee. A bread roll and a plate heaped with what
appear to be beans sit before him on the counter. He eyes the neat row of brass taps
before him longingly: perhaps for soda, or perhaps for more potent libations.
It is doubtful that SCI had much success in pulling off the stunt of substituting
soda for alcohol, but that did not stop it from putting the artifice to use for promotional
purposes. In the May 1914 issue of the Lookout, the writer tells the story of an Irish sailor
who was duped (complete with an unfortunate attempt at a brogue):
“Michael steered a pretty straight course toward the soda fountain bar and rested
one brogan on the brass foot rail with a sigh of contented achievement.

‘It’s beer Oi’m wanting,’ he suggested gently to the assistant, and the blur in his
rippling Irish voice spoke of many previous stimulants.

‘Shure,’ said the assistant, who has dialects to meet all demands, and he drew a
tall glass of ginger-ale, which foamed as disturbingly as Michael could expect.

He propped himself cautiously against the marble counter and drank four gingerales in succession. Then he drew himself up with a visible effort.”

‘Not another wan, sir,” he declared, manfully. ‘Faith an Oi wouldn’t dare; it’s
drunk Oi’d be in no time,’ and he walked with growing unsteadiness toward the
elevator.”
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Such accounts, while intended to be humorous, also served the function of reinforcing the
effectiveness of SCI’s maritime ministry project. Playing on dual stereotypes of a harddrinking Irish sailor, the scene attempts to reinforce the Institute’s ability to rehabilitate
its clientele despite tendencies for vice that seem inherent to their profession, and in this
case, ethnicity.

Finances and Employment
The Savings Department and Employment Bureau at 25 South Street were
designed to directly infiltrate the marketplace of shipping articles, advances, and
allotment notes that had motivated the sailortown economy for decades. The sailor ashore
was encouraged to deposit money with SCI for safekeeping rather than hand it over
(willingly or otherwise) to sailortown’s boardinghouse keepers and agents, and to seek
employment and sign articles under supervision of SCI administrators rather than under
lax conditions at the British Shipping Office, or through the informal back channels of
the waterfront. Again, the photographs that SCI staged and distributed to market the
narrative of their new headquarters lend insight into the strategies of Mansfield and his
administrators.
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Fig. 30: The Savings Department at 25 South Street. (Image: Seamen’s Church
Institute of New York and New Jersey)

In Fig. 30, the details of a simple shot depicting a temporarily empty Savings
Department reveal several points of SCI’s revised maritime ministry strategy. First, a sign
on the door at the back center of the frame reads: “INSTITUTE: NO ADMITTANCE.
ENTRANCE TO INSTITUTE AROUND THE CORNER.” This directive indicates that
the Savings Department was located outside of the official interior of the building,
lending access to passersby without forcing them to enter the Institute itself. This gesture
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toward accessibility was likely intended to encourage seamen who might otherwise be
skeptical or reluctant to enter 25 South Street to make use of the Savings Bank’s services.
Second, a sign at the far-left side of the frame, likely near the entrance to the
Bank, reads: “BEWARE OF SHARKS AND CRIMPS OUTSIDE. LEAVE YOUR
MONEY HERE. DRAW DAILY AS YOU NEED IT. WE SEND MONEY TO ANY
PART OF THE WORLD. REMEMBER THOSE AT HOME.” This inscription concisely
and emphatically summarizes the Institute’s intent in providing banking services for
seamen. Outside of 25 South Street, crimps and “sharks” ruled the day. Stories of
advance money lost, debts incurred, and seamen shanghaied passed along the waterfront
until the folklore of sailortown was thick with the threat of exploitation and violence. The
bank, occupying a sort of littoral space between the streets and the Institute, was there for
seamen who wanted to protect their earnings, whether their intent was to make use of it
on their own terms, or to remit funds back “home.” The sparse interior and collared clerk
behind the barred teller window suggest safety, security, and insurance; all qualities that
were at a premium when one found themselves on the streets of sailortown.
Arranged in the archives alongside photographs of the Savings Bank is the image
of a remittance sheet for sailor Michael Alexeew, 22-years-old from Odessa, Ukraine.
The sheet records ten times between April 16 and July 13, 1915 when Alexeew
repeatedly deposited sums of $5 and $10, for a total of $100, and signed that amount over
to his parents, living in Russia, in the name of his father Michail. The image of this sheet
was created and preserved intentionally as evidence that the system SCI established with
the Savings Bank did indeed actually work; seamen like Alexeew used the Bank as a
means to send money home and maintain the connections of family that were strained by
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work at sea. Other seamen deposited money for safekeeping or exchanged foreign
currency.

Fig. 31: The Employment Bureau at 25 South Street. (Image: Seamen’s Church
Institute of New York and New Jersey)
As with the Savings Bank, SCI’s Employment Bureau was established with the
purpose of undercutting the economic marketplace of sailortown that had thrived for so
long. The Institute’s previous victories in forcing its way to a position of surveillance and
regulation within the British Shipping Office had been but the beginning of larger
aspirations. SCI’s Employment Bureau, depicted in Fig. 31, established direct working
relationships with shipping companies in order to take over two of the most critical
aspects of sailors’ shipping articles: signing on and signing off. Instead of having
shipping agents recruit seamen from boardinghouses to man their vessels, SCI’s 580
dormitory rooms provided an ample supply of men ready to sign on their next ship.
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Undercutting the sailors’ boardinghouse economy in this way meant that SCI prevented
exploitation schemes involving sailors’ advance pay or allotment notes. And, of course,
SCI’s Savings Bank provided a repository for such funds, further ensuring that money
stayed out of the hands of SCI’s old enemies, the crimps. Control over hiring, including
the right to sign sailors on and off voyages with companies, remained one of the primary
objectives of maritime unions until the 1930s, when the union halls finally took control
from shipping companies and third parties like SCI. In the meantime, the Institute worked
hard to distinguish itself from nefarious hiring practices then prevalent in the city’s
sailortown.
Fig. 31 depicts a candid tableau of seamen in line for both “Engagement” and
“Discharge,” or signing on or signing off voyages. Contrary to tales of sordid
boardinghouses and the cramped corridors of the British Shipping Office, where crimps
were said to line up outside the door waiting for departing seamen known to have just
been paid, the offices of SCI’s Employment Bureau are orderly, brightly lit, and clean.
Signs on the wall proclaim “NO SMOKING” and “SPITTING ON THE FLOOR OF
THIS BUILDING IS UNLAWFUL. OFFENDERS ARE LIABLE TO ARREST BY
ORDER OF THE BOARD OF HEALTH,” simultaneously setting a sober tone for the
room while reminding those who enter that the powers of the state are behind the
business conducted therein.
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Fig. 32: Sailors at the Employment Bureau at 25 South Street. (Image: Seamen’s
Church Institute of New York and New Jersey)

Fig. 32 depicts a staged scene from a later era of the Employment Bureau. A suited
administrator reviews a sailor’s paperwork as a trio of oddly bemused men look on. The
younger man on the right nonchalantly holds the stub of a cigarette between his fingers
and reveals a cluster of tattoos on the back of his hand, visually marking him as a sailor.
If this scene is meant to depict a payoff, the sailor who is about to receive his
compensation is in the good company of his jovial colleagues rather than at the prey of
sailortown’s crimps. The well-dressed administrator consults his stacks of paperwork,
bestowing on the transaction an air of officiality and legitimacy that contrasts starkly with
sailortown’s underground networks of labor exchange.
The legitimacy that SCI projected through these photographs was not, however,
passively accepted by their seamen clientele, especially those who embraced industrial
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maritime unionism that took hold in New York during the 1920s and 1930s. Control over
hiring, or the right for seamen themselves to deal directly with shipowners to negotiate
the terms of their contracts, had been a priority for union men during 1912 Transport
Workers’ Strike detailed in Chapter Three, in which recognition of the union was a
central focus. Before then, the Coast Seamen’s Union opened in 1886 and established its
own shipping office, marking the first time, according to Bruce Nelson, anywhere in the
world when seamen successfully took control of the hiring process. Employers were
quick to counter by establishing their own shipping association, and implementing the
notorious “fink books,” which were meant to track a seaman’s identity as well as
employment history, and were used as a force to control seamen’s mobility within the
labor market for decades.38 During the 1930s, maritime unions’ demands for control over
hiring through union-run hiring halls intensified. Unions prioritized containing the hiring
process within union territory while preventing seamen from circumventing the unions by
“shipping off the docks.” As Nelson argues, this control was a hard fought and highly
valued gain: “That a union rep could board a ship and remove seamen who had been
hired via the legal mechanism of government and steamship company, that the authority
of the master of the vessel could be breached with such impunity, was indeed a bold new
development.”39
Within this context, SCI’s employment bureau agents, like the shipping
companies and their agents before them, were seen as meddlesome interlopers who were
ultimately sympathetic to shipowners, and therefore representative of yet another cog in a
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system designed to tamp down and control merchant seamen’s own agency as workers in
a free market economy. Contestations with SCI over control of hiring would intensify as
economic conditions worsened, in addition to fever-pitched battles over relief, which this
chapter will examine in detail.

Seamen’s Club Rooms

Fig. 33: The Dutch Seamen’s Club at 25 South Street. (Image: Seamen’s Church
Institute of New York and New Jersey)

The aggressions of Nazi Germany leading up to and during World War II inspired
SCI to open Seamen’s Clubs for seamen exiled from their occupied homelands: Sweden,
Denmark, and Holland. Club rooms were intended as spaces for seamen of particular
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nationalities to socialize, share coffee and snacks, and discuss matters “back home,” as
war picked up momentum and eventually threatened to destroy any connections seamen
might have with their homeland. Fig. 33 depicts Dutch seamen seated beneath a large
mural with grand scenes of nationalist imagery from Dutch history. Given the context of
the war, the club rooms served a very specific purpose in providing refuge for seamen
hailing from occupied nations.

Fig. 34: Sailors listen to music with stewardesses at the Dutch Seamen’s Club at 25
South Street. (Image: Seamen’s Church Institute of New York and New Jersey)

Club rooms also provided SCI with an opportunity to reinforce values that were
central to their strategy of maritime ministry. The Institute hired many young female
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“stewardesses” who were paid to serve coffee and food, and socialize with the men, all
within a safe, sober, and chaperoned environment. Fig. 34 shows two stewardesses at
work in the Dutch Seamen’s Club. A young sailor holding a record player smiles brightly
at the stewardess at the far right of the frame, who reciprocates his warmth. Four other
seamen, dressed smartly in clean white shirts, anticipate the record about to be played, as
a second stewardess blends in seamlessly to the jocular and innocent scene of youthful
socialization. Any thoughts of the troubles back “home” are far removed from this
carefully staged scene, which manages to capture the unguarded mirth of young men and
women enjoying each other’s company.

Race/Ethnicity
Photographs of the Danish, Dutch, and Swedish seamen’s clubs portray a version
of idyllic multiculturalism; one that is explicitly steeped in the politics of World War II
but nonetheless reflects of the demographic realities of the boarders of 25 South Street
that preceded the war years. Census data provides possible answers to a second question
that the Institute’s propaganda campaign leaves unaddressed: who was excluded from
SCI’s ministry project?

Census

Total Boarders from
U.S. and Puerto Rico

Total Boarders at 25
South Street

1915 New York State
Census

93

398

1925 New York State
Census

752

1,049
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1930 U.S. Federal
Census

211

738

1940 U.S. Federal
Census

516

1,073

Fig. 35: Total boarders at 25 South Street - U.S. and Puerto Rico.
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Fig. 36: Total boarders at 25 South Street – Northwestern Europe.

Fig. 35 shows the total number of boarders at 25 South Street from the United
States and Puerto Rico, while Fig. 36 shows the number of total boarders from seven of
the most common nationalities recorded in the state and federal censuses. The nations
represented formed a block of northwestern Europe and the British Isles, a significant
proportion of SCI’s clientele. Seamen from these nations were, not incidentally, also
provided special accommodations such as the seamen’s clubs, and would recognize
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themselves in the representations of white, Nordic seamen that SCI tended to feature in
its propaganda materials.

Total Boarders at 25 South Street - Eastern and Southern
Europe
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Fig. 37: Total boarders at 25 South Street – Eastern and Southern Europe.

Fig. 37, in contrast, represents boarders from nations in Eastern and Southern
Europe. Russia, Spain, and Finland are all relatively well represented in the census data,
but not to the extent of most of the Northwestern European nations of Fig. 36. Seamen
from Eastern and Southern European nations rarely appear in SCI’s propaganda imagery.
Nor do their numbers suggest that they were attracted to or welcomed by the Institute’s
presence in New York’s sailortown.
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Total Boarders at 25 South Street - Latin America, Africa,
and Asia
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1915

1925

1930

1940

Mexico

West Indies

Cuba

Costa Rica

Ecuador

Honduras

Panama

Colombia

Brazil

Argentina

Peru

Philippines

India

Syria

Algiers

South Africa

Fig. 38: Total boarders at 25 South Street – Latin America, Africa, and Asia.

Finally, Fig. 38 represents the total number of boarders from sixteen Latin
American, African, and Asian nations. While their numbers do not suggest a significant
presence at 25 South Street for seamen of any of the nations plotted, they do provide
proof of the spectrum of multiculturalism housed under the Institute’s roof.
Simultaneously, this data also helps answer a question posed at the beginning of this
section: while SCI accommodated and serviced a clientele that was remarkably diverse
and multicultural, certain nations, ethnicities, and races remained on the margins of what
was already a marginal space for marginal workers along the city’s waterfront. Black
seamen, recorded in the census as “N” or “Neg” for their race, appear a total of nine
times in all of the four censuses consulted. Filipino (“Fil”) and Mexican (“Mex”) seamen
also account for a total of nine entries. Perhaps most glaring of all is the total absence of
Chinese seamen, who, as will be examined in Chapter Five, were a common nationality
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to be found working on merchant ships, and a frequent target of American labor unions
and sympathetic legislators. South Indian, or “lascar” seamen, in pejorative use, are also
nowhere to be found in the data. In fact, with the exception of the 18 black, Filipino, and
Mexican seamen, all of the other 3,240 seamen who appear as boarders in the censuses
between 1915 and 1940 are recorded as “White.”
Recall the sailors’ boardinghouse census data from 1900, in which a Japanese and
black boardinghouse was not only recorded, but licensed by the Board of Commissioners.
Seamen from South and Eastern European nations such as Spain, Greece, and Russia
were well represented in other licensed houses. Based on this data, in addition to the
absence of nationalities and races that are known to have been common among merchant
seamen, it must be concluded that SCI’s clientele did not represent a comprehensive
spectrum of the maritime industry during the first half of the twentieth century.
In consulting census data, one must account for the subjectivities, eccentricities,
and even prejudices of the individuals responsible for recording data on the people whom
they encountered. It is simply untrue, for example, that 99.4% of all boarders at 25 South
Street between 1915-1940 were white. Seamen from nations in the West Indies, Asia, and
the Middle East are all represented in the data, and as is evident in Fig. 30, they appear in
SCI’s photographic archives, albeit rarely, and in far less flattering framing than the
Nordic sons of Neptune who were chosen as subjects for the Institute’s promotional
images. All of these men were apparently recorded as white, perhaps because the census
takers lacked an adequate vocabulary of race and ethnicity to describe such individuals
accurately, or perhaps because of larger structural limitations of the census as a system,
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and the parameters of how it was administered during the first half of the twentieth
century.
Even accounting for census takers’ errors, the majority of SCI’s boarders were
white, from northwestern European nations, and found themselves “at home” at 25 South
Street through services that catered explicitly to certain nations. Other seamen from
nations less commonly found at the Institute’s headquarters found themselves less
explicitly welcome, and possibly excluded in a more absolute manner that has eluded the
archival record.

Conclusion
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Fig. 39: A rare photograph of non-white seamen waiting for service in SCI’s
Medical Clinic. While there is no evidence that seamen were excluded explicitly
based on their race, the census records suggest that 25 South Street was
predominantly a space for white, American and Northwestern European seamen.
(Image: Seamen’s Church Institute of New York and New Jersey)
The racial makeup of boarders at 25 South Street aligned with members of the
International Seamen’s Union, and the racial agenda promoted by its leader, Andrew
Furuseth, leading up to passage of the 1915 Seamen’s Act, as is documented in the
previous chapter. Furuseth and the Union championed regulation of the U.S. merchant
marine that provided protections for white, skilled seamen through language and skill
requirements for crews. Reacting primarily to the impacts of industrialization on the
value of skilled labor, and the threat of cheaper sources of labor in Asian ports, Furuseth
and the ISU lamented the “drift from the sea on the part of the Caucasian” and predicted
that without protections, the sea would become “the domain of the Oriental.”40
SCI’s accommodation for white, skilled seamen, combined with legislative
protections also worked to bolster a model of craft unionism that Furuseth and the ISU
constantly fought to maintain against critiques and recruiting efforts by more radical
forms of maritime labor organization. Industrial unionism, which sought to cultivate
solidarity across all waterfront transport crafts and ethnicities, was most potent among
non-white, unskilled seamen, as with the Spanish firemen who assumed leadership roles
in the Transport Workers’ Federation strike of 1912, as documented in the previous
chapter. As Furuseth wrote, the way to address the challenge of industrial maritime
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unionism was to pursue legislative protections similar to the 1915 Seamen’s Act: “The
seamen have prayed, watched and waited until a large number of them… are so void of
hope that they are now joining the I.W.W. [Industrial Workers of the World] to try, in
their desperation, to get by direct action, what they have lost all faith in being able to get
from Congress and the President.”41
The 1920s was a decade of crisis for the American shipping industry. Increased
competition from foreign-flagged merchant ships as well as expanding rail systems meant
less American shipping commerce and fewer jobs for seamen. Unemployed seamen
crowded the slips of downtown Manhattan like never before, packing SCI’s dormitory
rooms to capacity on a nightly basis. Seamen “on the beach” organized during this time
to form formidable political labor groups. According to Paul Chapman, this climate of a
consistent, unified seamen’s presence in downtown Manhattan lent new energies to the
industrial maritime unionism: “in contrast to workers in factories, schools, or offices,
many of whom are together every day at the workplace, seafarers are rarely together in
one place. Rather, they are scattered around the globe in small, isolated groups.”42
Unemployment brought seamen together in New York during the 1920s. SCI, pushed to
the brink by the increase in demands from their clientele, became the target of the
disappointment and anger of these newly organized industrial maritime workers.
Considering the ISU’s interrelated campaign to protect jobs for skilled, white
seamen and their fight against industrial unionism, the racial makeup of SCI’s clientele
locates the Institute as steady adjunct to the craft unionist cause and in direct conflict with
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the city’s more radical maritime unions. During the 1920s and 1930s, dozens of radical
maritime unions formed in lower Manhattan, demanding that local organizations and
federal policy makers take action in order to alleviate the effects of a prolonged shipping
slump that was compounded by the stock market crash of 1929. Groups such as the
Waterfront Section of the Communist Party, the Waterfront Unemployed Council, the
Seamen’s Unemployed Council, the Marine Transport Workers Industrial Union, and the
National Industrial Union of Marine Transport Workers all established headquarters and
held meetings in lower Manhattan, often just a few blocks from 25 South Street. In 1926,
the Communist Party of the United States of America opened a branch of the International
Seamen’s Club down the street from SCI and offered a library, reading room, and
inexpensive lunch counter for all waterfront workers. In addition to directly competing
with SCI, the International Seamen’s Club openly sought to cultivate solidarity across
crafts along the waterfront, and encouraged seamen to agitate for a radical brand of class
struggle that would challenge the relatively conservative ISU.43
Mansfield, referring to his early years as SCI’s Superintendent, describes the
relationship between the waterfront unions and SCI as decidedly unfriendly, even before
the post-World War I economic climate gave momentum to radical labor movements of
the 1920s and 1930s: “All we ever tried to do was to help the seaman get and keep the
status of a self-respecting human being, and one might suppose the unions would like
that. I do not know why they were down on us, but they were. Perhaps they wanted a
monopoly of the sailor’s welfare, or perhaps they had not taken the trouble to find out
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what we were actually aiming at.”44 Nelson depicts a very different interpretation of
SCI’s relationship to antagonistic rank-and-file seamen:
“Many of them [seamen] regarded them with contempt and distrust. They
nicknamed it the Dog House and the Shipowners’ Institute. Perhaps it was the air
of paternalism, or the security guards who were sometimes overzealous in
enforcing the house rules, or the fact that many a destitute seaman couldn’t pay
the storage fee on his baggage and had his personal belongings auctioned off to
someone else. There were frequent charges that much of the charitable money
intended for the seamen went instead for the ‘fat salaries’ of SCI officials or for
religious literature.”45
Regardless of the specific reasons for the industrial maritime unions’ hostility towards
SCI, the severe economic conditions of the 1920s and 1930s only exacerbated relations
between the Institute and its clientele. Economic relief, in the form of guaranteed work,
full crews on ships, no wage cuts, and financial payments for those out of work, was at
the heart of the conflict between industrial maritime unionists and SCI. As labor historian
Bruce Nelson points out, merchant seamen’s transiency made them ineligible for official
sources of government relief that were made available to other American citizens, so that
many seamen were driven to “beg at the sacred portals of the Missions and holy rollers
that [were] springing up on the skidroad and doing a thriving depression business.”46
Whereas members of the Marine Workers Industrial Union in Baltimore had temporary
success in taking over relief operations from the Seamen’s Y.M.C.A. in 1934, control
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over the distribution of relief remained a volatile point of contention throughout the
1930s between merchant seamen in New York and charitable operations like SCI.47
This opposition climaxed in violence in 1932 when the Marine Workers Industrial
Union (MWIU), which had formed in 1930 with the mission of “building a viable
revolutionary industrial union on the waterfront” provoked a series of incidents that
climaxed in violence when MWIU members stormed the lobby of 25 South Street,
inciting a melee in which several shots were fired. In July of 1932, thousands participated
in a rally led by the MWIU in front of SCI headquarters. The Union also held a public
“mock trial” of SCI administrators based on accusations that the Institute had mishandled
relief funds, and in protest of the 35-cent fee for a bed.48
In addition to public rallies and mock trials, labor groups expressed their
dissatisfaction through the distribution of handbills, pamphlets, and other ephemeral
printed material. A handbill issued by the “Seamens Unemployed Council” is indicative
of the material produced by waterfront labor groups during this time. Next to a sketch of
a worker raising his right arm with an open palm, the title “Seamen Unite; Close Your
Ranks; and Fight!; Unemployed Seamen Organize” is laid out on the top half of the page
in basic hand-scrawled penmanship. Slanted, off-centered type provides the details of the
handbill in two paragraphs:
“Fellow Seamen: None of the fake charity outfits are doing anything for us…
They are only using us for a bait to catch suckers, who believe they are helping
the unemployed seamen, but in reality they are putting fat on the hips of Mother
Ropeyarn [SCI’s Janet Lord Roper] and the rest of her gang of PARASITES. We
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don’t want 10 cent dog stews either, we want square meals when we demand
relief from the bosses. They must be forced to give us free beds, free meals and
free clothing; also free medical aid. Don’t let us tolerate any discrimination in the
distribution of relief on account of race or nationality.”

The second paragraph urges seamen to attend a national hunger march in
Washington, D.C., most likely one that took place on December 7, 1931. The content of
the mimeographed handbill suggests that it was likely distributed at the street level to
seamen, hoping to recruit them in their fight against SCI. The Seamen’s Unemployed
Council had its headquarters at Coenties Slip at this time, meaning they were operating in
close proximity with SCI and probably interacting with many of the seamen who had
either stayed at SCI or (better for the Council) had been turned away by SCI.
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Fig. 40: Seamen’s Unemployed Council handbill. (Image: Seamen’s Church
Institute of New York and New Jersey)

In addition to handbills, industrial maritime unions produced more sophisticated
newsletters that openly mock and attack the sense of conservative authority SCI worked
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so hard to project through production and distribution of its printed material and
photographic propaganda. An internal SCI memorandum title “A Statement on
Communistic Attacks on the Institute” refers to “the Communistic Sheet, the Daily
Woker… the Marine Worker’s Voice, and the so-called Institute-Log, a mimeographed
sheet issued daily and distributed throughout the district and within the Institute
Building.” It can be argued that this “invasion” of 25 South Street’s print culture
necessarily existed alongside, or even preceded, physical invasions to SCI’s headquarters,
such as the violence that took place in 1932. Indeed, the survey of radical print
production in the “Communistic Attacks” memoranda is followed by a description of the
waterfront labor groups’ physical infiltration of 25 South Street:
“Not satisfied with this propaganda they have made attempts to hold meetings in
the Institute and by personal contacts to influence the Institute guests. There are
constant efforts being made to prevail upon the men to boycott the Institute to the
extent of even attacking on the Street men known to be loyal to the Institute.
Although there was a lull after we established the ten-cent meals and during the
winter when the extensive relief program was in effect recently the attacks have
become more serious, culminating in brutal assaults by the Communists made
simultaneously from within and outside of the Institute, when the Institute guards
were seriously injured.”49
In response to such tactics, SCI administrators launched a campaign of
undercover infiltration of the meetings of waterfront labor groups such as the Marine
Worker’s Unemployed Council. In a letter from SCI Attorney George Gray Zabriske to

“A Statement on Communistic Attacks at the Institute,” Series 10: Labor and Legislation, Records of the
Seamen’s Church Institute of New York and New Jersey.
49

252

SCI administration, the lawyer recommends that “[i]f any of your men go to the meeting
tomorrow night or any other such meetings, it would be well if possible to have someone
take notes of what is said for purposes of evidence.” Included with his letter was a list of
offenses that SCI could pursue in prosecuting offenders, including disorderly conduct for
offensive language, conduct, and/or behavior, congregating, loitering, and collecting a
crowd. Perhaps most significant was Chapter 22, Article 2, Section 15 of the Code of
Ordinances regarding handbills, cards, and circulars, which prohibited (with the
exception of the postal service) the distribution of printed material upon “any street of
public place, or in a front yard or court yard, or on any stoop, or in the vestibule or any
hall of any building, or in a letterbox therein.”50 Armed with such legal advice and with
the cooperation of lower Manhattan’s police, SCI engaged in a battle with industrial
maritime labor groups in which both sides attempted infiltrate and delegitimize the other:
SCI through institutional publications and secret memoranda reporting on waterfront
labor meetings, and the radical groups through libelous handbills, pamphlets, placards,
and telegraphs.
SCI staff members also sat in on industrial maritime union meetings, reporting
back to SCI’s administration through memoranda and meeting minutes as instructed by
SCI attorney Zabriske. In a report filed on December 18, 1930, SCI agent J. J. Kelly
documents a meeting held by the Marine Workers Solidarity League. Kelly described a
“Mr. Sizemore” who spoke of an incident in which he “came into the Institute with
several of his men” and began to hand out circulars produced by the Solidarity League.
According to Sizemore, he was immediately seized by police and brought to SCI’s then-
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Director Rev. Kelly’s office, where Kelly told him that “he would not allow anyone to
give out circulars of any description and would have his men stop those who attempted to
do so. He also said that if we were looking for trouble his men would be ready at
anytime, with a force of 60 men, to enforce the law.”51 Such a swift reaction from Kelly
is testament to the subversive power of printed material. The distribution of circulars and
handbills had been employed against the Institute as a means of recruiting seamen to the
side of the labor groups in opposition to SCI. The incident that Sizemore describes is one
in which a radical has infiltrated the Institutional sphere of 25 South Street both
physically, and perhaps more significantly, through the distribution of his printed
material. Such a violation was apparently threatening enough to Rev. Kelly to summon
the threat of a violent reaction to Sizemore’s act of protest.
Within this context, a final coda on Mother Roper comes during the turmoil of the
Great Depression, during which radical waterfront unions surrounded 25 South Street.
Unemployed and striking seamen took up SCI as a target at which to direct their
overflowing anger at the capitalist system, and an interpretation of the Institute and its
administrators as beneficiaries of an exploitative system not altogether different from that
of the crimps who Mansfield and his army of reformers claimed to be waging war
against. The animosity between waterfront radicals and SCI was so pervasive during this
time that even Finn, in his sympathetic portrayal of Roper and the Institute, was forced to
address it in his manuscript.52
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According to Finn’s narrative, Roper was sympathetic to the unionists’ cause,
conceding that “there is no doubt that radicals improve conditions on ships,” and even
paying union dues for penniless seamen out of her own personal account, a violation of
house rules for which she was supposedly nearly fired. Finn also claims that Roper
purchased every issue of The Dog House News, a handbill published by the Waterfront
Unemployed Council that was a satirical version of SCI’s The Lookout, and which
pilloried SCI staff and administrators, including Mother Roper, whom the newsletter
depicted as having gotten rich off the seamen’s plight, and whom some seamen referred
to derisively as “Mother Ropeyarn.”
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Fig. 41: Waterfront Unemployed Council, Dog House News, 1932. (Image: Seamen’s
Church Institute of New York and New Jersey)

While Finn depicts Roper as responding with good-natured tolerance, he leaves
out an incident in which a group of seamen physically attacked an aged Roper inside 25
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South Street, leading to a full investigation and a crisis of management within the
Institute. In a letter dated October 21, 1932 from SCI administrator J. M. Wainwright to
Secretary of Labor William Doak, Wainwright describes the attack:
“The Seamen’s Church Institute of New York, of which I am one of the
managers, contains, as you are undoubtedly aware, probably the greatest seamen’s
benevolent institution in any of our ports. Recently, the Institute and its
employees have been subject to really dangerous attack by the communistic
element which congregates on the water front near the Association’s building.”53
Wainwright goes on to identify Leo Solomi, “alias Nick Salami,” and Henry
Endlekoff as the perpetrators of the assault, and he claims that the former had been
identified as a “Russian alien.” The purpose of the letter was to express his
disappointment with a recent Congressional hearing at which it was ruled that such
individuals could not be deported because “he came from Soviet Russia” and the United
States did not at that time have diplomatic relations with the Russians: “[t]he fact being,
therefore, that this alien, bent upon subversive activities, is again at large and absolutely
free to continue his seditious activity.”54
In a separate letter addressed to SCI administrators from legal counsel George
Zabriske, the attorney describes a “couple of hand bills” “one of which advertises a
meeting to be held tomorrow night at the corner of White Hall and South Streets,”
immediately down the block from 25 South Street, “to ‘try Mother Roper and the grafting
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officials of Seamen’s Church Institute.’”55 Zabriske then goes on for several pages
detailing a litany of laws “under which these Communists can be dealt with,” suggesting
that “if you can get satisfactory cooperation from the police to break up the proposed
meeting and arrest the leaders and prosecute them vigorously, that would be desirable.”
Realizing that this approach might be untenable on short notice, Zabriske suggests an
alternative “counterattack”:
Among the papers Dr. Mansfield sent me was a letter signed by Leslie H. Jones,
in which the writer showed his indignation about the attack on Mrs. Roper and
undertook to do everything he could to avenge it. I notice under date of July 13th
you reported that the speaker who particularly attacked Mrs. Roper was
subsequently well beaten up. It may be that this was the work of Leslie H. Jones,
but whoever did it, there is evidently a good body of men in the Institute who
would be only too glad to take a hand in such a proceeding. I should think that it
might be well if a hint were judiciously dropped here and there tomorrow to the
effect that this trial of Mother Roper was to take place at eight o’clock at
Whitehall and South Streets, and that some of her friends in the Institute might
find it interesting to attend in a body. If enough of them should go and thoroughly
beat up the participants in the meeting it might have a salutary effect for some
time. Of course some of them might get arrested by mistake along with the
“Reds.” If your relations with the nearby police and satisfactory it ought to be
possible to prevent their being held.56
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The Institute did indeed launch a counterattack to the pockets of unrest and
resistance to SCI’s presence and mission in New York’s sailortown, enlisting the services
of a private detective to infiltrate subversive meetings like the one Zabriske describes.
The detective would have his hands full during the remainder of the 1930s, as radical
leftist maritime labor organizations splintered off from one another and established a
network of headquarters and subversive publications along the waterfront streets
surrounding 25 South Street. This era of discontent, in which seamen organized and
advocated for relief in the face of a devastating shipping slump, unprecedented
unemployment, and insufficient public services, produced an undercurrent of subversive
resistance to SCI’s mission that manifested itself in a physical attack on Mother Roper.
Having embedded itself within the heart of sailortown during the nineteenth
century, consolidated its services under the leadership of Mansfield and the roof of 25
South Street by 1912, and reached out beyond the confines of sailortown to shape the
personal and familiar lives of seamen through Roper’s regime of domesticity, SCI clearly
posed a serious threat to the autonomy of the seamen it served, as well as the character of
sailortown itself.
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Fig. 42: Mother Roper captured in an idealized pose waving bon voyage to her
many “sons” at sea from atop the Institute’s roof. (Image: Seamen’s Church
Institute of New York and New Jersey)

What characteristics of sailortown were so vital to the identities and culture of
merchant seamen in New York that they were to be defended at all costs against the
reformers who sought to eradicate them, even to the extent of physically attacking an
aged woman? In other words, what was at stake in these confrontations between SCI and
the commercial, leisure, and labor spheres of sailortown that had by the 1930s coalesced
into a last stand waged by radical maritime labor unions that surrounded 25 South Street?
The answer, in part, is that seamen fought back to regain control over their own
livelihood, their leisure, their ability to make decisions about their familial connections,
how they spent their money, the freedom to define their own systems of morality, and
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even spirituality. In short, what was at stake for seamen was control over all of the
gendered negotiations that were contested over in confrontations between seamen and the
shoreside reformers of the Seamen’s Church Institute. As the maritime industry
weathered the postwar shipping slump of the 1920s and the nation suffered through the
Great Depression, these confrontations intensified and were projected onto the state,
inciting legal battles that asked fundamental questions about the status of merchant
seamen under U.S. labor and immigration law and the U.S. Constitution itself. As
immigration law became increasingly restrictive and exclusionary, SCI became a target
not just of radical maritime labor unions, but also of the state itself, which set its sights on
the “million-dollar home for sailors” as it once had on sailortown’s boardinghouses.
Despite their best efforts, the city’s merchant seamen had largely retained the inherent
transience and foreignness that made them such a persistent threat to the parameters of
social, cultural, and economic propriety, and, as Chapter Five will document, their
uncertain status as workers on the margins of immigration law.
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CHAPTER FIVE

Deserters, Stowaways, and Mala Fide Sailors: Merchant Seamen and the Shaping of
U.S. Immigration Policy, 1917-1936
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Introduction
On the morning of February 3, 1931, agents from Immigration Inspector John
Kaba’s “flying squad” descended on the 13-story headquarters of the Seamen’s Church
Institute (SCI) at 25 South Street in New York City. Locking the doors behind them to
prevent anyone from leaving, the inspection team spent the next seven hours
interrogating more than 4,000 merchant seamen who had congregated inside the building
on that particular morning. Operating on intelligence gathered by undercover agents and
cooperative administrators at the Institute, the inspectors set to work rooting out seamen
whom they suspected of having entered the country illegally via merchant ships. Those
who were able to respond satisfactorily to inspectors’ questions regarding legal residency
were allowed to leave. Those suspected of illegal residency “were brought out in dejected
groups, under guard, to be taken to Ellis Island.” By the end of the day, 102 seamen had
been detained and three arrested for possession of forged birth certificates.1
Little more than two months after the raid on SCI, the Department of Labor issued
orders for immigration officers to prepare for the deportation of 100,000 merchant
seamen who were suspected of residing in the country illegally.2 Ironically, the very
Institute that had been founded to infiltrate, convert, and control merchant seamen based
on their inherent transience and foreignness had become a target of U.S. immigration
forces because of the men bearing those very same characteristics being harbored under
its roof. The same forces that had motivated SCI’s founding and history of maritime
ministry work had been officially picked up by the state, while the target–merchant
seamen–remained the same. The full weight of the nation’s immigration law would be
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weaponized particularly against seamen during this era of the war for control of
sailortown.
The crackdown on merchant seamen followed in the immediate wake of the U.S.
Supreme Court case Philippides v. Day, decided on March 23rd, 1931, in which two
merchant seamen brought suit claiming that their rights under the 1915 Seamen’s Act
protected them from more stringent terms of deportation put forth by the 1924 JohnsonReed Act. The Court decided against the plaintiffs, ruling that special provisions afforded
to seamen, specifically the right to desert their vessels while in port and the right to a
shorter statute of limitation during which they could be subject to deportation, had both
been essentially overturned by the Johnson-Reed Act.3 The 1915 Seamen’s Act
established the right for merchant seamen, whether American citizens or foreign-born, to
lawfully break contract and desert their vessel while in American ports. This had long
been a central issue for maritime labor unions and advocacy organizations, most
explicitly carried out in the 1897 U.S. Supreme Court case Robertson v. Baldwin, in
which the Court ruled against three merchant seamen who had brought suit claiming that
their being subject to arrest upon deserting their vessel in Astoria, Oregon constituted a
violation of the Thirteenth Amendment’s abolishment of involuntary servitude.4 The right
to desertion as protected by the 1915 Seamen’s Act represented a reversal of the Court’s
ruling in Robertson v. Baldwin. The desertion provision of the Seamen’s Act also created
a central venue for illegal immigration that would shape discourse surrounding the
construction and enforcement of immigration law from 1917-1935. By protecting the
right of foreign seamen to both shore leave and desertion, the Seamen’s Act ensured that
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foreign seamen, regardless of their citizenship status, would be able to come ashore
without having to be subjected to full official inspection on deck or at official sites at
points of entry. Instead, merchant seamen were within their rights to take leave of their
ship, circumventing the official processes of immigration inspection altogether.
Special protections afforded to foreign seamen, including a provision of the
Immigration Act of 1917 which set the statute of limitations for deportations at three
years for merchant seamen, as opposed to a five-year statute for all other non-citizen
residents, made the vehicle of merchant ships and seamen’s status an attractive option for
immigrants who lacked the resources to negotiate the official entry process. Following
passage of the Seamen’s Act, incidents like that involving the SS Magnolia in October of
1915, which involved the detention of 86 Chinese stowaways who were impersonating
seamen in an attempt to get ashore, became increasingly common under the restrictive
framework of the Chinese Exclusion Acts. In reports of the incident, officials suspected
that an additional thirty to fifty Chinese who were onboard the Magnolia escaped
detention and disappeared once on shore.5 A combination of increasingly restrictive
immigration legislation, a sharp increase in wartime internments and deportations, and
widespread turmoil and violence across much of Europe made the war years an especially
tumultuous time for foreign-born American residents and would-be immigrants. The
Immigration Act of 1917 tightened restrictions on immigration into the U.S. by extending
Chinese exclusion to much of the Asian continent, and the Espionage Act of 1917 and
Sedition Act of 1918 established broad frameworks for the mass deportation of suspect
non-citizens during wartime. More stringent rules for immigrants and would-be migrants
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made pathways for illegal entry through merchant ships and the impersonation of seamen
much more attractive for immigrants of all ethnicities. Launching what would become
known as the Palmer Raids beginning in January 1919, the U.S. government, led by
Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer, announced the mass internment and deportation of
thousands of “enemies from within,” including a long list of political radicals, including
many German and Italian merchant seamen and officers. In June 1919, Palmer estimated
that there were 4,000 men confined in Army internment camps, approximately half of
whom were merchant seamen.6 Under such intense scrutiny, and up against the forces of
federally mandated exclusion policies backed by public fear of subversion from within,
those aspiring or desperate to emigrate to the U.S. from all nations devised elaborate
plans for circumventing the recently-established restrictions on entry.
A news report from D.C. in 1920 described a typical incident involving an
“organized gang” thought to be running a smuggling ring via merchant vessels in
Baltimore. On August 5th, Captain Larsen of the Danish steamship Fredericksborg
reported that two of his crew, John Madsen and Magnus Olsen, who had been confined
on board for unspecified reasons, had literally jumped ship by leaping overboard into a
harbor launch that had pulled alongside their vessel. With the men safely aboard, the
launch sped off for shore. Whereas Olsen appears to have escaped, Madsen was not as
fortunate. Upon his capture Madsen testified that he and his co-conspirator had arranged
their escape ahead of time in collaboration with a man in Baltimore to whom they paid
six dollars each in exchange for their illicit passage. Similar escapes of German seamen
who were otherwise not permitted ashore, including charges against a Captain Firs of the
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Swedish steamship Volkarth Tham, who was fined $1,000 for the escape of four of his
crew, led the newspaper to editorialize that “[s]o many of these aliens have escaped from
their ships recently that it has become a source of considerable trouble and expense to the
ships and has led to the conviction that there is collusion between alien seamen who
desire to get into this country and men ashore.”7
Whereas Chinese had been excluded from emigration entirely since 1882, and all
other south Asians had been effectively barred entry with passage of the Immigration Act
of 1917, the Johnson-Reed Act of 1924 established quotas for all other immigrants based
on a hierarchy of selective inclusion. In addition to boldfaced pseudo-scientific racism,
increasingly restrictive immigration policies were fueled by attempts at countering
competition from cheap foreign labor and a widespread fear of the infiltration of radical
politics from Southern and Eastern European nations, as well as those under the growing
influence of the fledgling Soviet Union. Increasingly, these fears combined with forces of
political and socio-economic “push” towards emigration from many of the countries
codified as undesirable in the quotas of the Johnson-Reed Act. The pangs of a developing
socialist economy under Stalin in the Soviet Union, the rise of fascist regimes in Italy,
Germany, and Spain, and a cauldron of revolution and civil war sweeping across China
combined to make emigration to the U.S., with its booming domestic economy and
relatively stable political and social landscape, all the more attractive an option. Rather
than embracing its role as safe haven for international asylum seekers and economic
opportunity, the U.S. continued to turn inward through restrictive immigration legislation
and enforcement at points of entry along the nation’s geographic borders and ports.
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Despite these mechanisms of exclusion and border control, would-be immigrants
continued to successfully devise plans to enter the country illegally, either by negotiating
encounters with inspectors and immigration officials themselves or by circumventing
such encounters altogether via merchant ships and the impersonation of seamen. Under
the 1924 Act, merchant seamen were subject to inspections on board their vessels, but
only to check for infectious diseases and other mental or physical ailments that explicitly
excluded immigrants from entry. In all other respects, the burden of proof in terms of
identifying a foreign-born individual on a merchant ship as a bona fide seaman as
opposed to a passenger, stowaway, or “mala fide” seaman, resided fully with an
appointed ship’s officer who was personally responsible for the accuracy of his crew list
and roster.8 This arrangement opened the possibility for manipulation and bribery among
bona fide merchant seamen and officers who were willing to collaborate in smuggling
impostors or stowaways into the country for a fee. The entire process was further
complicated by the fact that with the exception of major port cities like New York and
Los Angeles, immigration inspectors at smaller ports along the East and West coasts
complained of chronic underfunding that spread resources thin and made consistent,
thorough inspections of merchant vessels impossible.9 Even when immigration officials
were present and able to reach merchant ships before they emptied their crews ashore,
inspections and encounters were often inadequate and subject to the cooperation, or lack
thereof, of those under inspection. In Norfolk, Virginia, for example, a Chinese crew who
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would have otherwise been barred from shore leave rushed the gangway, assaulted the
immigration inspector assigned there, and made their way freely ashore.10
Given the porous state of inspections involving merchant vessels and seamen, it is
hardly surprising that in 1924 alone, the U.S. Labor Secretary estimated that 38,000
merchant seamen, or those posing as merchant seamen, had deserted their vessels in
American ports.11 While shipping company officials maintained that as much as seventyfive percent of these desertions involved men who were intent on reshipping out on
different ships, as was within their right under the 1915 Seamen’s Act, immigration
officials and congressmen on the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization remained
suspicious.12 Indeed, committee hearings held by the U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Immigration and Naturalization during 1925 and 1926 were dedicated
solely to the issue of “alien seamen,” in which representatives from Congress, the U.S.
Department of Labor, shipping companies, and maritime labor unions debated the
viability of amendments to existing immigration regulations proposed with the intent of
curbing the problem of illegal immigration within the maritime shipping industry.
These hearings left unresolved many questions about the legal status of merchant
seamen under U.S. immigration law. Merchant ships and the impersonation of seamen
remained a viable and fluid channel for entering the country while circumventing much
of the official encounter with the state required of other non-seaman immigrants until
1931. In March of that year, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on a case involving merchant
seaman Demetrius Philippides, a Greek citizen who brought suit initially against
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Benjamin M. Day, Commissioner of Immigration for the Port of New York, alleging that
his arrest some three years and three months after he deserted his vessel in New York
constituted a violation of the protections afforded merchant seamen under the 1917
Immigration Act, which stipulated a three year statute of limitations after which merchant
seamen could not be prosecuted for illegal entry into the country. The Court ruled against
Philippides, arguing that the language of the Johnson-Reed Act altered the terms of the
Immigration Act of 1917 by incorporating merchant seamen under the category of
“Quota Aliens” who were all subject to the same five-year statute of limitations, as
opposed to the three-year statute specially provided to merchant seamen in earlier
legislation.13 Philippides v. Day, following in the wake of the raid on the Seamen’s
Church Institute on February 3rd, prompted a wave of immigration raids specifically
targeting merchant seamen within the nation’s port cities. A new era, albeit a brief one, of
exclusion, surveillance, and forcible deportation had begun, motivated by the deep
economic slump and scourge of unemployment that had overcome the nation in the
second year of the Great Depression. Even more so than during debates about Chinese
and Asiatic exclusion during the First World War and the 1920s, policies regarding the
exclusion of foreigners, merchant seamen included, that had previously been shaped by
racial and ethnic prejudice as well as a backlash against political radicalism were now
couched in explicitly economic terms.
Comparing this timeline with that of immigration history, merchant ships and the
impersonation of seamen stand out as an overlooked site of mobility for immigrants who
lacked the means to successfully negotiate encounters with the state, whether at border
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crossing stations or at inspection sites located at ports of entry, or who otherwise chose to
circumvent the process altogether. Indeed, historians who do focus on illegal entry tend
to focus on geographic crossings from the Mexican or Canadian borders, or focus on
methods for manipulating the inspection process itself.14 Merchant seamen provide a
necessary addition to scholarship on immigration history in tracing both the legislative
discourse and strategic approach of immigrants and cooperative agents within the
commercial maritime industry who capitalized on protections afforded foreign merchant
seamen under U.S. law.
Contrary to the lack of attention paid by historians to merchant ships and seamen
as sites of potential illegal immigration, the issue of alien seamen dominated discourse
surrounding immigration law from 1917-1935, as well as the rhetoric of seamen’s unions
and maritime reformers. In fact, the very first paragraph of the Immigration Act of 1917
establishes definitions for three terms only: “alien,” “United States,” and “seaman.” In
total, the words “seaman” or “seamen” appear 138 times, accounting for an astounding
25 pages of the 95-page bill. At least four separate hearings of the Committee on
Immigration and Naturalization were convened between the years 1925-1935 to
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specifically discuss the issue of “Deportation of Alien Seamen,” with representatives
from Congress, the U.S. Department of Labor, police departments, organized labor, and
shipping companies on both coasts testifying as to how to address the flow of immigrants
who were entering the country illegally via merchant ships. Additionally, pages upon
pages of the International Seamen’s Union’s (ISU) publication The Seamen’s Journal
discuss the issue of “alien seamen,” devising a complex stance on immigration policy that
would simultaneously protect the interests of American seamen while preserving rights
gained with the passage of the 1915 Seamen’s Act. Given this density of archival
material related to discourse surrounding the issue of “alien seamen” during the years
1917-1935, an extended study of the issue is warranted, especially considering the
relative inattention paid to the issue within the existent literature on immigration history.
It is of little surprise that merchant seamen would find themselves at the center of
discourse surrounding the issue of migration and foreign labor. As many historians have
argued, merchant seamen themselves have long embodied transnational networks of
transmission, whether it be of information, political ideology, or even disease.15 That
merchant ships and seamen were active nodes in the nexus of international mobility of
migrants only strengthens this depiction. Close analysis of the position of merchant ships
and seamen within the complicated landscape of illegal immigration during the exclusion
and quota eras should provide a necessary addition to our understanding of how
immigrants were able to negotiate the process of entering the U.S. under increasingly
restrictive laws and processes.
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1917-1924
Before the Immigration Act of 1924, merchant seamen who were not citizens of
the United States were granted a range of mobility not afforded to foreigners of other
classes and professions. Under the Immigration Act of 1907, aliens on merchant ships
“who are to be found as seamen” were granted freedom to shore leave, protected under
law, stipulating that they:
...shall not be examined by officers of the Immigration Service further than may
be necessary to determine their status as seamen, and to ascertain that they are not
insane, idiots, imbeciles, epileptics, or persons afflicted with tuberculosis or with
a loathsome or dangerous contagious disease; head tax shall not be certified on
their account; they shall not be prevented from landing temporarily in the United
States, nor required to land at any designated time or place; neither shall any
manifest of them be required, nor shall they necessarily be returned to the country
whence they came by the vessels bringing them.16
This litany of protections is indicative of the historically paradoxical status of merchant
seamen under U.S. law. The White Act of 1898 essentially overturned the Court’s ruling
in Robertson v. Baldwin and, under the 1907 law, legislators prioritized a seaman’s right
to shore leave over the threat that his mobility posed to nascent mechanisms of the
enforced borders of citizenship. The 1915 Seamen’s Act, referred to as the “Magna
Carta” of seamen’s rights by its adovcates, codified a seaman’s right to shore leave by
granting seamen the right to desertion in both domestic and foreign ports and outlawing
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the practice of arresting “runaway” seamen and returning them to their employers.
Further, the law represented a decidedly nationalist solution to the downward pull on
wages and working conditions created by competition with foreign ships and labor. As a
result, merchant seamen both American and foreign-born emerged from the victory of the
1915 Seamen’s Act under an unprecedented umbrella of new rights and protections.
It would have taken a truly prophetic visionary in Congress to foresee how such
protections would play out under the nation’s newly-articulated determination to increase
restrictions on immigration and narrow the definition of American citizenship in response
to the outbreak of global war and the perceived spread of radicalized politics on the home
front. In addition to establishing a literacy test over President Wilson’s veto, the
Immigration Act of 1917 defined a long list of “undesirables” banned entirely from
entering the country based on perceived mental or moral deficiencies, as well as those
who were evaluated to be carrying certain contagious diseases. The law also expanded
the Asiatic Barred Exclusion zone beyond China to include most of outhern Asia. In
regards to merchant seamen, the 1917 law upheld much of the framework established by
the 1907 bill in exempting seamen from increasingly restrictive immigration regulations.
Under the 1917 law an alien seaman who intended “to reship on board any other vessel
bound to any foreign port or place” was to be allowed to “land for the purpose of so
reshipping.”17 Whereas the 1907 law required no inspection of a ship’s manifest, the
1917 law placed the burden of responsibility for attesting to a seaman’s bona fide status
on an appointed ship’s master or other officer who would be required to testify, under
oath, as to the accuracy of the crew list, including “any alien member of the crew who
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has been treated or furnished with medicine during the voyage for any of the diseases or
disabilities” specified in an earlier section of the law.18 Further, the 1917 law stipulated
that any alien seaman “who shall land in a port of the United States contrary to the
provisions of this act shall be deemed to be unlawfully in the United States” and would
be subject to detention and deportation within a statute of limitations of three years. For
all other aliens found to be unlawfully in the country, the statute of limitations was five
years.19
Whereas non-seamen aliens seeking to enter the country lawfully were subject to
thorough examinations at official sites of entry, either at port towns and cities along the
nation’s coasts or inspection sites along the northern and southern borders, merchant
seamen encountered relatively light inspections while on ship that placed most of the
burden of proof as to an individual’s suitability for legal entry on the ship’s master or
appointed officer. Crew lists maintained by the presiding ship’s officer provided
sufficient proof of a seaman’s personal legality, and he would be granted entry based on
such documents alone. For many outside observers, this system seemed ripe for
manipulation. An article that ran in the Norwich Bulletin in January 1921 lamented the
porousness of this back door to the framework of exclusion that had been meticulously
built during the war years to keep out undesirable aliens. Titled “Where Attention Is
Needed,” the article points out that “while close attention seems to be given to dealing
with aliens who come here to make their homes, none too much if any attention is given
to those alien seamen who desert on reaching these shores, or who in fact come here as
seamen for the purpose of getting around the laws of this country.” The writer then
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relates an account of a certain unnamed seaman who had entered the country via
desertion, and who was later detained as a “bolshevist” who had confided to an
acquaintance his possession of “two powerful bombs.” As the writer describes, the
seaman “had snapped his fingers at the immigration restrictions and was as there are
reasons to believe, an individual who had come here for the purpose of creating
trouble.”20 Norwich, Connecticut being a small port town situated at the base of the
Thames River north of New London, the newspaper’s readers would certainly be familiar
with the comings and goings of maritime vessels and their crews. Such a lurid account,
drawing on contemporary fears of radical violence and illustrating the apparent inability
of the mechanisms of immigration restriction to keep out such undesirable aliens, likely
proved compelling reading for residents concerned with the security of their nation’s
ports.
Similarly, an article from the Dearborn Independent, a paper owned by Henry
Ford and mouthpiece for his River Rouge factory complex located in the Great Lakes
port town of Dearborn, Michigan, ran on July 2, 1921, drawing further attention to the
inadequate inspection procedures in place for merchant vessels and seamen. The article
points out that medical inspections performed on ships were carried out in a manner “not
wholly conducive to efficiency,” an obtuse way of stating more specific criticisms that
describe the procedures as “hurried,” lacking suitable equipment and resources, and
devoid of the privacy necessary to carry out inspections adequately. Finally, the article
concludes with the recommendation that “some legislation” be adopted that would
provide “a penalty against steamship companies in cases where diseased alien seamen are

20

Norwich Bulletin. (Norwich, CT), March 16, 1921.

276

discovered,” similar to the penalties put in place by the 1917 law against employment of
diseased non-seamen immigrants.21 As with the Norwich Bulletin article, the unnamed
Dearborn journalist saw a disparity between the treatment of aliens entering the country
with the explicit intentios of permanent residence and that of alien seamen who were
granted the right to shore leave or desertion with the implied intention of re-shipping. But
what lay behind this disparity? What about merchant vessels and seamen required that
they be allowed a fast-track path to both legal and illegal entry, and that they be granted a
reprieve from most aspects of official encounters with the state, which all other aliens
were subject to when arriving at border inspection sites and ports of entry?
The most obvious answer is that maritime commerce had long represented an
essential priority for both the nation’s industrial interests and for its lawmakers, who
found common ground in the mandate to provide for a stable, well-regulated, and freeflowing maritime trade, necessary for the United States to assert itself as a viable
participant within international markets. By the early-twentieth century, American ports
and consumer markets were dependent on an increasingly foreign-flagged merchant fleet,
as well as rising numbers of non-citizen seamen, particularly from regions of “new”
immigration in Southern and Eastern Europe and, of course, Chinese and other Asian
labor markets. Whereas these new sources of international labor created significant
agitation among American maritime labor unions seeking to protect jobs for American
citizen seamen, U.S. lawmakers, backed by powerful shipping companies whose interests
had expanded to multinational proportions, passed immigration legislation that privileged
mobility of merchant seamen both citizen and non-citizen alike over any imperative to
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create effective barriers of exclusion at the nation’s ports. Following the 1915 Seamen’s
Act, the upward pull on wages that a seaman’s right to desertion created within American
ports added economic incentive to maintain such mobility. Ironically, by protecting
foreign seamen’s right to desertion and encouraging them to weigh their options while in
port by allowing them to reship on a vessel with better pay and/or more favorable
conditions actually fostered the viability of American ships that were required by law to
provide certain minimum wage rates and working conditions. The porousness of the
Immigration Acts of 1907 and 1917 regarding foreign seamen in port was therefore
essential to maintaining the intricate mechanisms of labor competition and the viability of
the American merchant marine as ingeniously devised in the 1915 Seamen’s Act.
Further, legislation related to the regulation of merchant mariners’ labor and
immigration restrictions was firmly couched in the theory of “flexible maritime
capacity,” which maintained that a viable, properly manned citizen merchant marine was
essential to national security interests by providing an auxiliary to the Navy in times of
war and imperial expansion. Flexible capacity derived from Alfred Thayer Mahan’s The
Influence of Sea Power Upon History: 1660-1783, published in 1890, and was endowed
with greater urgency by imperial projects embedded in the Spanish-American War, and
later the global crisis of the Great War. As Justin Jackson argues, flexible capacity was
perhaps the primary factor driving legislative support for a subsidized, citizen-manned
merchant marine through protective labor legislation such as the 1915 Seamen’s Act.22
This same politics emphasizing a citizen-manned American merchant marine in the
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interests of national security structured immigration policy from 1917-1936, as well as
the reactions of American merchant seamen’s primary public representative, the ISU.
The ISU, intent on preventing foreign, and especially Chinese, crews from taking
American jobs and creating a downward pull on wages and working conditions, took a
decidedly less tolerant position regarding the mobility and employability of foreign
seamen in American ports and on American ships. Through the organ of its newsletter,
The Seamen’s Journal, the Union remained conspicuously silent on the details of the
Immigration Act of 1917 during the war years, instead adopting a simplistic patriotism
that focused on mariners’ heroic contributions and sacrifices to the war against the Kaiser
alongside active attention to the detention and deportation of alien seamen hailing from
the nations of the enemy. By 1921, articles regarding alien seamen were limited to
virulent anti-Chinese rhetoric typical of the Union’s earlier days amidst previous
incarnations of Chinese exclusion legislation. For example, an article titled “No More
Hyphens” from the early months of U.S. involvement in the war adopts the Wilsonian
rhetoric of “one-hundred-percent” Americanism and the myth of democratic
universalism: “[a]s a result of this war will be a wonderful amalgamation of races within
America. The melting pot is boiling now,” and, “[a]t this time we know only Old
Americans and New Americans. The hyphen is gone. It changed to vapor in the melting
pot.”23 But the inclusiveness of this vision was limited to either citizens by birth (“Old
Americans”), or citizens by naturalization (“New Americans”). There was no room for
non-citizen residents, aliens, or other foreigners seeking to carve out space within this
imaginary new America that the winning of the war would produce.
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The hiring of Chinese seamen on American vessels, a practice engaged in with
particular frequency among Pacific steamship companies operating under federal mailcarrier subsidies, became a rallying cry for the ISU during the war years and in their
immediate aftermath. The business practices of Robert Dollar, owner of the Dollar
Steamship Co., generated a torrent of articles in The Seamen’s Journal especially during
1918. Dollar was known for manning his steamships with Chinese crews, picked up in
the Far East or at California port cities like San Francisco, where the ISU was
headquartered. The Union’s complaints were couched in a nationalistic wartime rhetoric,
which they used to call attention to Dollar’s insistence on avoiding the hiring of
American seamen: “[i]t is becoming impossible to take him seriously… actuated solely
by the desire to retain his cheap Oriental crews at a time when all America—the
Government, the shipowners and the organized seamen are heartily co-operating to man
our great new merchant fleet with loyal and patriotic Americans.”24 The ISU reveled in
Dollar’s failures and capitalized on the steamship line’s misfortunes by emphasizing the
dangers of relying on foreign crews who, the ISU claimed, lacked the proper training and
experience possessed by “white” American seamen. Reacting to an incident in which the
SS Stanley Dollar lost three out of four boilers mid-voyage, leaving the vessel stranded in
the middle of the Pacific Ocean, the ISU offered an explanation as to the cause of the
Dollar line’s misfortunes, derived from a nationalism that was based on an adamant white
supremacist ideology: “[t]he vessel had been drifting for four days,” and had “happened
on her last trip after Captain Dollar had replaced an efficient white crew by his favorite
Asian pets.”25
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The use of Chinese crews on American steamships was not limited to the Dollar
Line. Articles in The Seamen’s Journal identify other lines, many operating under
government contracts to carry the nation’s international mail, that made use of Chinese
crews to man Pacific voyages. An article titled “More Imported Chinese” from May 15,
1918 made reference to the China Mail Steamship Company, which “has followed the
example of Captain Robert Dollar” in bringing to California a crew of approximately 150
Chinese for service on the American-flagged SS Nanking. Again, the ISU’s grievances
were carefully couched in patriotic wartime rhetoric: “[n]o self-respecting American
youth will voluntarily embrace a calling in which he must compete with Asiatic coolie
labor. For this reason, more than any other, the response to the appeal recently issued to
young men in the West to take up a career in the merchant marine has not been up to
expectations.” The combination of a wartime boom in the construction of American ships
and the increased demand for a citizen-manned American merchant marine, couched in
the theory of flexible capacity, created a climate in which the call for excluding foreign
seamen with the intent of protecting could be put forth in a manner that made claims on
national patriotism and enflamed fears of hypothetical weaknesses abroad. This was
particularly true at a time when, at least within the context of a Wilsonian vision of the
stakes of U.S. intervention, global war seemed to threaten the very foundations of
American democracy. Within this context, the ISU could sincerely ask of its readers
whether Dollar should be allowed to continue his business practices without reprimand or
consequences: “[s]hall he be permitted to go on? Will the American nation tolerate this
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sort of profiteering while every man, woman and child is making patriotic sacrifices to
make the world safe for democracy?”26
Given the ISU’s focus on the perceived threat of Chinese seamen to the viability
of the American merchant marine, it is of little surprise that the details of the newlypassed Immigration Act of 1917 are given little space within the pages of The Seamen’s
Journal during the years immediately following the bill’s passage. What little there is
written about immigration legislation is presented in a manner that is entirely sympathetic
to federal initiatives to tighten restriction on foreigners’ right to enter the U.S. The
union’s acquiescence to federal policy-makers is evident in its response to requirements
embedded in a newly created seaman’s identification card, issued by the Immigration
Service and ostensibly required in order to conduct inspections and to effectively exclude
diseased seamen, or those “[r]aces or Nationals which are especially subject to
contagious diseases” who “will not be brought to the United States in any considerable
numbers.” Rather than push back against the introduction of a sweeping new surveillance
measure intended to restrict and control the mobility of merchant seamen in American
ports, a right which had just been codified with the passage of the 1915 Seamen’s Act,
the ISU instead interpreted the new requirements as necessary to keep out undesirable
aliens and to protect the American merchant marine: “[o]fficers of the International
Seamen’s Union or its district unions should give all possible assistance to the
department [of Immigration] by making it plain to all seamen concerned that this action
under the Immigration Law is specifically for their own protection.”27
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A downturn in economic conditions that hampered the nation’s maritime
commerce following the Great War further agitated tensions among the nation’s native or
naturalized citizens and incoming immigrants and non-citizen residents. By the early
1920s, the intense glut of shipyard production carried out under government contracts
and subsidies had created a bubble that the end of wartime demand and a return to normal
domestic market conditions simply could not sustain. The increased demand for trained
merchant seamen during the war dropped off precipitously with the signing of the Treaty
of Versailles, and the nation’s shipping magnates struggled to figure out where to direct
their excess ships and waged mariners, whose production and employment had thrived at
levels not seen since the heyday of antebellum American shipping. 1921 saw tens of
thousands of seamen “on the beach” in the nation’s port cities, with an estimated 15,000
alien and 20,000 American seamen idle and without work in New York City alone by
September.28 Turmoil overseas in the wake of the war made the city an attractive option
for many foreign seamen, even if job prospects were poor to non-existent. The
Washington, D.C. Evening Star reported that thousands of alien seamen who were
stranded in New York “because of the slack shipping business” declining to take jobs on
ships bound for Europe “say they would rather be idle in New York than in their own
ports,” perhaps due to welfare services available to them, or the fraternal
communitarianism of the city’s booming sailortown.29
Backlash against such widespread economic dependency along the nation’s
waterfronts combined with long-established racial prejudice, particularly against Asian
seamen, and especially Chinese, to create a gathering momentum that would speed the
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nation’s legislators towards ever-increasingly restrictive immigration policy, culminating
in the ethnic quotas of the Immigration Act of 1924. In September 1921 the Chairman of
the shipping board, steeped in xenophobic nationalism and the mandates of flexible
capacity, announced an initiative to “Americanize” all United States-flagged shipping
lines.30 Newspapers from Bisbee, Arizona, fresh off the scandalous deportation raids of
striking workers (many of whom were immigrants) carried out by local vigilante justice
groups during 1917, reported somewhat gleefully in 1921 that “the elimination of alien
seamen is well under way” and hypothesized that the Chairman’s “Americanization plan”
would eliminate approximately twenty-five percent of all alien seamen from American
port traffic.31 The ISU, led by legendary Norwegian maritime labor leader Andrew
Furuseth, joined in this chorus of voices denouncing the continued presence of unnaturalized alien seamen who had descended on the nation’s ports in the midst of a period
of decline for maritime shipping. It is from this context of overwhelming nativist
sentiment that Congress passed a new wave of restrictive immigration laws, beginning
with the supposedly temporary Emergency Immigration Act of 1921 and the JohnsonReed bill in 1924.

The Johnson-Reed Act, 1924-1925
The end of the Great War left Europe in a state of economic and social chaos.
Heavily subsidized mobilization during U.S. intervention in the war transitioned to a
peacetime economy in which thriving industrial markets, especially those related to
maritime commerce, returned to their pre-war levels, or worse, dipped into a prolonged
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economic slump, creating widespread unemployment and economic displacement. In
Europe, the dissolution of both the Ottoman and the Austro-Hungarian Empires severed
long-standing national ties and spurred mobility and migration of peoples on a massive
scale. Additionally, the Russian Revolution of 1917 seemed to confirm American fears
that subversive ideologies from Eastern Europe, unleashed upon native populations
through immigration, would now pose a legitimate threat to domestic stability and,
ultimately, the democratic-capitalist system itself. Reacting to such fears, Rep. Albert
Johnson (R-WA) sponsored a bill that proposed setting a temporary cap on immigration
into the United States based on a three percent quota per foreign nation relative to all
individuals living in the United States from each foreign country as of the 1890 census.
The metrics of this formula served the purpose of targeting individuals who participated
in the “new immigration” of the 1890s onward, primarily from Eastern and Southern
European countries that were viewed as being particularly active breeding grounds for
subversive political ideologies. The bill, known as the Immigration Restriction Act of
1921 (or the Emergency Immigration) Act of 1921, passed with virtually no opposition
with Congress operating on an extended period of wartime “emergency” conditions. The
Act reduced Immigration into the U.S. by more than half in just one year after its
passage.
Rather than serving as a temporary solution to provisional post-war problems, the
1924 Johnson-Reed Act solidified the exclusionary components of the 1921 Act and
heightened the restriction of its three percent quotas by limiting immigration to two
percent of all individuals from foreign nations, relative still to the statistics of the 1890
census. Again, this had the effect of severely limiting immigration from Eastern and
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Southern Europe, as well as Africa, the Middle East, and other geographic regions that
did not have a large presence in the U.S. as of 1890. Further, the Act maintained and
strengthened the Barred Asiatic Zone originally established by the Immigration Act of
1917, prohibiting immigration entirely from much of the southern Asia in order to placate
white supremacist fears of race-based contagious disease and moral degeneracy, as well
as validating the virulent attacks against Chinese and “coolie” workers that had been
promulgated by organized labor, especially the ISU, for decades. The 1924 Act
functioned by dividing all immigrants into two categories: “Quota Immigrants” and
“Non-Quota Immigrants.” Non-Quota Immigrants included minors; children or wives of
resident citizens; individuals returning from a temporary visit abroad; individuals born in
a country contiguous to the United States; ministers; professors; and bona fide students.
Additionally, the classification of “immigrant” was not applied to “a bona fide alien
seaman serving as such on a vessel arriving at a port of the United States and seeking to
enter temporarily the United States solely in pursuit of his calling as a seaman.” All other
aliens entering the country were consider “Quota Immigrants” and thus subject to all the
rules and specifications established by the 1924 Act.32
Regarding deportation, Section 14 of the 1924 Act stipulated that “[a]ny alien
who at any time after entering the United States is found to have been at the time of entry
not entitled under this Act to enter the United States, or to have remained therein for a
longer time than permitted under this Act or regulations made thereunder, shall be taken
into custody and deported in the same manner as provided for in sections 19 and 20 of the
Immigration Act of 1917.” Most significant about this provision as it applied to merchant
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seamen is that it made no special provisions for alien seamen, such as the three-year
statute of limitations established by the 1917 Act. Alien seamen who did not fall under
the categories defined by the 1924 Act as Non-Immigrants or Non-Quota Immigrants
were, therefore, subject to the same restrictions and rules as applied to all other Quota
Immigrants. This was a reality that took several years to fully develop into functional
policy and which ultimately required the intervention of the Supreme Court in 1931 to
define exactly what protections alien seamen could expect under the new Immigration
Act. In the interim, the reactions of the ISU reflect its continued support of the law based
largely on the persistence of nativist sentiment within the Union, but also on an
apparently less-than-comprehensive understanding of the changes regarding the
regulation of merchant seamen’s mobility in American ports. In an article published in
the Seamen’s Journal less than two months after passage of the Johnson-Reed bill, the
journal’s editors reflected on the “The New Immigration Law,” claiming that “[s]o far as
seamen are concerned the new United States Immigration law, effective July 1, 1924,
does not very materially change their former status.”33 Despite this initial assertion, an
article from November 1924 begins by reminding readers that any “bona fide alien
seaman serving as such on a vessel arriving at a port of the United States and seeking to
enter as an immigrant shall be subject to all the immigration laws, rules and regulations
applicable to immigrants…”34 Here the Union seems to have come to terms with the fact
that the 1924 Act had eliminated special provisions for alien seamen provided for under
the 1917 Act, a reality that would not be officially acknowledged for another seven years
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when the case of Philipiddes v. Day was brought before the Supreme Court. The same
article announced requirements that all alien seamen must carry and present authenticated
immigration visas, and have their identities and status as bona fide seamen corroborated
by their ship’s crew list and through confirmation from the appointed ship’s master. If a
seaman engaged in pursuits outside of his calling, entered the coastwise trade (which was
protected for American citizen seamen only by the Jones Act of 1920), or remained
longer than sixty-days without re-shipping “he shall be deemed to have abandoned his
status as a non-immigrant… and shall be taken into custody and deported at any time
thereafter.”35
The Union’s support for the increasingly restrictive regulation of alien seamen’s
mobility in American ports was consistent with what Justin Jackson calls a long-standing
“laborite ideology of national sea power engendered by U.S. imperial expansion and the
racist working-class Americanism of white maritime labor reformers.”36 Within this
ideology, American maritime reformers emphasized the proper training and character of
“white” American seamen in contrast to seamen of lesser races and nationalities–
particularly the Chinese–who were depicted as morally corrupt, engaged in the
widespread smuggling of people and narcotics, and a threat to national security if relied
upon during times of war (as they had been to crew Army Transport Services ships
during the Spanish-American War).37 Accordingly, organized maritime labor, most
vocally through the ISU and its leader, Andrew Furuseth, emerged as one of the
staunchest supporters of Asian exclusion and immigration restriction, fortifying its
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arguments in the nationalist rhetoric of flexible capacity in order to render the selfserving objective of eliminating foreign wage competition more palatable to a Congress
and American public fresh off the latest imperial victory abroad in the Great War. As the
Union’s argument went, if conditions and wages were not favorable enough to attract
able young white American men to enter the maritime profession, then the country would
be forced to rely on foreign labor and thereby weaken itself abroad, according to the
theories regarding sea power put forward by Mahan.
In order to shape the domestic labor market to better accommodate its vision for
an American citizen-dominated merchant fleet, the ISU adopted two primary lines of
argument to strengthen restrictions put forward by the Johnson-Reed Act. First, the Union
plied on racial fears of a “yellow peril” at sea by sensationalizing news reports of
smuggling involving Chinese seamen. Second, the Union called attention to loopholes
that existing immigration legislation created by allowing a fluidity and opportunity for
exploitation for aliens on board merchant vessels that was not anticipated or accounted
for by legislators who had crafted the policy. A series of articles followed in the wake of
the Johnson-Reed Act’s passage chronicling reports of smuggling “via the Oriental
employes [sic] of American ships plying between Asia and American ports.”38 Raids
throughout the “underworld” of San Francisco revealed large smuggling cartels
trafficking in the opium, morphine, and heroin trades. Citing unnamed “oldtimers” in the
San Francisco Customs Service as their source, the article claimed that many Chinese
seamen on merchant ships, whose names were listed on shipping articles as members of
the crew, were in reality engaged in “scientific smuggling,” their claimed identities as
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merchant seamen merely serving as a means to desert their vessels in American ports
with the smuggled goods:
These men are uncanny in their ability to masquerade as ship employes [sic] when
their real business is smuggling dope. As seamen, they are able to get by where
they couldn’t as ordinary passengers. Working aboard ship is not their business—
many of them are wealthy and as a matter of fact don’t need to work. But the
temptation for big profits is more than some of them can withstand and so they go
on as waiters, galley boys, etc., until by some slip-up or misadventure, they fall
into the meshes of the law.39

The article goes on to describe a Chinese seaman who upon inspection while in port at
San Francisco was caught with more than $16,000 on him. The seaman had been under
surveillance by American authorities for nearly two years, and the suspect amount of cash
in his possession was sufficient to confirm his role as a smuggler in the city’s drug trade.
Cases involving Chinese seamen engaged in criminal activity continued to appear
in the Seamen’s Journal following passage of the Johnson-Reed Act, ostensibly serving
as proof that tighter restrictions were needed both in the overarching legislation
regulating the entry of alien seamen, and in the processes of inspection and detention at
American ports. But there was a different side to this story, articulated in a remarkable
editorial published without commentary by the ISU in the September 1925 issue of the
Seamen’s Journal. Sent to many press outlets by a “Chinese Seamen’s Union,” the
editorial, titled “Declaration, Through the Labor Press of All Countries of the World. To
The Labor Organizations, Public Bodies, Shipping Companies, Boards of Directors,
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Shareholders, Labor Movement Promoters and All Interested in Social Reconstruction,”
argued that “the condition of the Chinese workers is worse off than elsewhere in the
world, not excluding the Chinese seamen.” The editorial went on to describe the
exploitative conditions under which Chinese seamen were recruited, operating through
agents or contractors who had a monopoly on the maritime labor supply chain in China
and who were therefore free to “practice the most vicious forms of exploitation.” After
these agents had collected their “dues” for securing employment for clients, estimated at
two to three dollars per every month’s wages, or having had to purchase their jobs
outright if a seaman wished to sail as a head steward, cook, or other relatively desirable
position, and having paid fees for dormitories and the services of “public organizations,”
the Chinese seaman was left with very little. This situation, the editorial argued, left
Chinese seamen with little recourse but to engage in “smuggling passengers and
contraband” into the United States: “[t]hose unaware of the situation often blame the
Chinese seamen for smuggling, whereas it is but the consequence of economic
necessity.” If Chinese seamen were afforded proper payment of their full wages, the
editorial rationalized, and granted the same protections that “all interested in improving
the conditions of workers” advocated for on behalf of white Americans, then smuggling
would be eliminated, or reduced to a negligible presence. The editorial ended in a thinly
veiled threat: “In making this declaration to the world, we expect a satisfactory settlement
of the matter in question. If the situation should remain as it is, we should be obliged to
resort to final measures, for which we should not be blamed.”40
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While the ISU willingly published the Chinese Seamen’s Union provocative
editorial, no other such content in its journal suggested any sympathy for the plight of
Chinese seamen, whom the union saw as undercutting jobs in a climate of severe scarcity
along the nation’s waterfronts. The glut of federally-subsidized shipping during the Great
War had left a bloated postwar market in which idle ships and unemployed seamen
clogged the nation’s ports. In such a weak labor market, shipowners were free to seek out
crews willing to work for the lowest wages, with little real recourse available to
American seamen or their union representatives. Considering these economic realities,
the appeal of Chinese seamen to their American brethren fell on deaf ears. Chinese
seamen continued to be portrayed as degenerate smugglers and incompetent mariners
whose presence in place of American seamen on American ships was a threat to national
security, both domestically and abroad. U.S. courts, when given the opportunity, seemed
to support this rejection of the sentiments put forward in the Chinese Seamen’s Union
editorial. In a case involving two Chinese crewmembers of the SS President Cleveland
accused of smuggling cocaine into Hawaii, one of the defendants, a man named Chang
Po, pled for leniency by arguing that “he was the sole support of his 74-year old mother
and had a wife and four small children in the Orient,” while the other defendant referred
to his wife and two small children in his defense. Unimpressed by such appeals, the judge
sentenced both men to three years imprisonment, citing Po’s twelve-dollar per month
contract as sufficient rebuttal to the defendants’ economic justification for smuggling
narcotics onto American soil.41
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Motivated in part by deep-seated anti-Chinese sentiment, and desperate to reclaim
legal and economic agency amidst the shipping slump of the mid-1920s, the ISU staked
out its position regarding the Johnson-Reed Act at its 1925 convention, held at the
Niagara Hotel in Buffalo, NY and called to order by Furuseth himself. The Union’s
enthusiasm for tighter restrictions and visa requirements imposed upon alien seamen
stopped short of a full endorsement of the recent legislation. Arguing that the JohnsonReed Act would “only accomplish the deportation of very few of the many that have
entered illegally or violated their status,” the convention delegates passed a resolution
criticizing the bill for serving as “encouragement to some steamship companies to carry
immigrants to the United States under the guise of seamen.” Delegates also bemoaned the
mobility granted Chinese crews, who were granted “additional facility for landing
excluded aliens.” As bona fide “white” American seamen “who cheerfully obey the law
of the land,” the delegates filed protest against what they perceived as a perverse misuse
of the 1915 Seamen’s Act: “we protest against the seaman being used as a scapegoat and
the Seamen’s Act as an excuse for landing in the United States such persons who are
specifically excluded… who under any circumstances are coming to this country with the
purpose of remaining in violation of its law.” The delegates concluded by passing a
resolution in support of “the amendment to such deportation bill offered by the
Honorable John E. Raker of California.”42

The Raker Amendments, 1925-1930
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The Raker Amendments, as they were commonly known, represented an attempt
to strengthen the restrictive mechanisms of the Johnson-Reed Act by tightening control
over alien merchant seamen. In addition to exclusionary provisions regarding diseased
and Asian seamen, Raker’s bill proposed two additional requirements for all ships
entering American ports that proved to be particularly controversial. Amendment F
required that all vessels entering American ports with crews that had been engaged or
taken on at foreign ports should depart from port carrying a crew of at least an equal
number to the number with which they entered. According to Raker’s testimony before
the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, chaired by the same
Representative Johnson of the Immigration Acts of 1921 and 1924, this amendment
would address the reality of a “great desire for people to come to the U.S. illegally” via
merchant ships: “[t]hey sign the crew list on the vessels either by paying a bonus to get
on or by working, for, say, a dollar, and when they reach the U.S. they desert and get into
the populace and into all kinds of business scattered all over the country.”43 Raker then
accused an unspecified number of ships’ masters of accepting “bonuses” and bribes from
aliens desiring to get on ship by impersonating bona fide seamen. Since the JohnsonReed Act left intact the clause from the 1917 Act placing the burden of proof as to a
seaman’s bona fide status on the ship’s master or appointed officer, a well-placed bribe
was all that was necessary for an individual to secure passage overseas and to be allowed
ashore as a seaman as verified by the master or officer under pay. If vessels were required
upon departure from American ports to take with them the same number of alien crew
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with which they entered, Raker’s logic argued, this back door to the supply chain of
illegal immigration would be effectively cut off.
Raker’s proposed Amendment G would have imposed even tougher restrictions
on ships seeking to enter American ports with alien crews. The amendment stipulated that
no vessel, unless in distress, should enter an American port with members of her crew
any alien who if applying for admission to the U.S. would have been denied entry based
on the restrictions established by the Johnson-Reed Act (except for vessels carrying crew
members who were natives of the nation to which the ship was registered). For a country
like China, which lacked any substantive national merchant marine, this clause would
have effectively prohibited Chinese national seamen altogether from American ports.
This “seamen’s clause” had a long lineage dating back to a bill introduced by
Representative William Astor Chanler (D-NY) in early 1900 which sought to plug a hole
in an 1898 subsidy bill requiring that all ships receiving subsidies from the federal
government, primarily in the form of mail-carrier contracts, must hire U.S. citizens for at
least twenty-five percent of their crews. Chanler, taking up the Union line in criticizing
the subsidies bill for allowing exemptions to the rule if the mandated number of
American citizens “could not be reasonably obtained,” proposed a requirement that any
alien seaman hired in a foreign port for whom federal law prohibited entry into the U.S.
be deported at the shipowners’ expense upon entering an American port.44 While the
Chanler bill never left committee, its legacy was picked up by Rep. Edward J. Livernash
(D-CA) and his allies in the Sailor’s Union of the Pacific (SUP), predecessor to the ISU
and also headed by Furuseth, who between 1901-1904 put forward a bill that would have
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excluded Chinese seamen from American ships altogether. The crux of Livernash’s bill
depended on an interpretation of American ships as U.S. territory for the purposes of
immigration law. Under this interpretation, the restrictions embedded in the Chinese
Exclusion Laws would apply on the high seas just as they would on land.45 Like the
Chanler bill, Livernash’s proposals never passed in Congress, but they were revived in
the form of language requirements and manning standards that did pass in the 1915
Seamen’s Act. These skill and language regulations effectively imposed a ban on hiring
alien seamen over a certain percentage without explicitly establishing race or nationalitybased quotas as proposed by both Chanler and Livernash.46
Raker’s Amendment G returned to the outright ban on employing alien seamen on
American vessels put forward prior to the passage of the 1915 Seamen’s Act. Echoing the
white supremacist ideology of the ISU, Raker’s testimony suggests that the primary
motivation of his investment in tightening control over the mobility of alien seamen
derived from his belief that those foreigners who would engage in such underhanded
tactics to come ashore illegally were among the “lowest, meanest class of people in the
world.” In questioning G. F. Ravenel, Assistant to the President of the International
Mercantile Marine Co., Raker attempted to corner the shipowners’ representative into
admitting that the persistence of illegal desertions via merchant ships posed a threat to the
racial character of the nation:
Raker: I want to get this before you: You will admit that a lot of men sign up in
foreign countries on foreign vessels, and possibly on American vessels who are
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not seamen, but who are farmers, lumber jacks, hotel men, and ordinary laborers,
and sign up as seamen simply to come here and desert?
Ravenel: Yes; but not so many as you are led to believe.
Raker: What can we do to prevent that class of people from coming to the U.S. we
ought to do?
Ravenel: Yes.
Raker: You will admit that they will not make good citizens?
Ravenel: I think they will make good citizens, good farmers, and good laborers.
Raker: The rough people who come over here as seamen?
Ravenel: I do not know who you mean. If there are a lot of good farmers,
mechanics, and laborers among them, they would make, I believe. It does not
make any difference because this section is not going to stop it.47
Ravenel’s dodging questions is typical of a stance taken by many with interests in
industrial production and commerce who relied on cheap, immigrant labor in order to
keep their business interests thriving. Contrary to Raker’s depiction of corrupt ship
masters and willing shipping companies complicit in the trafficking of illegal aliens via
merchant vessels, Ravenel offered testimony before the Committee that emphatically
rejected the notion that any of the ships under his conglomerate were knowingly
participating in channels of illegal immigration through desertion. Further, Ravenel
claimed that placing responsibility for replacing men who desert in American ports on the
shipping companies in order to fulfill the numerical quotas, as proposed in Raker’s
Amendment F, would set an impossibly high standard.48 If such an amendment were to
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pass, Ravenel argued, maritime commerce would become so delayed and unwieldy that
its economic inefficiency would be felt even by ordinary American citizens. Appealing to
the Committee’s responsibilities to American consumers and the federal mail system,
Ravenel boldly pronounced that “[t]his is not going to be good for the commerce of the
U.S., the welfare of the traveling public, or facilitate the transportation of American
mails.”49 Further, Ravenel placed responsibility for the alleged porousness of merchant
vessels in relation to immigration legislation on the passage of the decidedly antishipping interest 1915 Seamen’s Act, claiming that desertions carried out by aliens
attempting to enter the country illegally were permitted under the La Follette Act’s
protection of an individual seaman’s right to break contract and desert his vessel.
Following Ravenel, Edwin H. Duff, an attorney representing the PacificAmerican Steamship Association, read a written statement on behalf of his clients.
Pacific steamship companies were particularly notorious among anti-Chinese labor
advocates for employing non-American crews that were easily recruited and signed on
while in foreign ports. Drawing attention to the fierce competition that American
maritime commerce faced from foreign ships while operating in the Pacific, and the
burden already endured in complying with U.S. maritime laws like the 1915 Seamen’s
Act, the letter argued that the new amendments would place further, undue hardship on
American shipping interests in the Pacific. Clearly on the defensive in front of the
Committee, the Steamship Association adopted a dubious line of racial theorizing in
order to justify its hiring of Asian crews: “Our American steamers trading out of the
Pacific coast go through the Tropics where it is impracticable for white men to give
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efficient service. This has been demonstrated by years of experience in this trade on the
Pacific. In fact great difficulty has been experienced in obtaining white crews of any kind
satisfactory or unsatisfactory who will stick on the job.”50 According to this reasoning,
Asian seamen were the only option for ships plying the trade in the sweltering heat of the
tropical Pacific simply because white seamen refused to work there. Rather than an
endorsement of the hardiness and competencies of Asian seamen, the Steamship
Association’s justification for their hiring practices fell within the same white
supremacist framework that motivated organized maritime labor’s vehement anti-Chinese
rhetoric. Such hard, brutal work as took place on Pacific steamships was simply beneath
white seamen, and therefore the recruitment of Asian seamen was a necessary evil that
the Raker amendments would eradicate, thereby destroying American shipping interests
in the Pacific, wreaking havoc on commerce and the U.S. mail, and weakening American
sea power by making business for American ships in the Pacific untenable.
Ironically, the same white supremacist logic used by the Pacific Steamship
Association to justify their employment of Asian seamen was also employed by the ISU
and its leader, Andrew Furuseth, to put forward an argument for an outright prohibition
on the employment of Asian seamen on American vessels. Earlier testimony from Robert
F. Hand, representing the American Steamship Owners’ Association and Assistant
Manager of the marine department of Standard Oil Co., honed in on the root of the
disagreement between labor and management regarding the Raker amendments. Hand
claimed that Amendment F would cause manning emergencies while in American ports,
forcing shipping companies to “chase around to the boarding houses and sign [seamen]
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up… These deserters slip out at the last minute, and there may be one or five or six of
them.” While inconveniencing shipping management and possibly creating the
widespread delays that Ravenel had warned about, this chaotic scenario would
theoretically work in favor of merchant seamen in that last-minute replacements would
command a higher wage rate. “Why should the ship be penalized by requiring it to pay
his passage as well as being forced to engage a man at a very high rate of pay to take the
deserter’s place?” Hand asked the Committee. “The answer is, from the labor viewpoint,
to require that ship to increase wages.”51 Hand’s explanation for labor’s support of the
Raker amendments was essentially spot on. In placing ever-tightening restrictions on the
employment of alien seamen on American vessels, requiring that mala fide alien seamen
be rooted out and deported at the expense of the shipping companies, jobs would
theoretically open up for bona fide “white” American seamen who would be hired at
higher wage rates according to the mechanisms of market competition embedded in the
1915 Seamen’s Act. The ISU and Furuseth’s support for the Raker amendments
amounted to a refinement of the 1915 Act, using immigration legislation as a fulcrum
upon which to further edge out competition from foreign labor.
Furuseth’s own testimony to the Committee offered a rebuttal to claims by
shipping company representatives Ravenel and Duff by arguing that any notion that white
seamen were inherently unfit for labor in tropical climates was nonsense, instead offering
an explanation for the Pacific steamship companies’ difficulties in recruiting white
seamen that claimed racial mixing as the primary barrier: “They [shipping companies]
tried for 40 years to mix the ships’ crews, but it has not been successful, except that they
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employ them in separate departments. They can mix them to the extent of having Chinese
in the stewards’ department and other nationals in the engineering or deck force. I am
telling you the kind of men these sailors are.”52 By Furuseth’s rationale, if Asian seamen
were eliminated from crews on American vessels in the Pacific, then any difficulties in
recruiting white seamen would vanish instantly. Furuseth also argued that insufficient or
weak restrictions on alien seamen’s mobility in American ports had had a devastating
impact on the coastwise and Great Lakes maritime labor market, where American
seamen’s jobs were protected under the Jones Act of 1920. According to Furuseth, the
porousness of recent immigration legislation threatened to overturn gains made through
passage of the Jones Act and the 1915 Seamen’s Act. The protections of a seaman’s right
to desertion for the purpose of reshipping had created an increase in American seamen in
both the coastwise and ocean-going maritime trade, from 7% in 1915 to 51% by 1920.
Appearing before the Committee in 1925, Furuseth described a radically different
landscape, facilitated by lax regulations for the mobility of alien seamen in American
ports and widespread smuggling of mala fide seamen and stowaways. Regarding the
smuggling of Chinese seamen, Furuseth testified, “I can say this to you, that the vessels
coming across the Pacific bring more [seamen] than are needed under the rules of
American law, and go out again and they leave them there.”53 Citing unspecified
testimony, Furuseth alluded to recruiters who “come in spring” to port cities like New
York “who go to these men [alien seamen], saying, ‘We will take you upon the Lakes and
give you a season’s employment.’”54 Furuseth claimed that a majority of men in the
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coastwise trade in 1925 “have no right in the country. They can not pass the immigration
law under any circumstances and they never did pass it… When speaking of deporting
men in the coastwise trade, there is not a single shipowner who wants you to do it,
because it means that if you take the men out of the coastwise trade the shipowner will
have to treat the men he gets in their places significantly better and he might have to pay
more wages.”55
Ultimately, debate over the Raker amendments boiled down to two conflicting
views over the future of American maritime commerce: the shipping companies and
shipowners, who opposed increased restrictions over their ability to take advantage of
cheaper wage rates and a labor force more suitable to conditions in the Pacific by
prohibiting the recruitment of Asian seamen; and organized maritime labor leaders, who
were in favor of the amendments because they protected jobs and higher wage rates for
white American seamen. Ironically, both sides put forward their arguments couched in
the rhetoric of white supremacy and the national security imperatives of flexible capacity.
According to shipowners, particularly in the Pacific, the labor required to operate a
competitive American fleet required Asian seamen who were willing to do work that was
beneath white seamen. Imposing restrictions on American ships’ ability to recruit these
willing laborers would devastate the American fleet and deplete the American merchant
marine’s ability to serve as an effective auxiliary component of American sea power. On
the other side of the debate, Furuseth and the ISU, who, along with its neighboring
California Congressman Raker, had been the chief architects and proponents of the
amendments, argued that increased restrictions on alien seamen that amounting to an
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outright ban on Asian seamen in American ports were necessary in order to maintain a
viable pool of American citizen mariners who would be capable of manning the
American fleet during times of war and imperial expansion. Allowing American ships to
continue their dependency on what the Union perceived as a cheap, unreliable, and
potentially subversive Asian workforce would not only cut into jobs for white American
seamen on both ocean-going and coastwise vessels, but also pose a national security risk
in creating a racially-depleted American maritime workforce.
In the end (at least temporarily), the shipping company argument won out, and the
Raker amendments were scuttled in Committee. The amendments were again debated in
January 1926, before being shelved for several years, eventually reemerging in 1930 as
the King Bill, sponsored by Rep. William H. King (D-Utah). By then, the postwar
shipping slump of the 1920s had been trumped by the global economic catastrophe set off
by the market crash of 1929. With the scourge of unemployment impacting the daily lives
of ordinary Americans, debate over alien seamen and foreign labor competition took on a
new and enlarged resonance that touched on major themes that dominated national
discourse throughout the 1930s.

Raids: 1930-1931
The U.S. entered the 1930s on the heels of a catastrophic market collapse, the
depth and longevity of its impact of which were still uncertain in 1930-1931. As
economic production plummeted and unemployment rose, the specter of foreign labor
competition, especially from aliens who were residing in the country illegally, intensified
in its threat to jobs and economic opportunity for ordinary “white” Americans. Within
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this context, the issue of alien seamen raised by the Raker amendments that had stalled in
Committee by 1926 was resurrected in the form of the King Bill, a proposed legislative
measure sponsored by Senator William H. King (D-UT) and containing language
essentially identical to that articulated in amendments F and G of the Raker amendments
some four years prior. Once again, the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization,
chaired by Sen. Albert Johnson, was summoned in February 1931 to discuss the issue of
“Deportation of Alien Seamen.” Just as in 1924 and 1925, the debates centered on two
central propositions that would impose increased restrictions on shipping companies’
ability to recruit and bring alien seamen into American ports: the requirement that all
vessels entering American ports depart from port with the same number of crew with
which they entered, and, a prohibition on manning ships with alien seamen who would
otherwise be excluded from entry into the U.S. under the restrictions of the Johnson-Reed
Act of 1924.
In 1930 King, suffering from an illness, had passed the bill over the Sen. La
Follette, who raised it while in session, only to face a filibuster from Sen. Hiram
Bingham (D-CT), apparently under the influence of shipowners opposed to further
restrictions on their ability to recruit cheap labor, who “kept talking until 2 o’clock, so
that automatically [the bill] went back into the same position that it was in when it was
called up.” The bill was subsequently pushed back to the next session, just as it had been
delayed and shelved on and off since 1924.56 Given the nation’s widespread
unemployment, and increasing unrest among organized labor, issues regarding the
containment and reduction of illegal immigrants from competition in American labor
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markets began to dominate national discourse during the Great Depression. Particularly
hard hit were the waterfront districts of New York City, one of the world’s largest ports
and “home” to thousands of merchant seamen who were out of work and “on the beach.”
Rep. Fiorello La Guardia (D-NY) went public with his dissatisfaction with Congress’s
refusal to take action regarding what he perceived as the scourge of alien seamen in
American ports. In an interview published in the Seamen’s Journal, La Guardia took
Congress and President Hoover himself to task, declaring that responsibility for the
defeat of the King Bill “to stop the ‘bootlegging’ of aliens into this country disguised as
seamen ‘lies at the doorstep of the White House.’”57 La Guardia noted that the bill had
widespread support from organized labor (both the AFL and the ISU) and had enjoyed
quick passage in the Senate before it was sidetracked in the House, allegedly owing to the
fact that the “shipowners’ lobby was able to reach some one [sic] in the State
Department.” After having passed unanimously in the Senate on April 14, 1930, the bill
was held up by Sen. Bingham, upon which it was sent back to the House Committee on
February 28, 1931. With Congress set to adjourn on March 4, the only way the bill could
be brought back for an official vote was to “to induce Speaker [Nicholas] Longworth [ROH] to permit the bill to be called up under suspension of the rules,” a scenario which
never materialized. Speaker Longworth justified his refusal to allow the bill to come up
for a vote by alluding to his being “informed by the State Department that European
nations protested against the bill,” thereby complicating the geopolitical ramifications of
its potential passage. As La Guardia summarized, “The steamship interests again became
active and moved against the bill from all sides… The bill having failed… American
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steamship companies will now crowd out American seamen with Chinese crews to the
extent of the limit of the law, notwithstanding the fact that these American steamship
companies are receiving millions of dollars of subsidies from the American government.
Foreign steamship companies will continue to do business with undesirables endeavoring
to enter the United States as seamen.” Expressing the sentiment shared by many of his
colleagues in the Senate and, no doubt the weary and economically desperate American
public, La Guardia concluded that “[t]he whole thing is a sorry mess.”58
Where Congress failed to act, the nation’s law enforcement agencies took up
action in response to the growing chorus of public support for measures to eradicate the
scourge of foreign labor competition. The decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Philippides v. Day, in which two Greek national merchant seamen were ruled to be
subject to deportation despite their claim to protections under a three-year statute of
limitations established for merchant seamen under the Immigration Act of 1917,
effectively clarified what had been implicitly stated in the Johnson-Reed Act of 1924:
namely, that merchant seamen were no longer considered a separate class distinct from
Quota Immigrants and were therefore subject to the same rules and regulations that
applied to all other aliens seeking admission to the U.S.59 The case proved a watershed in
terms of pressures applied to alien seamen who were illegally residing in U.S. port cities.
It also provided license for law enforcement agencies at both the federal and local levels
to adopt dragnet tactics in conducting sweeping raids along the nation’s waterfronts that
exceeded the boundaries of jurisdiction afforded agencies responsible for the detection
and detainment of aliens subject to deportation.
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Immediately following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Philipiddes v. Day, the
Labor Department, under the leadership of Secretary William Doak, issued a decree
calling for local agencies to prepare for the deportation of up to 100,000 merchant
seamen who were believed to have deserted in American ports and who were supposedly
residing in the country illegally. A breathless New York Times headline blasted
sensational claims regarding alien seamen that were indicative of the nation’s weariness
with foreign labor: “MOST NOW WORKING HERE: Labor Secretary Says They Are
‘Depriving Citizens of Jobs’ and Can and Will Be Expelled.”60 The Supreme Court ruling
granted wide license for the mass deportation of alien seamen suspected of having
violated the restrictions embedded in the Johnson-Reed Act “whenever found, without
regard to the length of time they have been in the country.” Indeed, the Labor Secretary
seemed to have been waiting on such a decision in order to take action on an issue cutting
severely into employment opportunities for bona fide American citizen seamen. As Doak
explained, “Ever since the quota limit laws went into effect illegal entry in the guise of
seamen has been a prolific source of immigration law violations,” estimating that nearly
100,000 seamen had deserted ships in port in the U.S. since passage of Johnson-Reed.
“Most deserting seamen have taken employment in the United States, thereby depriving
citizens and lawfully resident aliens of jobs, and Department of Labor officials are
confident that it will now be possible to expel many who have evaded arrest for three
years and believed they were safe from deportation.”61
On the local level, Capt. Michael F. McDermott, head of the Bureau of Criminal
Alien Investigation at the New York Police Department, coordinated with federal
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officials to conduct a spectacular raid in one of the nation’s largest ports. The Seamen’s
Church Institute, in the heart of the City’s lower Manhattan port district at 25 South
Street, was the declared permanent residence of more than 5,000 merchant seamen in
1931 who were out of work and forced to remain in New York City due to the lack of
employment opportunities in a severely slumping shipping industry. Seamen who
claimed 25 South Street as their home included men who paid nominal fees to rent out
one of the 580 dormitory-style rooms within the building’s 13 floors; they also included
men who had taken out post office boxes at the Institute’s thriving postal office. This
cluster of merchant seamen–many of them aliens whether naturalized or residing in the
country illegally–represented a prime target for immigration officials under orders to
clean up the nation’s waterfronts. “The majority of undesirable aliens in this city today
represent ‘ship-jumpers’,” Capt. McDermott told the press, “and the present hard times
make them potential criminals of whom the city would be well rid.”62 Rather than rely on
ad hoc tactics, such as picking up suspects on the technical charge of vagrancy,
McDermott pivoted to more direct intervention: “I believe that a raid on the seamen’s
home will result in ridding the city of several hundred men of the undesirable type, who
might turn to crime as a means of getting sufficient money for food and sleeping
accommodations during the winter.”63
The actual raid took place on the morning of February 3, 1931, with 102 men in
total being detained and sent for processing at Ellis Island. A similar raid had taken place
in Hoboken just days earlier on January 27th, in which some 300 aliens were detained and
interrogated, consisting principally of German seamen. 63 men were sent to Ellis Island
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facing deportation charges. The raid itself took place in an almost identical fashion to that
on Manhattan’s Seamen’s Church: “Inspector Kaba, with the aid of Hoboken police and
his own staff visited the German Seamen’s Mission, at 63 Hudson Street, about 8 p.m.
The exits to the mission were guarded by the raiders for four hours, during which time
about fifty aliens entered the mission but were unable to leave.64 Among those sent to
Ellis Island were twelve cooks reported to have deserted from their vessels. Most of the
detainees faced similar charges of illegally gaining entry into the U.S. via merchant
vessels. The article concluded by stating that “[t]his is the largest group of aliens rounded
up at one time at Hoboken in several years.”65 Similar raids occurred throughout the city
during the early months of 1931, including at a ball held at the Finnish Workers’
Education Association, in which 1,000 men and women were detained without warrant.
It did not take long before backlash mounted against this proliferation of dragnetstyle raids in which thousands of men and women were illegally detained under vague
suspicion of having violated terms of immigration legislation which may or may not
apply to them. The American Civil Liberties Union led complaints against these “alien
drives,” protesting the “high-handed and unlawful” tactics of immigration agents.66
Eventually, U.S. Congressmen took up opposition to the raids. Rep. Samuel Dickstein
(D-NY) publicly questioned the constitutionality of such tactics: “I don’t suppose,”
Dickstein mused. “that the ‘alien squad’s’ warrantless dragnet raids in February on the
Finnish ball in New York, with its illegal detention of 1,00 men and women while
credentials were being overhauled; on the Seamen’s Church Institute, where 4,000 men
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were restrained of their liberty en masse by officials having no jurisdiction over them;
later on the municipal lodging house. I don’t suppose that these incidents here occurred to
the labor secretary as mere lawless, anarchistic proceeding than those of any of the ‘reds’
he is trying to deport.”67 By April 1931, responding to public backlash, the Labor
Department announced the end of all raids targeting alien seamen in the nation’s port
cities.68
Rep. Dickstein’s comments cut to the heart of the economic and political
conditions which fostered the use of such extraordinary tactics to root out illegal aliens,
many of them seamen, in the first place. The “alien raids” conducted by both local and
federal law enforcement agencies in early 1931 were the manifestation of a complex of
anxieties that dominated the psyche of mainstream American society during the early
years of the Great Depression. The specter of totalitarianism in Europe cast a sinister
light over the widespread unemployment that plagued the nation’s urban centers, as many
middle-class and elite Americans feared that the scourge of unemployed, transient men
could transform into an army of political radicals intent on subversion from within. This
was particularly true along the nation’s waterfronts, where pockets of political radicalism
flourished in the form of spin-off and subsidiary labor organizations. With many of their
members hailing from nations subject to increasingly restrictive quotas under the
Johnson-Reed Act, radical maritime unionists were largely in favor of more lenient
immigration policies, and certainly in support of maintaining the unique fluidity and back
channels that alien seamen had enjoyed in American ports prior to the quota laws.
Radical maritime unionists were also adamantly opposed to the rising deportations and
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persecution of suspected political radicals, as made clear by a maritime presence within
the movement to rally support for the defense of Italian anarchists Sacco and Vanzetti. A
1927 pamphlet distributed along the New York City waterfront calls for a general strike
and rallies workers for a “Mass Protest Demonstration” to be held at Union Square on the
evening of August 9th: “Show the strength of organized labor! LAY DOWN YOUR
TOOLS AT NOON… COME IN THOUSANDS… Workers of New York! Join your
fellow workers of the world in this GENERAL PROTEST STRIKE TO FREE SACCO
AND VANZETTI!”69 The pair of defendants would be executed two weeks later.

Conclusion
Merchant ships and seamen represented vibrant sites of immigrants’ mobility and
negotiation in the face of increasingly restrictive immigration law. Following the 1915
Seamen’s Act, and increasingly under the restrictive policies the Immigration Laws of
1917 and 1924, merchant ships and the impersonation of seamen were a viable option for
immigrants who lacked the means to successfully negotiate encounters with the state, or
who otherwise chose to opt out of such encounters altogether. During the quota era of
immigration restriction, alien seamen enflamed the anxious imaginations of middle-class
and elite Americans, who feared the influx of a transient population of working-class men
feared to be politically subversive, and racially and morally degenerate. These anxieties
spring from deep-seated ideologies of white supremacy and the lingering cult of
Victorian-era domesticity. The containment and purge of these threatening workers from
the nation’s ports was enacted through the mechanisms of the Johnson-Reed Act, in
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addition to the mandates articulated in Philipiddes v. Day and zealous law enforcement
agencies at both the federal and local levels. Only in overstepping their authority through
the spectacle of indiscriminate dragnet raids did these enforcement agencies lose their
credibility in the public eye and the raids temporarily cease.
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CONCLUSION
Merchant Seamen, Sailortowns, and the Shaping of U.S. Citizenship, 1843-1945
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Merchant seamen, because of their inherent transience, diversity, and the unique
nature of their work, occupied a marginal position in U.S. society, and that marginalization
produced a series of confrontations with shoreside people, communities, institutions, and
the state, most specifically over the nature and definition of citizenship. This argument has
been developed through an examination of a series of encounters and negotiations that
merchant seamen provoked from the piers, back alleys, and boardinghouses of the nation’s
“sailortowns” from the 1830s through the 1930s, including: 1) nineteenth century maritime
ministry projects in the Port of New York that originated during the 1830s, in which
merchant seamen and evangelical reformers confronted each other within Manhattan’s
lower wards and engaged in contestations over sailors’ liberty, mobility, and masculinity;
2) the 1897 U.S. Supreme Court case Robertson v. Baldwin, in which four merchant
seamen argued that their imprisonment as punishment for breaking contract through
desertion constituted a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment; 3) an analysis of the 1915
Seamen’s Act that focuses on the outbreak of industrial maritime labor unionism in New
York that sparked a national reckoning with seamen’s rights following the Titanic disaster;
4) a tour of the “million dollar home for sailors” at 25 South Street in lower Manhattan,
and an analysis of the ideological and economic motivations behind the war that the
Seamen’s Church Institute waged on the city’s sailortown and its indigenous economies
from 1913-1945; and, 5) an examination of the “alien seamen problem” that became a
national political issue during the 1920s, emerging alongside restrictive and exclusionary
immigration legislation from 1917-1936, and the alien seamen immigration raids that took
place in New York in 1931.
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The preceding chapters have argued that merchant seamen have always been
perceived as inherently alien, and therefore have constantly posed challenges to the
boundaries of U.S. citizenship. In response, attempts by both civil society and the state to
counter these challenges have consistently attempted to marginalize and exclude merchant
seamen from the full protections and rights of citizenship. This dissertation concludes by
sustaining this argument through 1945 and beyond by addressing the question of how
merchant seamen responded to the Great Depression through the lens of the Merchant
Marine Act of 1936, which empowered the federal government to impose unprecedented
regulation and control over the U.S. merchant marine and its labor pool. The narrative ends
with the coming of World War II, in which merchant seamen, acting as civilians recruited
for work transporting war cargo through combat zones, suffered a higher casualty rate than
any branch of the armed services and yet were excluded from postwar benefits despite the
extent of their sacrifices.
The threat of political subversion amidst a prolonged economic depression, as well
as the specter of a depleted American citizen merchant marine in light of rising geopolitical
tensions and outright violence in the Pacific kept the imperatives of flexible capacity at the
forefront of political thought regarding the racial regulation of the merchant marine. The
Merchant Marine Act of 1936, put forward by Rep. Schuyler Otis Bland (D-VA), was
designed "to further the development and maintenance of an adequate and well-balanced
American merchant marine, to promote the commerce of the United States, to aid in the
national defense, to repeal certain former legislation, and for other purposes." In
establishing a U.S. Maritime Commission, federal subsidies for the construction and
operation of merchant ships, and the U.S. Merchant Marine Cadet Corps, the 1936 Act
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sought to maintain a U.S. merchant marine that could carry all domestic cargo and a
“substantial portion” of foreign commerce on U.S.-flagged vessels manned by U.S. citizens
“insofar as may be practicable.”1 Logistically, the realities of how this legislation would
play out on the ground were framed by the increasingly urgent imperatives created by the
growing specter of global war. Mahan’s theories of American seapower had won out over
the interests of shipping companies who depended on cheap labor to remain competitive,
and those of radical maritime unionists seeking to maintain fluidity and mobility along the
nation’s waterfronts. World War II would present new questions regarding this new U.S.
citizen merchant marine’s status within a national movement of American intervention.
But the coming of the war, as well as the nation’s transition towards preparedness, had
resolved debates over the status of alien seamen under U.S. immigration law.
World War II was ultimately a war of industrial production, and the merchant
marine provided the crucial link between “factories for democracy” back home and
warfronts overseas. As Alex Roland, Jeffrey Bolster, and Alexander Keyssar describe in
detailed statistics, the merchant marine “carried the sinews of war,” delivering 15 million
tons of cargo to the United Kingdom and continental Europe, 13 million tons to the
Pacific, 8 million tons to the Mediterranean, and 5 million tons to the Soviet Union by the
end of 1944, all to support Allied operations. U.S. merchant ships also carried 7,129,906
army personnel and 141,537 civilians, ultimately returning 4,060,883 soldiers and
169,626 civilians to the U.S at the war’s end.2
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American merchant mariners experienced the impacts of the war long before
Pearl Harbor, however. Partially in response to growing overseas threats to U.S. national
security, the 1936 Merchant Marine Act resolved a debate over control and
administration of the U.S. merchant fleet that had been ongoing in Congress for decades.
The primary question at hand focused on the extent to which the federal government
should be involved in subsidizing and regulating the merchant marine, with proposals for
full nationalization and even militarization on the table at various times leading up to
1936. Legislation passed that year took up the agenda that President Roosevelt laid out in
his March 1935 “Subsidy Message,” in which he called for a federally subsidized
merchant fleet and a stable pool of American mariners for the purposes of commercial
independence and military self-defense. The 1936 Act established the U.S. Maritime
Commission and made it responsible for the planning and management of an elaborate
subsidy system intended to ensure a viable American merchant marine.3
Meanwhile, Congress passed Neutrality Acts in 1935, 1936, 1937, and 1939 that
were designed to curtail American involvement in foreign wars by preventing U.S.
merchant ships from delivering goods to belligerent nations and into war zones. Again
attempting to respond to an increasingly urgent need for preparedness, President
Roosevelt urged the repeal of the Acts as early as September 1939, eventually navigating
a transition first to a cash-and-carry policy, and finally to the Lend-Lease Act, which
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passed in March 1941. U.S. ships were thereafter allowed to ship war material to any
country whose interests and defenses aligned with those of the United States.4
The revision and ultimate repeal of the Neutrality Acts made for deadly
conditions at sea for American ships carrying cargo for Allied nations. On March 21,
1941 the SS Robin Moor, carrying war material to the British, became the first American
merchant ship sunk by a German submarine in World War II. German U-boats sank an
additional three American merchant ships before the U.S. entered the war. U.S.
intelligence services worked carefully to control the spread of information about these
acts of aggression, and the American public remained largely unaware of the fact that
German submarines were torpedoing American ships and killing civilian mariners.5 By
the time the realities of German aggression became undeniable, U.S. officials changed
course and openly advocated for a more proactive approach to protecting American
interests on the high seas. Taking the lead on this new policy, President Roosevelt
responded to a German attack on an American destroyer in a fireside chat in which he
described the threat of German “rattlesnakes of the Atlantic” to American shipping in
lurid detail.6
Having rallied public support, President Roosevelt established the War Shipping
Administration by executive order on February 7, 1942, appointing Admiral Emory S.
Land as Chief Administrator with powers to “organize the operation, purchase, charter,
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insurance, repair, maintenance, and requisition of vessels” in the U.S. merchant fleet.7
Working closely with the WSA and the U.S. Coast Guard, the Maritime Commission
launched a massive labor recruitment program that established more than 200 maritime
training stations across the nation, including a system of maritime academies that
altogether produced 262,474 qualified seamen and 31,986 officers by the end of the war.8
Negotiations with the National Maritime Union, Sailors’ Union of the Pacific, and the
Sailors’ International Union yielded an agreement to assist the government with labor
recruitment and to cease all strikes during wartime in exchange for war risk
compensation and insurance that made merchant mariners among the highest paid
participants in the combat zones of the war.9
In 1944 sixteen-year New Yorker Gabe Frank heard a radio spot calling on young
men to join the merchant marine. He gathered what few possessions he had and set out
for the Sheepshead Bay Maritime Service Training Station in Brooklyn a few months
after his seventeenth birthday. Gabe’s description of the militarized nature of his training
makes it clear that these young men, while civilians, were voluntarily joining the war
effort at the lethal front lines on the high seas:
I joined up. Had five cents car fare to Sheepshead Bay. I got there penniless, and I
went to boot camp… We had to do boot camp: marching, drills, obstacle course.
We had to jump naked into a pool, climb over a ladder, drop in the water under a
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lifeboat in case we were attacked. We had machine guns, aircraft practice with
machine guns, simulated guns. We were training for wartime, of course.10
Federal intervention in maritime shipping industry did not stop with recruiting and
training mariners. The subsidization of and negotiation of lucrative contracts with
American shipyards led to an unprecedented period of intense shipbuilding and record
levels of production on all fronts: labor, capital, raw materials, and technology. As Daniel
Levine and Sara Ann Platt have argued, “The record of the Maritime Commission can be
summed up in a single sentence: ‘during the Second World War, the United States built
far more merchant ships than anyone thought possible.’”11 The U.S. Maritime
Commission wartime shipbuilding program, lasting from 1939-1945, produced a total of
5,601 vessels, including 2,648 “Liberty” ships for emergency cargo. Other vessel types
included long-range cargo ships, passenger ships, tankers, and “Victory” ships, built
according to VC2 design beginning in April 1943 to replace slower, more vulnerable
vessels in the fleet.1213
This unprecedented output of ships and labor cast a wide net of American
shipping across the wartime seas, putting civilian vessels and lives in immediate danger.
Once the U.S. officially entered the war, German U-boats and submarines intensified
their campaign against American shipping. Operation Drumbeat (Paukenschlag) targeted
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ships up and down the East Coast, wreaking havoc and sinking American ships within
sight of land. During the first six and one-half months of the U.S. entrance into the war,
German U-boats sank 360 Allied merchant ships, carrying a total of 2,250,000 gross tons
of cargo.14 American ships were particularly vulnerable due to a lingering clause of the
Neutrality Acts that outlawed the arming of merchant ships, and a baffling reluctance by
the federal government and the U.S. Navy to resurrect convoying to protect merchant
vessels, a strategy that had been used effectively during the First World War.15 It was not
until spring of 1942 that the Navy “rediscovered” convoying, but the damage was already
well underway: one-half of all losses or damages to American ships during World War II
occurred before the end of 1942.16 Due to the timing of these early losses, many of the
ships sunk prior to 1943 were remnants from the World War I emergency fleet, rather
than products of the Maritime Commission’s World War II shipbuilding program.17
Nonetheless, the Liberty and Victory ships remain lasting symbols of the merchant
marine during World War II.
Miles MacMahon trained as a radio operator on Hoffman Island after being turned
away by the U.S. Navy due to his imperfect eyesight. Miles remembered riding the ferry
in New York Harbor, and navigating the anti-submarine nets that were laid to protect the
city’s coastline from enemy submarines:
Hoffman Island was at one end of the submarine net for New York Harbor, which
stretched from Coney Island to Hoffman Island. On the western side of Hoffman
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Island it was too shallow for submarines to sneak in, so there was no net there
between the island and South Beach. But between Coney Island and Hoffman
Island there was this large floating chain made of heavy wood blocks that floated
and metal chains that chained them together. And when ships left, little boats
would come out and open the gate in the middle. And the ships would leave, and
the boats would close the gates, especially for the night… They were always
waiting outside New York Harbor—U-Boats were. Many a ship was at sea for
forty minutes before it was torpedoed. Right outside the Harbor they were
leaving.18
Such immediate dangers so close to home only increased as merchant ships
ventured further out to sea. The most lethal front of the war at sea took place along the
dreaded Murmansk Run, from the Atlantic coast of the U.S. to Scotland and over to the
port city of Archangel where allied ships were sent to deliver supplies to sustain the
Russian fight against the Nazis. The run to Murmansk was a brutal voyage through Arctic
waters infested with enemy submarines. Despite sailing in convoys with armored escorts,
many ships were sunk and many mariners killed. Convoy PQ17, which made the run in
July 1942, consisted of 34 merchant ships, three rescue vessels, five destroyers, three
British corvettes, three minesweepers, four anti-submarine trawlers, two anti-aircraft
ships, and two submarines. Despite such protection, only eleven merchant ships reached
port safely in Russia. Twenty-four ships were sunk, and 153 mariners killed.19
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Dick Weir described the fear and agonizing uncertainty of taking a ship with an
unknown destination, with Murmansk always in the back of young mariners’ minds:
I got on another Liberty, an American Export Lines Liberty, and as soon as I got
aboard that ship, I checked in with the Chief Mate, or, before that, I found out
which room I would have, went and opened the door, threw in my sea bag, and
one of the fellas, the crewmen, was reading in his bunk. So I said, ‘Where is this
ship going?’, and he said ‘We don’t know but we just came from Russia.’ And I
looked out at the outer bulkhead, the outer wall of the ship, and it was totally
insulated. It had insulation on it. And I saw right away: insulated Liberty ship,
only used for the Russian run. So I had to stop and make a very, very careful and
quick decision: shall I take that ship, and go north? Or shall I find some excuse—
maybe I hated the Captain, or the ship, or something. Then I decided, I prayed
about it, and I decided, ‘Lord, this is now my turn to face the North.’ So I said
alright, I went up and told the Mate ‘Here I am.’ And he said ‘OK, you’re on the
12 to 4. So take your gear and settle in.’ I did. And that was a very, very miserable
experience. Not because of the ship, or because of the crew, or because of the
officers. But because of the run.20
The realities of life at sea in convoy en route to Murmansk were full of constant
trepidation. Luck of the draw, including what position a ship was assigned in the
convoy’s formation, could determine whether the men on board lived or died. If a ship
was hit, there was no stopping or turning back for survivors. The convoy sailed on,
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leaving whatever wreckage, human and otherwise, behind in its wake. Dick learned from
first-hand experience how precarious the lives of his convoy-mates were within the
context of front-line combat:
As we came over loaded, we were at the tail end of the line, and we were also at
the corner. So that was what we called “coffin corner” of the convoy. And we
were sailing along, and I was on the watch in the bow at night, at about 1 or 2
AM, and all of a sudden I saw little red lights shining in the water around us. And
then I realized that each of those red lights represented one man who had turned
on the little red light on his life jacket. These were seamen from the ship that had
been sunk ahead of us. We had never heard anything. Because the ship was
loaded, the torpedo when it blew up was very muffled, and it sank the ship, the
lead ship in that line. The ship went straight ahead and down. And we came up the
line after it, and there were some men still floating around in the water. We hoped
they had been--they were rescued. But we didn’t know what happened to them
after that. That was the most terrifying experience, because it showed you that
things were not always as they seemed to be.21
By the end of the war, the U.S. merchant marine had suffered tremendous losses to
vessels, cargo, and men. American merchant ships supplied war material and cargo to
every front of the war, carried troops and armed forces personnel to battle and back home
again once the war was over, had supported the invasions of Africa in 1942, Italy in
1943, France in 1944, and kept open supply routes to defeat the Nazis in Europe and
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Japan in the Pacific.22 Towards the end of the war, Dwight D. Eisenhower, then Supreme
Commander of Allied Forces, offered a reflection on the strategic importance of the
merchant marine:
“Every man in this Allied command is quick to express his admiration for the
loyalty, courage, and fortitude of the officers and men of the Merchant Marine.
We count upon their efficiency and their utter devotion to duty as we do our own;
they have never failed us yet and in all the struggles yet to come we know that
they will never be deterred by any danger, hardship, or privation. When final
victory is ours there is no organization that will share its credit more deservedly
than the Merchant Marine.”23

Despite such sacrifices and experiences of trauma along the front lines of combat at sea
as described by Dick and countless others, American merchant mariners who sailed
during World War II were excluded from the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944,
better known as the G.I. Bill. Upon signing the GI Bill on June 22, 1944, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt, a life-long advocate for the significance of the merchant marine to
national security and American economic prowess, said, “I trust Congress will soon
provide similar opportunities to members of the Merchant Marine who have risked their
lives time and time again during war for the welfare of their country.”24

22

Roland, Bolster, and Keyssar, The Way of the Ship, 307.
Atlas Video, Inc. (video), War Stories: The Merchant Marine, as cited in Brian Herbert, The Forgotten
Heroes: The Heroic Story of the United States Merchant Marine, (New York: Forge, 2004), 106.
24
American Merchant Marine at War, “Merchant Seamen’s War Service Act,” from
http://www.usmm.org/seamanrights.html, accessed May 7, 2017.
23

325

Neither the 78th Congress, which passed the G.I. Bill, nor the 79th Congress, in
power upon the death of F.D.R., nor the thirty-four Congresses that have held power
since have heeded Roosevelt’s mandate to pass legislation that would recognize and
provide just compensation to merchant mariners who sailed during World War II. On
November 11, 1988, after a protracted lobbying effort led by the American Merchant
Marine Veterans Association (AMMV), the Civilian Military Service Review Board,
authorized to determine whether civilian or contractual groups should be considered
“active duty” for the purposes of laws administered by the U.S. Department of Veterans
Affairs (VA), granted veteran status to merchant mariners who sailed in hazardous waters
before August 15, 1945 (V-J Day). This status entitles them to VA hospital services, and
the right to a veteran’s burial. In 1998, the 105th Congress wrote this recognition into
proposed legislation. The description on the Merchant Marine at War website, an
organization that has served as a grassroots research repository for many years, regarding
these benefits makes clear the general dissatisfaction with the provisional nature of these
mariners’ status:
These Bills [introduced by the 105th Congress in 1998] were to give mariners the
right to call themselves ‘Veterans of WWII’ and would allow them to request a $7
flag for their coffin and gravestone marker. In October of 1998, these Bills were
incorporated into HR4110 and the words honorable ‘discharge’ was changed to
‘certificate’ by someone on the House Veterans Affairs Committee headed by
Congressman Bob Stump. As a result mariners would receive the same thing they
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received after WWII—a certificate of honorable service, but apparently not
recognition as veterans.25

A scene from The Sea is My Brother,26 a short-form documentary directed by
Avishai and Shari Mekonen, opens with a close-up on the title of a large bronze plaque:
“UNITED STATES MARITIME SERVICE TRAINING STATION / SHEEPSHEAD
BAY, NEW YORK / WORLD WAR II,” then pans upward revealing three columns of
names, listed alphabetically, perhaps 100 deep in each column. The header at the top of
the plaque reads, “THESE—VOLUNTEERS ALL—ANSWERED THEIR
COUNTRY’S CALL, SIGNED THE ARTICLES, AND SAILED—TO ETERNITY.”
The camera then cuts to Gabriel (Gabe) Frank, 87-years-old, hunched over and
clinging to a walker. He has on his standard wardrobe: a polo shirt with stray collar, thick
tie loose around his neck, and a navy blue blazer that is sagging with the weight of
dozens of pins, mostly flags from all of the country’s he sailed to while he was a
merchant seaman. Dense rings of jangling bracelets cover his wrists. His hat reads
“KOREA VETERAN,” a testament to his career at sea after WWII. He sharply addresses
two passersby, young students at Kingsborough Community College, the City University
of New York outpost that took over the campus on which the Sheepshead Bay Maritime
Service Training Station had operated from 1943 to 1954. “Do you know what that
means?” Gabe asks, gesturing towards the plaque. The students are bewildered. “I was
here in World War II,” he goes on, undeterred. “These guys went on the ships, based--
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trained here. Never came home.” Gabe knows this because he was one of those guys who
trained at Sheepshead Bay during the war. He and his brother Rueben, both orphans
struggling to survive after being passed through a series of foster and group homes on the
Lower East Side of Manhattan, decided to answer the government’s call for young men
to sign on and ship out on the merchant ships that supplied the Allied effort overseas. The
year was 1945. Gabe was seventeen-years-old.
Gabe reads part of the inscription on the plaque to the students (“They sailed on to
eternity!”), then describes his training—“obstacle course, marching, parades…” He
ignores the students’ silence and starts to list the places he’s visited as a seaman: Norway,
India, Africa, Japan, Korea, Philippines, Vietnam… After learning that one of the
students is from Puerto Rico, Gabe smiles and shifts into Spanish, listing Latin American
ports: San Juan, Antigua, Colombia, Panama, Peru, Chile, Ecuador, Venezuela,
Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica, El Salvador… He wishes the students luck (“Buena
suerte!”), and smiles as he waves goodbye. One of the students salutes him.
The scene ends with Gabe alone, the students having gone on their way. He turns
to the director, Avishai behind the camera and gestures again towards the plaque. “You
see, Avish, they don’t know what that means!” “You told them. Now they know,”
Avishai offers. But Gabe is angry now. “These guys, you know where they’re at now?
They’re at the bottom of the ocean! They should tell them that in the classroom! They
were at the bottom of the ocean! They were burned, swallowed oil, the ships exploded!”
The shot cuts away and the scene ends with Gabe, in a hunch over his walker, shuffling
away with his back to the camera.
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Fig. 43: Gabe Frank gestures towards a plaque at Kingsborough Community
College, formerly the Sheepshead Bay Maritime Training Station, honoring WWII
mariners who died at sea during the war. (Image: Avishai Mekonen).
In total 8,300 civilian mariners were killed at sea during World War II, with some
12,000 wounded, 1,100 of whom died from their wounds. 663 were taken prisoner, 66 of
whom died in prison camps. By the end of the war, one in 26 merchant mariners had
died. The merchant marine had a higher casualty rate during the war than any branch of
the armed forces, meaning that you were more likely to die as a merchant mariner than if
you had been drafted into the Army, Navy, or the Marine Corps. And yet, the federal
government excluded merchant mariners from G.I. Bill benefits, granting them nominal
veteran status only in 1988, some 40 years after their service. World War II veteran
merchant mariners continue to exist as marginalized and overlooked participants in what
has become the greatest triumphalist story in the historical narrative of twentieth century
Western democracy: the “Good War,” fought by the “Greatest Generation.”
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Every year since 2008, a bill has been introduced in Congress that would provide
compensatory payments to WWII veteran merchant mariners who were denied even these
provisional benefits between 1945 and 1988. Recent incarnations have included H.R.
563: Honoring Our WWII Merchant Mariners Act of 2015, was introduced by Rep.
Janice Hahn (D-CA) on January 27, 2015. H.R. 563 proposed to establish a Merchant
Mariner Equity Compensation Fund from which the Secretary of Veterans Affairs would
make a single payment of $25,000 to mariners who “served as a crewmember of a vessel
that was operated in U.S. waters by the War Shipping Administration or the Office of
Defense Transportation and under contract to, or the property of, the United States.”
Introduction of the bill in Congress mobilized the AMMV, who sent representatives from
chapters nationwide, aided by canes and walkers, on a “Storm the Hill” campaign to the
halls of Congress for marathon meetings with Representatives in June 2016.27 Despite
these actions, the bill was immediately referred to the Subcommittee on Disability
Assistance and Memorial Affairs where it was eventually scuttled.28
Most recently, HR154: Honoring Our WWII Merchant Marines Act of 2017 was
introduced on January 3, 2017 in the House by co-sponsors Rep. Adam Smith (D-WA) and
Rep. Joe Courtney (D-CT), calling for similar just compensation measures as in Rep.
Hahn’s bill. The bill remains stuck in the House Veterans’ Affairs Subcommittee on
Disability Assistance and Memorial Affairs.29
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Fig. 44: Rep. Janice Hahn (D-CA), alongside a promotional poster featuring Gabe,
addresses Congress from the floor of the House regarding HR563: Honoring Our
WWII Merchant Mariners Act of 2015. (Image: YouTube)

Fewer than 10,000 veteran mariners are alive as of the writing of this disseration,
and that number gets smaller every day. Recently, after attending a fundraiser event on a
pilot boat in New York Harbor, Gabe took ill and required help back to his home on the
Upper West Side of Manhattan. After sending a concerned friend away for the night,
Gabe walked out of his apartment building, hailed a cab, and checked himself into a
hospital. He had suffered a series of strokes, and lost feeling and movement on the right
side of his body. Despite his condition he managed to call me the following day, having
memorized my phone number. After several weeks in the hospital Gabe was transferred
to a rehabilitation center. Shortly thereafter, while on Twitter, I came across a
surreptitious retweet from the AMMV’s account that let me know that Gabe was
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officially on the mend. A Twitter user had apparently been walking in the park across
from the Cathedral when he stumbled upon an impromptu video shoot in progress:

Fig. 45: Twitter timeline referencing user’s encounter with Gabe Frank

It was Gabe, survivor of 16 years as an orphan on the Lower East Side, months at sea
during World War II, a career of hard labor on ships and on land, and a series of strokes
that took away his mobility and slurred his speech. But he was not finished yet. There
was more of his story that he wanted to tell, and there were people who were there to
listen.
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Fig. 46: Gabe Frank grants an interview to an unidentified film crew outside his rehab
facility. (Image: Twitter)
Gabe Frank and the AMMV encapsulate so many historical truths about merchant
seamen that this dissertation has attempted to address. What are they, who sailed in combat
zones and suffered the highest casualty rate of WWII, entitled to as citizens of the U.S.? If
not the benefits of the G.I. Bill, then what? The answer, is nothing. Shoreside people,
communities, and institutions have never known what to do with these salty, cosmopolitan,
transient, and sometimes radical individuals who temporarily invaded their much-coveted
urban shorelines. Merchant seamen have always challenged conceptions of propriety,
economic stability, and by extension, U.S. citizenship itself.
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Gabe Frank is still fighting for recognition and legitimacy. Given the history of
shoreside marginalization that merchant seamen have endured, he and his shipmates will
likely never receive it.
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